scholarly journals Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity

1983 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas W. Diamond ◽  
Philip H. Dybvig
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Bank Runs

scholarly journals Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity

2000 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas W. Diamond ◽  
Philip H. Dybvig
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Bank Runs

scholarly journals On the Effects of Deposit Insurance and Observability on Bank Runs: An Experimental Study

2012 ◽  
Vol 44 (8) ◽  
pp. 1651-1665 ◽  
Author(s):  
HUBERT JANOS KISS ◽  
ISMAEL RODRIGUEZ-LARA ◽  
ALFONSO ROSA-GARCÍA
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Bank Runs

Redenomination Risk and Bank Runs in a Monetary Union with and Without Deposit Insurance Schemes

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-256
Author(s):  
Paolo Canofari ◽  
Alessandra Marcelletti ◽  
Marcello Messori
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Union ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Bank Runs

BANK RUNS: DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS*

2002 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
RUSSELL COOPER ◽  
THOMAS W. ROSS
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Bank Runs

Bank Runs and Moral Hazard

2019 ◽  
pp. 684-706
Author(s):  
Deniz Anginer ◽  
Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
Keyword(s):  
Financial Stability ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Bank Runs ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Economic Costs ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Excessive Risk

Deposit insurance is a widely adopted policy to promote financial stability in the banking sector. Deposit insurance helps ensure depositor confidence in the financial system and prevents contagious bank runs, but it also comes with an unintended consequence of encouraging banks to take on excessive risk. In this chapter, we begin with a review of the economic costs and benefits associated with deposit insurance. Drawing on the recent literature, we then review and discuss optimal deposit insurance design and risk-based pricing of insurance premiums. Finally, we discuss the impact of the larger institutional environment on how well deposit insurance schemes work in practice.

Symposium on Federal Deposit Insurance for S&L Institutions

1989 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 3-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dwight M Jaffee
Keyword(s):  
Great Depression ◽  
Commercial Bank ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Bush Administration ◽  
Bank Runs ◽  
Future Prospects ◽  
The Great Depression ◽  
Bank Deposits ◽  
Savings And Loan ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance

Federal deposit insurance was introduced to eliminate the bank runs of the Great Depression: the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) was created in 1933 to insure commercial bank deposits, and the FSLIC (Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation) was created in 1934 to insure savings and loan association (S&L) deposits. Following a decade of neglect, the Bush administration and Congress moved early in 1989 to resolve the most serious problems yet to confront federal insurance of U.S. bank deposits. How did S&L losses expand so rapidly and unexpectedly? How should FSLIC be redesigned to avoid a reoccurance? Who is going to pay for the existing FSLIC losses? What are the future prospects for the S&L industry?

LIQUIDITY REGULATION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 1240-1263
Author(s):  
Yang Li
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Bank Runs ◽  
Limited Commitment ◽  
Financial Intermediaries ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Multiple Dimensions ◽  
Liquidity Regulation

Anticipating a bailout in the event of a crisis distorts financial intermediaries’ incentives in multiple dimensions. Bailout payments can, for example, lead intermediaries to issue too much short-term debt while simultaneously underinvesting in liquid assets. To correct these distortions, policymakers may choose to regulate the composition of both the assets and liabilities of intermediaries. I examine these regulations in a version of the Diamond and Dybvig [(1983). Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), 401–419] model with limited commitment. I demonstrate that, contrary to common wisdom, introducing a minimum liquidity requirement can increase intermediaries’ susceptibility to a run by their investors.

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