Veritistic value

2000 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 259-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick F. Schmitt
Keyword(s):  
Veritistic Value

In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism

2012 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
Keyword(s):  
Veritistic Value

Are Epistemic Norms Fundamentally Social Norms?

Episteme ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Henderson
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Common Good ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Epistemic Practice ◽  
Veritistic Value

AbstractPeople develop and deploy epistemic norms – normative sensibilities in light of which they regulate both their individual and community epistemic practice. There is a similarity to folk's epistemic normative sensibilities – and it is by virtue of this that folk commonly can rely on each other, and even work jointly to produce systems of true beliefs – a kind of epistemic common good. Agents not only regulate their belief forming practices in light of these sensitivities, but they make clear to others that they approve or disapprove of practices as these accord with their sensibilities – they thus regulate the belief forming practices of others in an interdependent pursuit of a good – something on the order of a community stock of true beliefs. Such general observations suggest ways in which common epistemic norms function as social norms, as these are characterized by Cristina Bicchieri's (2006) discussion of various kinds of norms. I draw on this framework – together with an important elaboration in Bicchieri (2017) – as it affords an analysis of the various related ways in which normative sensibilities function in communities of interdependent agents. The framework allows one to probe how these normative sensibilities function in the various associated choice situations. I argue that epistemic norms are fundamentally social norms, and, at the same time, they also are widely shared sensibilities about state-of-the-art ways of pursuing projects of individual veritistic value. The two foundations suggest the analogy of an arch.

scholarly journals A diachronic perspective on peer disagreement in veritistic social epistemology

Synthese ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 197 (10) ◽  
pp. 4475-4493
Author(s):  
Erik J. Olsson
Keyword(s):  
Computer Simulation ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Main Issue ◽  
Simulation Framework ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Simulation Techniques ◽  
Meta Level ◽  
Veritistic Value ◽  
Bayesian Simulation ◽  
Over Time

Abstract The main issue in the epistemology of peer disagreement is whether known disagreement among those who are in symmetrical epistemic positions undermines the rationality of their maintaining their respective views. Douven and Kelp have argued convincingly that this problem is best understood as being about how to respond to peer disagreement repeatedly over time, and that this diachronic issue can be best approached through computer simulation. However, Douven and Kelp’s favored simulation framework cannot naturally handle Christensen’s famous Mental Math example. As a remedy, I introduce an alternative (Bayesian) simulation framework, Laputa, inspired by Alvin Goldman’s seminal work on veritistic social epistemology. I show that Christensen’s conciliatory response, reasonably reconstructed and supplemented, gives rise to an increase in epistemic (veritistic) value only if the peers continue to recheck their mental math; else the peers might as well be steadfast. On a meta-level, the study illustrates the power of Goldman’s approach when combined with simulation techniques for handling the computational issues involved.

scholarly journals A Simulation Approach to Veritistic Social Epistemology

Episteme ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik J. Olsson
Keyword(s):  
Computer Simulation ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
Simulation Approach ◽  
Simulation Environment ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Concrete Case ◽  
Large Classes ◽  
Computational Problem ◽  
Veritistic Value

In a seminal book, Alvin I. Goldman outlines a theory for how to evaluate social practices with respect to their “veritistic value”, i.e., their tendency to promote the acquisition of true beliefs (and impede the acquisition of false beliefs) in society. In the same work, Goldman raises a number of serious worries for his account. Two of them concern the possibility of determining the veritistic value of a practice in a concrete case because (1) we often don't know what beliefs are actually true, and (2) even if we did, the task of determining the veritistic value would be computationally extremely difficult. Neither problem is specific to Goldman's theory and both can be expected to arise for just about any account of veritistic value. It is argued here that the first problem does not pose a serious threat to large classes of interesting practices. The bulk of the paper is devoted to the computational problem, which, it is submitted, can be addressed in promising terms by means of computer simulation. In an attempt to add vividness to this proposal, an up-and-running simulation environment (Laputa) is presented and put to some preliminary tests.

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