De-confounding the neural constitution of phenomenal consciousness from attention, report and memory

2015 ◽  
pp. 81-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeroen J.A. van Boxtel ◽  
Naotsugu Tsuchiya
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness

Phenomenal Experience

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Levine
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Phenomenal Experience ◽  
Making Sense

This paper presents a sketch of a theory of phenomenal consciousness, one that builds on the notion of a “way of appearing,” and draws out various consequences and problems for the view. I unabashedly endorse a version of the Cartesian Theater, while assessing the prospects for making such a view work. As I treat phenomenal consciousness as a relation between a subject and what it is she is conscious of, I face a difficulty in making sense of hallucination, since the object of awareness is missing. I distinguish my position from direct realists who endorse disjunctivism, and end on a somewhat speculative note.

Perceptual awareness or phenomenal consciousness?A dilemma

2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher F. Masciari ◽  
Peter Carruthers
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Perceptual Awareness

scholarly journals Can Autonomous Agents Without Phenomenal Consciousness Be Morally Responsible?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
László Bernáth
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Autonomous Agents ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Ethical Considerations ◽  
Popular View

AbstractIt is an increasingly popular view among philosophers that moral responsibility can, in principle, be attributed to unconscious autonomous agents. This trend is already remarkable in itself, but it is even more interesting that most proponents of this view provide more or less the same argument to support their position. I argue that as it stands, the Extension Argument, as I call it, is not sufficient to establish the thesis that unconscious autonomous agents can be morally responsible. I attempt to show that the Extension Argument should overcome especially strong ethical considerations; moreover, its epistemological grounds are not too solid, partly because the justifications of its premises are in conflict.

scholarly journals Extending the extended consciousness debate: perception, imagination, and the common kind assumption

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Deery
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Mental Event ◽  
The World ◽  
Predictive Approach ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Brain

AbstractFor some, the states and processes involved in the realisation of phenomenal consciousness are not confined to within the organismic boundaries of the experiencing subject. Instead, the sub-personal basis of perceptual experience can, and does, extend beyond the brain and body to implicate environmental elements through one’s interaction with the world. These claims are met by proponents of predictive processing, who propose that perception and imagination should be understood as a product of the same internal mechanisms. On this view, as visually imagining is not considered to be world-involving, it is assumed that world-involvement must not be essential for perception, and thus internalism about the sub-personal basis is true. However, the argument for internalism from the unity of perception and imagination relies for its strength on a questionable conception of the relationship between the two experiential states. I argue that proponents of the predictive approach are guilty of harbouring an implicit commitment to the common kind assumption which does not follow trivially from their framework. That is, the assumption that perception and imagination are of the same fundamental kind of mental event. I will argue that there are plausible alternative ways of conceiving of this relationship without drawing internalist metaphysical conclusions from their psychological theory. Thus, the internalist owes the debate clarification of this relationship and further argumentation to secure their position.

More empirical cases to break the accord of phenomenal and access-consciousness

1995 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Talis Bachmann
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness

AbstractAdditional experiments show that P-consciousness and A consciousness can be empirically dissociated for the theoretically so phisticated observer. Phenomenal consciousness can have several degrees that are indirectly measurable.

Psychology supports independence of phenomenal consciousness

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 500-501 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tyler Burge
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Psychological Evidence

AbstractInference-to-best-explanation from psychological evidence supports the view that phenomenal consciousness in perceptual exposures occurs before limited aspects of that consciousness are retained in working memory. Independently of specific neurological theory, psychological considerations indicate that machinery producing phenomenal consciousness is independent of machinery producing working memory, hence independent of access to higher cognitive capacities.

scholarly journals The Efference Copy Signal as a Key Mechanism for Consciousness

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giorgio Vallortigara
Keyword(s):  
Sensory Input ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Efference Copy ◽  
Sense Organs ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Evaluative Response ◽  
Sensory Structures ◽  
The Senses ◽  
Carbon Copy

Animals need to distinguish sensory input caused by their own movement from sensory input which is due to stimuli in the outside world. This can be done by an efference copy mechanism, a carbon copy of the movement-command that is routed to sensory structures. Here I tried to link the mechanism of the efference copy with the idea of the philosopher Thomas Reid that the senses would have a double province, to make us feel, and to make us perceive, and that, as argued by psychologist Nicholas Humphrey, the former would identify with the signals from bodily sense organs with an internalized evaluative response, i.e., with phenomenal consciousness. I discussed a possible departure from the classical implementation of the efference copy mechanism that can effectively provide the senses with such a double province, and possibly allow us some progress in understanding the nature of consciousness.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document