The Economic Theory of Regulation and Public Financing of Presidential Elections

1978 ◽  
Vol 86 (2, Part 1) ◽  
pp. 245-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Burton A. Abrams ◽  
Russell F. Settle
Public Choice ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 79 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 247-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Teske ◽  
Samuel Best ◽  
Michael Mintrom

1999 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-136
Author(s):  
Daniel Sutter

Abstract This article considers the regulation of externalities within the interest group model of politics. A group concerned about correcting an externality generates zero marginal support at the efficient level of regulation. Politicians respond to interests directly affected by policy and thus inefficiently correct externalities.


2002 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian E. Zelizer

“It is a cesspool, it is a source of infection for the body politic,” Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) warned his fellow senators in 1973 about the private financing of elections. “[I]f it doesn't stop, there are going to be good men in this hall right here today who are going down the drain, not that you are guilty, not that you have done anything wrong, but that the public is disenchanted with all of us, and they are going to want somebody new and say I want a fresh one here.” From 1971 through President Nixon's resignation in 1974, Congress enacted the boldest campaign finance reforms in American history, including strong disclosure laws, public financing for presidential elections, contribution and spending limits, and an independent enforcement commission. Despite these reforms, after only a decade under the new laws, citizens still felt that campaign finance was corrupt.


1989 ◽  
Vol 1989 ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Peltzman ◽  
Michael E. Levine ◽  
Roger G. Noll

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