What is Montague semantics?

2000 ◽  
pp. 39-49
Author(s):  
Diego Marconi
Keyword(s):  
Montague Semantics

Comments on Friederike Moltmann’s “Variable Objects and Truth-Making”

2020 ◽  
pp. 496-502
Author(s):  
Kit Fine
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Broad Agreement ◽  
Montague Semantics ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Way

I have long admired Friederike Moltmann’s work at the intersection of linguistics and philosophy; and I have always been especially impressed by the way in which she has attempted to break free of the stranglehold of the possible worlds approach by showing how the diversified ontology of objects commonly associated with traditional metaphysics provides a much better tool for the investigation of natural language than the simple and stylized ontology of Montague semantics. The present paper is a characteristically rich, original and thought-provoking contribution to the subject; and I am afraid that I can do no more than pick my way through one or two of the many interesting issues that she raises. However, any criticisms I make on this score should not be seen to detract from my broad agreement with much of what she says....

Introduction to Montague Semantics

1980 ◽  
Author(s):  
David R. Dowty ◽  
Robert E. Wall ◽  
Stanley Peters
Keyword(s):  
Montague Semantics

Game-theoretical semantics, montague semantics, and questions

Synthese ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Hand
Keyword(s):  
Montague Semantics

The inadequacy of the neighbourhood semantics for modal logic

1975 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Gerson
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Modus Ponens ◽  
The Other ◽  
Montague Semantics ◽  
Propositional Constants

We present two finitely axiomatized modal propositional logics, one between T and S4 and the other an extension of S4, which are incomplete with respect to the neighbourhood or Scott-Montague semantics.Throughout this paper we are referring to logics which contain all the classical connectives and only one modal connective □ (unary), no propositional constants, all classical tautologies, and which are closed under the rules of modus ponens (MP), substitution, and the rule RE (from A ↔ B infer αA ↔ □B). Such logics are called classical by Segerberg [6]. Classical logics which contain the formula □p ∧ □q → □(p ∧ q) (denoted by K) and its “converse,” □{p ∧ q)→ □p ∧ □q (denoted by R) are called regular; regular logics which are closed under the rule of necessitation, RN (from A infer □A), are called normal. The logics that we are particularly concerned with are all normal, although some of our results will be true for all regular or all classical logics. It is well known that K and R and closure under RN imply closure under RE and also that normal logics are also those logics closed under RN and containing □{p → q) → {□p → □q).

Montague semantics, nominalization and Scott's domains

1983 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond Turner
Keyword(s):  
Montague Semantics
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