Termination of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Syria: Positions, Decisions and Constraints at Israel's Ministerial Level

2001 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 182-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Tzabag
Keyword(s):  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Yom Kippur

Sadat and the Yom Kippur War, October 1973

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Grunwald ◽  
Mark Perrin
Keyword(s):  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Yom Kippur

For heaven’s sake: Squadron 201 and the Yom Kippur War

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 192-193
Author(s):  
David Rodman
Keyword(s):  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Yom Kippur

Moscow and the Yom Kippur War: A Reappraisal

1986 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Efraim Karsh
Keyword(s):  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Yom Kippur

Israeli culture on the road to the Yom Kippur War

2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 696-698
Author(s):  
David Rodman
Keyword(s):  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
The Road ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
On The Road

The Effect of the Yom Kippur War on Anxiety Level in Israeli Children

1976 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberta M. Milgram ◽  
Norman A. Milgram
Keyword(s):  
Anxiety Level ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Yom Kippur

The Yom Kippur War, Dr. Kissinger, and the Smoking Gun

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 357-373
Author(s):  
Rami Rom ◽  
Amir Gilat ◽  
Rose Mary Sheldon
Keyword(s):  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Yom Kippur

Yom Kippur War

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dina Rezk
Keyword(s):  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
Military Capability ◽  
Arab Culture ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Intelligence Failure ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Radical Revision ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Military Victory

The Yom Kippur War was a critical game changer in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the politics of the Middle East. Henry Kissinger famously explained the ‘intelligence failure’ of Yom Kippur thus: ‘Our definition of rationality did not take seriously the notion of starting an unwinnable war to restore self-respect.’ The most recently released material suggests that Kissinger’s explanation requires some revising. This chapter demonstrates that British and American analysts understood perfectly well Sadat’s intentions, specifically his desire for a limited military victory to gain ‘face’ at home and leverage abroad. Instead analytical weakness lay in assessments of Egypt’s military capability where there was a unanimous consensus of Egypt’s impotency. Ideas about Arab ‘culture’ seem to have played a key role in this underestimation: the notion of a fatalistic Islam for example, prevailed in numerous analyses. In a radical revision of the conventional wisdom about the strengths and weaknesses of Western intelligence agencies, the Yom Kippur war provides a revealing case study whereby the West excelled in understanding the ‘mystery’ or intentions leading to war, but simply did not believe that Egypt possessed the capability to act effectively, and so perilously dismissed the prospect of an Egyptian attack.

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