The Language of Modern Physics. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Ernest H. Hutten

1958 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-136
Author(s):  
Virgil Hinshaw,
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Mormann

Abstract The main thesis of this paper is that Pap’s The Functional A Priori in Physical Theory and Cassirer’s Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics may be conceived as two kindred accounts of a late Neo-Kantian philosophy of science. They elucidate and clarify each other mutually by elaborating conceptual possibilities and pointing out affinities of neo-Kantian ideas with other currents of 20th century’s philosophy of science, namely, pragmatism, conventionalism, and logical empiricism. Taking into account these facts, it seems not too far fetched to conjecture that under more favorable circumstances Pap could have served as a mediator between the “analytic” and “continental” tradition thereby overcoming the dogmatic dualism of these two philosophical currents that has characterized philosophy in the second half the 20th century.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Karpenko

The author analyzes a number of key problems of modern physics and cosmology, offers original interpretations and solutions, and also discusses the prospects for the development of science in the context of attempts to create a "theory of everything". The monograph pays special attention to the physical theories of the multiverse, the new principles of scientific knowledge resulting from these theories, and the connection between consciousness and concrete physical reality. It is intended both for those who are just discovering the world of philosophy of science in the most fundamental field — physics, and for specialists who are professionally engaged in the topic and are interested in the most relevant research.


1990 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 135-154
Author(s):  
Michael Redhead

In what sense do the sciences explain? Or do they merely describe what is going on without answering why-questions at all. But cannot description at an appropriate ‘level’ provide all that we can reasonably ask of an explanation? Well, what do we mean by explanation anyway? What, if anything, gets left out when we provide a so-called scientific explanation? Are there limits of explanation in general, and scientific explanation, in particular? What are the criteria for a good explanation? Is it possible to satisfy all the desiderata simultaneously? If not, which should we regard as paramount? What is the connection between explanation and prediction? What exactly is it that statistical explanations explain? These are some of the questions that have generated a very extensive literature in the philosophy of science. In attempting to answer them, definite views will have to be taken on related matters, such as physical laws, causality, reduction, and questions of evidence and confirmation, of theory and observation, realism versus antirealism, and the objectivity and rationality of science. I will state my own views on these matters, in the course of this essay. To argue for everything in detail and to do justice to all the alternative views, would fill a book, perhaps several books. I want to lead up fairly quickly to modern physics, and review the explanatory situation there in rather more detail.


Author(s):  
Paolo Perinotti

While classical physics is consistent with an objectivist point of view, the advent of modern physics undermines its fundamental assumptions. Quantum mechanics, in particular, put a question to the philosophy of science as to whether its intrinsically probabilistic interpretation should be revised in order to save the traditional epistemology, or should be adopted unconditionally, along with its revolutionary consequences. We propose some crucial arguments in favour of the second option. Finally, we discuss how the above choice may suggest a constructivist view about the nature of physical sciences.


Physics Today ◽  
1957 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-40
Author(s):  
Ernest H. Hutten ◽  
Erich M. Harth

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