Review of Jaszczolt (1999): Discourse, Beliefs and Intentions: Semantic Defaults and Propositional Attitude Ascription

Propositional attitudes, like believing and asserting, are relations between agents and propositions. Agents are individuals who do the believing and asserting; propositions are things that are believed and asserted. Propositional attitude ascriptions are sentences that ascribe propositional attitudes to agents. For example, a propositional attitude ascription α believes, or asserts, that S is true iff the referent of a bears the relation of believing, or asserting, to the proposition expressed by s. The questions I will address have to do with the precise nature of propositions, and the attitudes, like belief, that we bear to them.I will assume both that propositions are the semantic contents of sentences, and that the proposition expressed by a sentence is a structured complex made up of the semantic contents of the parts of the sentences that express it.

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Mentale Simulation und radikale Interpretation

Grazer Philosophische Studien ◽

10.1163/18756735-070001002 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 70 (1) ◽

pp. 25-45 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Christian Beyer

Keyword(s):

Propositional Attitude ◽

Simulation Theory ◽

Theory Theory ◽

Theoretical Discussion ◽

Radical Interpretation ◽

Attitude Ascription

The notion of empathy has more recently seen a considerable revival—notably (first) in connection with Quine's empathy model of radical interpretation, in contrast to which Davidson has developed his triangulation model, and (secondly) in the context of the debate between simulation theory vs. theory theory about propositional attitude ascription. So far, these debates have been carried on fairly independently of each other. This paper is an attempt to utilize the interpretation-theoretical discussion in order to argue for a moderate version of simulation theory. To this end, Davidson's explanation of the radical interpretation scenario in terms of triangulation is reconstructed by comparison to some relevant ideas of Husserl's.

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The property theory and de se attitudes

10.1093/oso/9780198714217.003.0012 ◽

2017 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Wayne A. Davis

Keyword(s):

Propositional Attitude ◽

Property Theory ◽

De Se ◽

Propositional Theory ◽

Independent Property

The property theory of de se belief denies that believing is a propositional attitude, maintaining instead that for Lingens to believe that he himself is lost is for him to self-attribute the property of being lost. For Lingens to believe that Lingens is lost is for him to self-attribute the independent property of being such that Lingens is lost. The chapter argues that this theory postulates differences where we expect uniformity, introduces unnecessary theoretical complexity, is false to a variety of linguistic and phenomenological facts, and fails to explain many psychological and linguistic facts. If “self-attribute a property” means “believing oneself to have the property,” then the theory provides no explanation of de se belief. The author sketches a propositional theory on which the objects of the attitudes are complexes of concepts (thoughts), de se attitudes involving one type of indexical concept.

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De se marking, logophoricity, and ziji

10.1093/oso/9780198786658.003.0006 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Hsiang-Yun Chen

Keyword(s):

Blocking Effect ◽

The Self ◽

Critical Examination ◽

Long Distance ◽

Attitude Ascription ◽

New Approach ◽

De Se

This chapter addresses the assumed connection between de se attitude ascription and logophoricity in the case of Chinese ziji. It is widely believed that logophors are among the paradigm cases of de se marking, and that long-distance ziji is logophoric. Drawing on a critical examination of a variety of analyses, this chapter argues that long-distance anaphora, de se interpretation, and logophoric marking are overlapping but distinct phenomena. Even if ziji is logophoric, it does not automatically trigger de se requirement. A de se-neutral analysis of ziji is consistent with pragmatic derivations of interpretations that emphasize the self. The findings point to a new approach to long-distance binding, and identify the blocking effect as the key issue for further research.

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Judgment

10.1093/oso/9780198791485.003.0005 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Uriah Kriegel

Keyword(s):

Propositional Attitude ◽

Objectual Attitude

One aspect of Brentano’s theory of judgment that is crucial for his ontology and metaontology is Brentano’s astonishing claim that judgment is not a propositional attitude, but an objectual attitude. In this chapter, I offer an exposition of this highly heterodox theory, discuss the case for it, and consider some objections. In the following two chapters, the theory’s implications for metaontology and ultimately ontology will be developed.

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Against Intellectualism

10.1093/oso/9780198809517.003.0003 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Aaron Z. Zimmerman

Keyword(s):

Teaching And Learning ◽

Propositional Attitude ◽

The Other

The other animals fail to construct sentences, and Descartes inferred from this that they entirely lack beliefs. Contemporary intellectualists—e.g. B. Williams (1973) and D. Velleman (2000)—allow non-human animals beliefs in an “impoverished” sense of the term, while emphasizing the importance of an animal’s “aiming at the truth” when constructing representations of her environment. The pragmatists reject these forms of intellectualism. Humans use sentences to attribute beliefs to themselves and other animals; but there is no further sense in which belief is an essentially “propositional attitude.” Field ethologists report wolves, dolphins, chimpanzees, and scrub jays reflecting and planning, teaching and learning, loving and forgiving. It is a mark in favor of pragmatism that it allows us to understand these behaviors as manifestations of complex bodies of animal belief.

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