On two antagonistic game approach problems

2021 ◽  
Vol 212 (9) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandr Anatol'evich Ershov ◽  
Andrei Vladimirovich Ushakov ◽  
Vladimir Nikolaevich Ushakov
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 370-379
Author(s):  
Oksana Korolovych ◽  
Olha Chabaniuk ◽  
Natalia Ostapiuk ◽  
Yurii Kotviakovskyi ◽  
Nelia Gut

The conditions for doing business at this stage are often similar in a game in which you need to calculate your actions a few steps ahead. At the same time, it is important to highlight several possible current options and make the necessary decision at the control moment. Moreover, each of the options formed should be justified, understandable and take into account the risk factors and available resources.Today, the main problem of assessing and minimizing the risk of “unfriendly takeover” is due to the fact that in most cases the raider is a player who acts quite legitimately and relies on the loopholes of the current legislative framework. Therefore, it is easier to identify possible actions of the raider and to avoid them within the limits of the reverse game than to deal with the consequences.The purpose of the research is to study the specificity of the individualized assessment and minimization of the risk of “unfriendly takeover” by using elements of game theory.It has been taken into account that the effect of individualization in assessing the risk of unfriendly takeover of enterprises can possibly be achieved on the basis of the application of game theory, the elements of which provide simulation of the unfriendly takeover process within the mathematical description of the inherent combinations of attack/defence as if they actually occurred in time both within one state of the external environment and for their given set.The results allowed forming mathematical decision-making models based on the elements of the antagonistic game “raider-target enterprise” and “raider games with the external environment”, which proved the possibility to: 1) identify possible functions of wins/losses; 2) combinations of attacks that can be neglected (that is, from the point of view of the rationality of decisions, will be rejected by the raider); 3) the ranking of the raider’s “attack combinations” for the reliability of their use during “unfriendly takeover”. Under such conditions, the target company can provide not only a detailed assessment, but also an effective minimization of the risk of “unfriendly takeover” and allocate the best combination of protection.


1981 ◽  
Vol 9 (17) ◽  
Author(s):  
Antoni Styszyński
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 164 ◽  
pp. 08027
Author(s):  
Natalya Petrikeeva ◽  
Yekaterina Kopytina ◽  
Galina Martynenko ◽  
Victoria Kozlova

The paper is devoted to a new way of determining optimal distribution of resources in performing construction and assembly work. Properly analyzed territorial features of the construction site, the local topography and housing density, the degree of the system reliability, available resources, and options for carrying out work may help reduce construction costs. That may be done after choosing the best variant relying on a number of criteria, which is one of the main goals for any organization and one of the main principles of efficient use of resources. As a simulation of this situation, it is offered to consider the theory of games. The solution of the antagonistic game in relation to the gasification of housing development by a construction and assembly organization is considered. A solution to this type of game in mixed and pure strategies is offered. The results obtained may be used for further engineering evaluation. Application of this approach at early stages of construction, namely while planning and designing, may cut energy costs, will significantly reduce the organization’s expenses and decrease the project implementation time by spending a little more time for taking decision at the preliminary stage. It was shown that the reliability of the system in diverse variants meets the regulatory requirements.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2096 (1) ◽  
pp. 012155
Author(s):  
V D Munister ◽  
A L Zolkin ◽  
T G Aygumov ◽  
V E Ozhiganov

Abstract The article deals with the problems of speed and timeliness of the development of control actions from digital management systems. Generalization of researches is given. The role of mathematical applications of game theory for the role in the implementation of fog and boundary computations in the paradigm of the development of digital signal processing systems as well as their optimization value are substantiated.A particular generalization is developed and is given from the processing of an encoded signal sequence that demonstrates the operation of a humidity sensor from the viewpoint of bringing it to the basis of an antagonistic game in order to determine the optimal strategy of the device’s behaviour at a given time interval.The practical significance of the study is confirmed by a new approach to the implementation of economic methods for analysis of probabilistic outcomes within the framework of game theory in an algorithm for analysis of a digital signal for a linear comparator of recorded physical quantities in the form of digital levels. The value of such analysis metrics in network-centric distributed systems of the Internet of things in multiplexing environments is given.


2002 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Romar Correa

Kaleçki’s microeconomics is recast in a strategic framework. The transformation is made in two steps. First, the relationship between capitalist and worker is modeled as a cooperative game. It is shown that the outcome is ‘more favorable’ to the capitalist than any other point on the payoff frontier. The game is then converted into a perfectly antagonistic game. The saddle-point is shown to be the outcome of a capitalist maximization problem


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 121-131
Author(s):  
Vladimir G. Chernov ◽  

We consider a method for solving an antagonistic game with a fuzzy payment matrix based on converting fuzzy estimates of the consequences of possible strategies into an integral estimate in the form of an equivalent fuzzy set with a triangular membership function. The method does not impose restrictions on the type of membership functions for fuzzy elements of the payment.


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