Durkheim's Philosophy of Science and the Sociology of Knowledge: Creating an Intellectual Niche.Warren Schmaus

The nature of the debates surrounding international relations (IR) as a social science have pointed to issues of ontology, epistemology, methodology, philosophy of science, history, and sociology of knowledge, yet they are all crucial in understanding the character of international relations. Such an idea was brought about by Stanley Hoffman’s 1977 article, “An American Social Science: International Relations.” For Hoffmann, IR developed the way it did out of a set of distinctive intellectual predispositions, political circumstances, and institutional opportunities. His insights, however controversial, thus reveal fundamental questions about the work of IR scholars. The key issues here are the definition of IR as a discipline, the definition of IR as a science, and the definition of IR as an American social science in particular. The large variety of inquiries explored in IR, the “kind” of social science IR scholars are engaged in, as well as how “progress” is assessed, all reveal some important nuances in international relations as a discipline. Moreover, the debates surrounding the scientific legitimacy of IR scholarship reveal how IR gained legitimacy as a discipline. The historical development of IR could in fact be described as a series of debates, known among those in the field as the “great debates,” which eventually became the coherent whole understood to be the field of international relations.

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IR As a Social Science/IR As an American Social Science

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies ◽

10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.76 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Anne-Marie D'Aoust

Keyword(s):

Social Science ◽

International Relations ◽

Philosophy Of Science ◽

Historical Development ◽

Sociology Of Knowledge ◽

Science History ◽

American Social Science ◽

Scientific Legitimacy ◽

Key Issues ◽

Definition Of

The nature of the debates surrounding international relations (IR) as a social science have pointed to issues of ontology, epistemology, methodology, philosophy of science, history, and sociology of knowledge, yet they are all crucial in understanding the character of international relations. Such an idea was brought about by Stanley Hoffman’s 1977 article, “An American Social Science: International Relations.” For Hoffmann, IR developed the way it did out of a set of distinctive intellectual predispositions, political circumstances, and institutional opportunities. His insights, however controversial, thus reveal fundamental questions about the work of IR scholars. The key issues here are the definition of IR as a discipline, the definition of IR as a science, and the definition of IR as an American social science in particular. The large variety of inquiries explored in IR, the “kind” of social science IR scholars are engaged in, as well as how “progress” is assessed, all reveal some important nuances in international relations as a discipline. Moreover, the debates surrounding the scientific legitimacy of IR scholarship reveal how IR gained legitimacy as a discipline. The historical development of IR could in fact be described as a series of debates, known among those in the field as the “great debates,” which eventually became the coherent whole understood to be the field of international relations.

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Keynes, Kuhn and the sociology of knowledge: a comment on Pernecky and Wojick

Cambridge Journal of Economics ◽

10.1093/cje/beaa016 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 44 (6) ◽

pp. 1415-1424 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Rod Thomas

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Science ◽

Sociology Of Knowledge ◽

Critical Philosophy ◽

Critical Rationalism ◽

Knowledge Function ◽

Philosophy Of Knowledge

Abstract Mark Pernecky and Paul Wojick use T.S. Kuhn’s philosophy of science to diagnose The problematic nature and consequences of the effort to force Keynes into the conceptual cul-de-sac of Walrasian economics. But their diagnosis is itself problematical in nature and consequence. It assumes the virtues of a pre-Kuhnian philosophy of knowledge that the Kuhnian meta-framework overtly discards. One way to eliminate the inconsistency is to recognise that Kuhn’s philosophy of science and sociology of knowledge function to immunise theories from criticism. Anyone who wishes to embrace a sociologically more critical philosophy ought to consider instead the philosophical attitude of critical rationalism.

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THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS MOVEMENTS

Sociologia & Antropologia ◽

10.1590/2238-38752019v10110 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 10 (1) ◽

pp. 267-287

Author(s):

Renan Springer de Freitas

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Science ◽

Intellectual History ◽

History Of Science ◽

Sociology Of Knowledge ◽

Academic Discipline ◽

Production Of Knowledge ◽

History Of ◽

Conditions Of Possibility ◽

Conceptual Problems

Abstract The sociology of knowledge that became established as an academic discipline ‘lives’ alongside another that never did so, but nevertheless manifests itself within other disciplines, including the philosophy of science, the history of science, and intellectual history. I discuss the ways in which each of them has evolved. I argue that while the former works by reflecting on the conditions of possibility of the production of knowledge about knowledge itself, the nature of the knowledge produced under these conditions, the metatheoretical ‘dilemmas’ that supposedly plague the production of this knowledge, the means by which these dilemmas can be ‘overcome,’ the conceptual problems supposedly involved in the production of this knowledge, and the ways through which these conceptual problems can be solved, the latter works by offering solutions to specific empirical problems.

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