Census Counts and Apportionment: The Politics of Representation in the United States

10.1068/d17s ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 619-627 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ron Johnston

Census counts are used in the United States as the basis for a derived ‘apportionment count’, which is employed by the President to allocate seats in the House of Representatives across the 50 States. This apportionment count includes not only those individuals recorded by the census (either by direct count or by imputation) as usually resident in each State but in addition federal employees, including military personnel, and their dependents. This practice has been challenged on several occasions in the courts, most recently by the State of Utah, which claimed that it was denied a fourth seat in the House for the period 2002 – 12 as a consequence. Its claim was denied, for reasons which are discussed here and which throw further light (following Hannah, 2001 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space19 515 – 534) on the social constructions involved in the conduct and use of censuses.

1956 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 1023-1045 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Truman

Recent controversies over the degree of responsibility displayed by American parties have underscored at least one feature of voting in the Congress. Whatever the merits of the contending interpretations and demands, the facts adduced on both sides suggest relatively fluid, unstructured voting patterns, especially in the House of Representatives. Although the party label is clearly the single most reliable indicator of congressional voting behavior, it is admittedly somewhat less than perfect. The individual Representative may fairly often dissent from the views of most of his party colleagues, not only on matters of local or minor significance but also on issues of national or even global import.The Representative's “independence” is most commonly, and in a good many instances accurately, ascribed to peculiarities of his constituency which generate demands for a non-conforming vote or, perhaps more frequently, are expected to be the source of recriminations and penalities if he does not display independence of his party colleagues on certain types of issues. But the Member of Congress is by no means always able to predict the electoral consequences of his choices even though he is sure that they may produce repercussions in his district.


1901 ◽  
Vol 47 (198) ◽  
pp. 632-632

It is well known that a heavy burden has been imposed upon the United States of America by the immigration of persons already insane. A Bill has been introduced in the House of Representatives, after a full inquiry, to amend the immigration laws in this respect. Briefly, it proposes that aliens should be excluded if previously, within ten years, confined in any asylum for the insane, idiotic or epileptic, or if they have so suffered before landing in the United States, or if so affected within two years after admission, unless disorder is shown to have been due to causes arising after arrival. Certificates will be required from immigrants, and these must be granted by a local physician of experience in mental diseases whose reputation is vouched for by the local Consul, and must show whether the alien has been insane, etc. The Bill further provides for the return of aliens to their respective countries should they be undesirable immigrants for the reasons indicated. It was shown in the evidence that by the census of 1890 the foreign population of the State of New York constituted 25 per cent. of the whole, whereas the foreign population in the New York State Asylums was 50 per cent. of the whole. These and similar facts have long been recognised as vital to American interests, and it is by no means surprising that an effort is now being made to relieve the State of such an incubus.


2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Michael Weinman ◽  

This is, indeed, another work on the subject of hate speech regulation in the United States. And yet, it is not just another such work. For my goal here is not to settle the jurisprudential arguments regarding the possibility of any specific hate speech regulation, either extant or yet to be conceived, withstanding a Constitutional test. Nor is it my intention to demonstrate, on the basis of a comparative study of existing legislation, that such regulation either is or is not effective in addressing or redressing the social ills of hatred, discrimination, and inequality. Rather, I will achieve greater analytical clarity about just what the harms of hate speech are. I do so in order to reinvigorate the question about regulation with a new view of what exactly the object needing attention is, by demonstrating that though there are real harms here, the state cannot provide a regulatory remedy (at least qua criminal justice). Thus, in my conclusion I will assert that the question of what we might do differently in response to hate speech can only be answered —however provisionally—insofar as we first confront how we need to think differently about it. Specifically, I will argue that we need to replace the emphasis on redressing harms once they have occurred with a new emphasis on addressing, and ultimately eliminating, the conditions which make those harms possible in the first place.


Author(s):  
Simeon Man

This chapter examines the social experiences of Asian Americans who fought in the Vietnam War. Their collective experience of being racialized as “gooks,” alongside the burgeoning movements for Third World liberation in the United States, drove many Asian American veterans to understand the violence of the war as an intrinsic part of the state-sanctioned violence faced by Asian American and other racialized communities in the United States. Asian American veterans came home from the war and became active participants in the Asian American movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s.


1981 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre Birnbaum

THE STATE, IN THE STRONGEST MEANING OF THE WORD, IS NOT indispensable to the functioning of civil society. Indeed society can often so organize itself as to prevent the emergence of a state intent on establishing itself as an absolute power. The very existence of the state itself, the consequence of particular sociohistorical processes, upsets the whole of the social system which is henceforth ordered around it. The relationships between the nobility, the bourgeoisie, the working class or, today, the middle classes, differ profoundly according to whether these groups were confronted by a strongly institutionalized state or a centre which exercised essentially co-ordinating functions. Still today the political systems which have simultaneously a centre and a state (France) can be distinguished from those which have a weak state without a real centre (Italy) or a centre without a genuine state (Great Britain, the United States) or neither centre nor state (Switzerland). In the first two cases, in varying degrees, the state dominates and manages civil society; in the two latter, civil society manages itself. It is therefore possible to distinguish societies in which the state attempts to dominate the social system by endowing itself with a strong bureaucracy (ideal type: France; paralle development: Prussia, Spain, Italy) from those in which the organization of civil society makes it impossible for a powerful state and a powerful dominating bureaucracy to emerge (ideal type: Great Britain; parallel development: the United States and the consociational democracies like Switzerland). Without claiming to retrace methodically the history of each of these states or of their political centres, I should like to sketch a broad outline of their evolution with the object of showing that the different relations by which the many governing groups are linked together within the different social systems depend sometimes on the formation of the state and sometimes on the simple formation of a political centre.


Divested ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 28-50
Author(s):  
Ken-Hou Lin ◽  
Megan Tobias Neely

This chapter considers the issue of inequality. It provides a synopsis of the existing explanations for rising inequality and identifies some of their shortcomings before outlining the contours of the investigation into the connection between financialization and inequality. It argues that the rising inequality in the United States is not a “natural” result of apolitical technological advancement and globalization. Instead, the widening economic divide reflects a deeper transformation of how the economy is organized and how resources are distributed. Financialization has motivated or complemented many inequality-inducing developments through three interwoven processes: the extraction of economic rents from the nonfinancial economy to the financial sector, the demise of the capital-labor accord, and the dispersion of economic risks from the state and organizations to families.


2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nils Edling

Where does the welfare state come from? On the long history of a modern key conceptThisarticle charts the history of the term the welfare state in Germany and the United States, the two countries where it was formed. It starts from the premise that political key concepts, such as the welfare state, have multiple meanings and are open to contestation. This means that the objective is to study the different and changing usages and meanings of the term from the 1860s to the 1940s.In the oldest of the four usages, der Wohlfahrtsstaat referred to pre-1789 authoritarian regimes where the welfare of the people constituted the objective and rationale of the state. Gradually during the latter half of the nineteenth century, an alternative understanding emerged in Germany where the culture and welfare state connoted a responsible state, which regulated the modernizing economy. In the early twentieth century, many texts mentioned this new Kultur- und Wohlfahrtsstaat as a fitting label for contemporary Germany. At the same time, this new regulating welfare state became a topic in the United States as well.In the Weimar Republic 1919–33, the idea of the social welfare state was highly contested from the start. This understanding centred on social policy, on the state as the driving force in social reform. Fourthly, the democratic welfare state, a state that catered for the common good and respected civil liberties, was contrasted to authoritarian power states. These four usages should not be seen as separate stages in an orderly historical sequence of conceptual development, but as co-existing layers of meaning that could be mixed in multiple and changing ways. Depending on ideological and political point of view, the modern welfare state, which emerged after 1945, could incorporate one or several of the historical layers (the authoritarian-paternalistic, the regulating, the social and the democratic welfare state). This new idea of the welfare state was a product of the Depression and the War with expanding state activity and ideological mobilization. The United States’ acquired position as global military and moral superpower constituted one prerequisite. The welfare state was in this sense part of the democratic restart after 1945. Two considerations were important for this conception: the state’s responsibility for promoting economic growth and combating unemployment and the emergence of human rights that include social security.


1990 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 137-160
Author(s):  
Robert Grosse

This study is intended to establish a framework for analyzing the economic impact of narcotraffic between Colombia, where most of the world's cocaine is refined, and the State of Florida, which is the primary area of entry for Andean cocaine into the United States. The purpose of the study is to analyze the economic costs and benefits of this activity to Florida, as an example that could be extended in both directions — to Colombia and to the entire United States—if additional data were to become available. Only the trade in cocaine is examined, though additional traffic in marijuana does take place and, in some cases, the data are not disaggregated for each drug. Only the economic impact is studied, though the trade obviously impacts the social and political realms as well. Because the tools of analysis are quite different among the disciplines, and because the economic issues need to be sorted out in any discussion of the overall impact of the cocaine trade, only economic issues are treated here.


2001 ◽  
Vol 15 (01) ◽  
pp. 53-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Rehfeld

Every ten years, the United States “constructs” itself politically. On a decennial basis, U.S. Congressional districts are quite literally drawn, physically constructing political representation in the House of Representatives on the basis of where one lives. Why does the United States do it this way? What justifies domicile as the sole criteria of constituency construction? These are the questions raised in this article. Contrary to many contemporary understandings of representation at the founding, I argue that there were no principled reasons for using domicile as the method of organizing for political representation. Even in 1787, the Congressional district was expected to be far too large to map onto existing communities of interest. Instead, territory should be understood as forming a habit of mind for the founders, even while it was necessary to achieve other democratic aims of representative government.


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