Why are you telling me that? A conceptual model of the social function of autobiographical memory

Memory ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole Alea ◽  
Susan Bluck
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Sutton ◽  
Jason Render

The story of who we are is central to our sense of authenticity and this story is constructed from our autobiographical memories. Yet we know surprisingly little about the functions that autobiographical memories of being authentic serve. This study provides a preliminary examination of the self, social and directive functions used in autobiographical memories of being authentic and inauthentic. Participants recalled times they felt they had been authentic or inauthentic at work. Analyses revealed that the self and directive functions were significantly more prevalent than the social function. In addition, authentic memories were most strongly associated with the self function while inauthentic memories were more likely to be used for the directive function. This may indicate that recall of an authentic experience serves to support one’s current self-identity, while recall of an inauthentic experience provides an opportunity to direct future behaviour towards a more authentic response. This study provides some of the first evidence for how autobiographical memories of being authentic or inauthentic may function in developing a coherent story of self that is needed for a sense of authenticity.


Author(s):  
Alistair M. C. Isaac ◽  
Will Bridewell

It is easy to see that social robots will need the ability to detect and evaluate deceptive speech; otherwise they will be vulnerable to manipulation by malevolent humans. More surprisingly, we argue that effective social robots must also be able to produce deceptive speech. Many forms of technically deceptive speech perform a positive pro-social function, and the social integration of artificial agents will be possible only if they participate in this market of constructive deceit. We demonstrate that a crucial condition for detecting and producing deceptive speech is possession of a theory of mind. Furthermore, strategic reasoning about deception requires identifying a type of goal distinguished by its priority over the norms of conversation, which we call an ulterior motive. We argue that this goal is the appropriate target for ethical evaluation, not the veridicality of speech per se. Consequently, deception-capable robots are compatible with the most prominent programs to ensure that robots behave ethically.


1941 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Park
Keyword(s):  

2006 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arlene J. Astell ◽  
Maggie P. Ellis

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