An Empirical Job-Search Model, with a Test of the Constant Reservation-Wage Hypothesis

1979 ◽  
Vol 87 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas M. Kiefer ◽  
George R. Neumann
2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan B. Krueger ◽  
Andreas I. Mueller

This paper provides evidence on the behavior of reservation wages over the spell of unemployment, using high-frequency longitudinal data on unemployed workers in New Jersey. In comparison to a calibrated job search model, the reservation wage starts out too high and declines too slowly, on average, suggesting that many workers persistently misjudge their prospects or anchor their reservation wage on their previous wage. The longitudinal nature of the data also allows for testing the relationship between job acceptance and the reservation wage, where the reservation wage is measured from a previous interview to avoid bias due to cognitive dissonance. (JEL J22, J31, J64)


1999 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 1039-1074 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Bontemps ◽  
Jean-Marc Robin ◽  
Gerard J. Van den Berg
Keyword(s):  

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Leora Friedberg ◽  
Michael T Owyang ◽  
Tara M Sinclair

Abstract Recent declines in job tenure have coincided with a shift away from traditional defined benefit (DB) pensions, which reward long tenure. New evidence also points to an increase in job-to-job movements by workers, and we document gains in relative wages of job-to-job movers over a similar period. We develop a search model in which firms may offer tenure-based contracts like DB pensions to reduce the incidence of costly on-the-job search by workers. Either reduced search costs or an increase in the probability of job matches can, under fairly general conditions, lower the value of deterring search and the use of DB pensions.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document