The Notion of Analytic Truth. R. M. Martin

1962 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 318-320
Author(s):  
Hilary Putnam
Keyword(s):  
Analytic Truth

Internal Relations and Analyticity: Wittgenstein and Quine

1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 591-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Hymers
Keyword(s):  
Plausible Candidate ◽  
Analytic Truth ◽  
Internal Relations ◽  
The Subject ◽  
In Virtue Of

Since Russell and Moore forsook idealism, it has often been assumed that only analytic truths can express internal relations — relations which, in Russell's words, are ‘grounded in the natures of the related terms.’ An object, a, is internally related to another object, b, if and only if a is related to b in virtue of a's possessing some property, P. So if a has the property of being a branch, then it is internally related to some tree, b, as part to whole. In turn, ‘A branch is a part of some tree’ is (at least a plausible candidate for) an analytic truth. It is true in virtue of the meanings of its terms, or because the concept of the predicate contains the concept of the subject.Quine's critique of analyticity has thus made the pragmatically minded wary of talk of internal relations.

The Truth in Modalism

2019 ◽  
pp. 145-191
Author(s):  
Sanford Shieh
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Interesting Consequence ◽  
Analytic Truth ◽  
History Of

This chapter takes up two further issues about Frege’s attitude towards modality. First, Frege doesn’t simply reject the relativization of truth. He gives amodalist explanations of linguistic phenomena that seem to show that truth is relative to time, and of talk of truth in various circumstances. Second, Frege’s truth-absolutism is not incompatible with two analyses of modality prominent in the history of philosophy: in terms of a priori knowledge and in terms of analytic truth. But Frege construes apriority and analyticity in logical terms. Thus, ultimately, Frege’s view is that if there are any modal distinctions, they amount to nothing more than logical distinctions. An interesting consequence of Frege’s accounts of apriority, analyticity, and modality is that they allow not only for synthetic a priori truths, but also necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori truths.

From Resistance to Analytic Truth

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-83
Author(s):  
Frank Summers
Keyword(s):  
Analytic Truth

Implicit Definition, Analytic Truth, and Apriori Knowledge

Noûs ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 423-440 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Horwich
Keyword(s):  
Implicit Definition ◽  
Analytic Truth

Religion and Ethics—II

1992 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 135-146
Author(s):  
A. Phillips Griffiths
Keyword(s):  
God's Will ◽  
Analytic Truth ◽  
Religion And Ethics

Professor Sutherland has argued that ‘God wills the good’ should be regarded as an analytic truth, with the consequence that any account of what is God's will in which it does not appear to be good is either a mistake about God's will or a mistake about what is good.

Analytic Truth—It’s Worse (or Perhaps Better) than You Thought

1993 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jamie Tappenden ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Analytic Truth ◽  
Better Than

scholarly journals To believe is to believe true

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-136
Author(s):  
Howard Sankey
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Contingent Fact ◽  
Counter Example ◽  
Analytic Truth ◽  
Aim Of Belief

It is argued that to believe is to believe true. That is, when one believes a proposition  one thereby believes the proposition to be true. This is a point about what it is to believe  rather than about the aim of belief or the standard of correctness for belief. The point that  to believe is to believe true appears to be an analytic truth about the concept of belief. It  also appears to be essential to the state of belief that to believe is to believe true. This is  not just a contingent fact about our ordinary psychology, since even a non-ordinary believer  must believe a proposition that they believe to be true. Nor is the idea that one may accept a  theory as empirically adequate rather than as true a counter-example, since such acceptance  combines belief in the truth of the observational claims of a theory with suspension of belief  with respect to the non-observational claims of a theory. Nor is the fact that to believe is to  believe true to be explained in terms of an inference governed by the T-scheme from the belief  that P to the belief that P is true, since there is no inference from the former to the latter. To believe that P just is to believe that P is true.

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