The Role of Markets in Reducing Expected Utility Violations

Barton L. Lipman of Boston University reviews “Theory of Decision under Uncertainty” by Itzhak Gilboa,. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins “Textbook for a graduate-level class in decision under uncertainty examines the classical axiomatic theories of decision under uncertainty and considers critiques and alternative theories. Discusses motivating examples; free will and determinism; the principle of indifference; relative frequencies; subjective probabilities; a case study; the role of theories; von Neumann-Morgenstern’s theorem; De Finetti’s theorem; Savage’s theorem; the definition of states; a critique of Savage; objectivity and rationality; Anscombe-Aumann’s theory; Choquet expected utility; prospect theory; maxmin expected utility; case-based qualitative beliefs; and frequentism revisited. Gilboa is Professor in the Berglas School of Economics at Tel-Aviv University and Professor in the Department of Economics and Decision Science at HEC Paris. Index.”

Download Full-text

Expected utility violations evolve under status-based selection mechanisms

Journal of Theoretical Biology ◽

10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.06.033 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 254 (3) ◽

pp. 650-654

Author(s):

Eric S. Dickson

Keyword(s):

Expected Utility ◽

Selection Mechanisms ◽

Expected Utility Violations

Download Full-text

To Have One's Cake and Eat It, Too: Sequential Choice and Expected-utility Violations

The Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.2307/2941089 ◽

1995 ◽

Vol 92 (11) ◽

pp. 586-620 ◽

Cited By ~ 33

Author(s):

Wlodek Rabinowicz ◽

Keyword(s):

Expected Utility ◽

Sequential Choice ◽

Expected Utility Violations

Download Full-text

Moving Beyond Deterrence

American Sociological Review ◽

10.1177/0003122412450573 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 77 (4) ◽

pp. 597-624 ◽

Cited By ~ 93

Author(s):

Laura Dugan ◽

Erica Chenoweth

Keyword(s):

Rational Choice ◽

Expected Utility ◽

Full Range ◽

State Actors ◽

Terrorist Violence

Rational choice approaches to reducing terrorist violence would suggest raising the costs of terrorism through punishment, thereby reducing the overall expected utility of terrorism. In this article, we argue that states should also consider raising the expected utility of abstaining from terrorism through rewards. We test effects of repressive (or punishing) and conciliatory (or rewarding) actions on terrorist behavior using the newly developed GATE-Israel dataset, which identifies events by Israeli state actors toward Palestinian targets on a full range of counterterrorism tactics and policies from 1987 to 2004. Results show that repressive actions are either unrelated to terror or related to subsequent increases in terror, and conciliatory actions are generally related to decreases in terror, depending on the tactical period. Findings also reveal the importance of understanding the role of terrorists’ constituencies for reducing violence.

Download Full-text