Chapter 17. Top down influence on executive control in bilinguals

Author(s):  
Ramesh Kumar Mishra ◽  
Niharika Singh
Keyword(s):  
2002 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 260-260
Author(s):  
Jeremy R. Gray ◽  
Todd S. Braver

The primrose path and prisoner's dilemma paradigms may require cognitive (executive) control: The active maintenance of context representations in lateral prefrontal cortex to provide top-down support for specific behaviors in the face of short delays or stronger response tendencies. This perspective suggests further tests of whether altruism is a type of self-control, including brain imaging, induced affect, and dual-task studies.


Author(s):  
Earl K. Miller ◽  
Timothy J. Buschman

The prefrontal cortex is a source of internal control of attention as it captures three important components of an executive controller. First, it provides top-down selection of neural representations through descending projections, This top-down input may act by increasing the synchrony of local neural populations, enhancing their connectivity, and boosting the transmission of information. Second, intelligent top-down control of behaviour requires integrating diverse information. Neural representations in prefrontal cortex capture this breadth of information: representing anything from the specific contents of working memory to abstract categories and rules. Third, through reciprocal connections with the basal ganglia, prefrontal cortex neurons are ideally situated to learn the ‘rules’ of behaviour that allow us to know what to attend to in a given situation. These connections may support an iterative, bootstrapping, process that allows for increasingly complex rules to be learned. The prefrontal cortex acts as a generalized executive controller, acting through mechanisms such as attention, to guide thoughts and behaviour.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex J. Cope ◽  
Eleni Vasilaki ◽  
Dorian Minors ◽  
Chelsea Sabo ◽  
James A.R. Marshall ◽  
...  

AbstractThe capacity to learn abstract concepts such as ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ is considered a higher-order cognitive function, typically thought to be dependent on top-down neocortical processing. It is therefore surprising that honey bees apparantly have this capacity. Here we report a model of the structures of the honey bee brain that can learn same-ness and difference, as well as a range of complex and simple associative learning tasks. Our model is constrained by the known connections and properties of the mushroom body, including the protocerebral tract, and provides a good fit to the learning rates and performances of real bees in all tasks, including learning sameness and difference. The model proposes a novel mechanism for learning the abstract concepts of ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ that is compatible with the insect brain, and is not dependent on top-down or executive control processing.


Author(s):  
Daniel Gopher ◽  
Yaakov Greenshpan ◽  
Lilach Armony

Top down processes guided by attention and intention, have been recognized to be important determinants, and necessary complements in the formulation and guidance of skilled performance. The present paper summarizes the results of four experiments conducted to investigate the control operations and the cost involved in switching attention between task dimensions and attention strategies. Subjects were asked to switch between judging the value of digits, or the number of digit elements, in rows of digits presented on the screen. Alternatively they performed the task, switching between speed or accuracy emphasis. The experimental results provide strong evidence for the work of executive processes which operate as attention strategies and policy regulators. They are executed top down, in the service of intentions and basic attention policies, but depend on the existence of task representations, including the “so called” automatic performance units. Executive processes are shown to have sizable operation costs, over and beyond those imposed by the direct processing and response demands of the performed tasks. These costs are reduced with specific training focusing on the improvement of control functions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 81 (10) ◽  
pp. S43
Author(s):  
Alik Widge ◽  
Samuel Zorowitz ◽  
Matthew Boggess ◽  
Earl Miller ◽  
Thilo Deckersbach ◽  
...  

2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (9) ◽  
pp. 1908-1918 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu-Chin Chiu ◽  
Adam R. Aron ◽  
Frederick Verbruggen

Behavioral studies show that subjects respond more slowly to stimuli to which they previously stopped. This response slowing could be explained by “automatic inhibition” (i.e., the reinstantiation of motor suppression when a stimulus retrieves a stop association). Here we tested this using TMS. In Experiment 1, participants were trained to go or no-go to stimuli. Then, in a test phase, we compared the corticospinal excitability for go stimuli that were previously associated with stopping (no-go_then_go) with go stimuli that were previously associated with going (go_then_go). Corticospinal excitability was reduced for no-go_then_go compared with go_then_go stimuli at a mere 100 msec poststimulus. Although these results fit with automatic inhibition, there was, surprisingly, no suppression for no-go_then_no-go stimuli, although this should occur. We speculated that automatic inhibition lies within a continuum between effortful top–down response inhibition and no inhibition at all. When the need for executive control and active response suppression disappears, so does the manifestation of automatic inhibition. Therefore, it should emerge during go/no-go learning and disappear as performance asymptotes. Consistent with this idea, in Experiment 2, we demonstrated reduced corticospinal excitability for no-go versus go trials most prominently in the midphase of training but it wears off as performance asymptotes. We thus provide neurophysiological evidence for an inhibition mechanism that is automatically reinstantiated when a stimulus retrieves a learned stopping episode, but only in an executive context in which active suppression is required. This demonstrates that automatic and top–down inhibition jointly contribute to goal-directed behavior.


1999 ◽  
Vol 7 (6) ◽  
pp. E14
Author(s):  
William T. Couldwell

Knowledge or experience is voluntarily recalled from memory by reactivation of the neural representations in the cerebral association cortex. In inferior temporal cortex, which serves as the storehouse of visual long-term memory, activation of mnemonic engrams through electric stimulation results in imagery recall in humans, and neurons can be dynamically activated by the necessity for memory recall in monkeys. Neuropsychological studies and previous split-brain experiments predicted that prefrontal cortex exerts executive control upon inferior temporal cortex in memory retrieval; however, no neuronal correlate of this process has ever been detected. Here we show evidence of the top-down signal from prefrontal cortex. In the absence of bottom-up visual inputs, single inferior temporal neurons were activated by the top-down signal, which conveyed information on semantic categorization imposed by visual stimulus-stimulus association. Behavioural performance was severely impaired with loss of the top-down signal. Control experiments confirmed that the signal was transmitted not through a subcortical but through a fronto-temporal cortical pathway. Thus, feedback projections from prefrontal cortex to the posterior association cortex appear to serve the executive control of voluntary recall.


2014 ◽  
Vol 269 ◽  
pp. 147-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandre Heeren ◽  
Pierre Maurage ◽  
Hélène Perrot ◽  
Anne De Volder ◽  
Laurent Renier ◽  
...  

Nature ◽  
10.1038/44372 ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 401 (6754) ◽  
pp. 699-703 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyoe Tomita ◽  
Machiko Ohbayashi ◽  
Kiyoshi Nakahara ◽  
Isao Hasegawa ◽  
Yasushi Miyashita

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