The Legitimacy of Norwegian Local Government: The Impact of Central Government Controls

1997 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
R J Sørensen

The Norwegian system of government comprises three levels: highest is the central government, or Storting (Parliament); in the middle are the counties, and at the lowest level are the municipalities. The municipal and county levels are considered local government. In this paper the degree of central control of the lower two levels of Norwegian government are compared and the implications of national regulations for local democracy, particularly for county governments, are discussed. The counties are more heavily controlled by the central government than are the municipalities, measured both by reliance on central grants and by regulation of the service supply. Whereas the representatives of the municipal councils are ambiguous when it comes to expressing the extent of central government control, the county-level politicians are clearly dissatisfied with central governmental constraints. Central regulations appear not to weaken the attractiveness of positions on the local councils, and the desire for reelection appears higher at the county level than at the municipal level. Voters see the parliamentary elections as most important, the municipal elections as of secondary importance, and the county elections as least important. At the county elections, national policymakers are to some extent responsible for the performance of the county government. It is argued that the lack of voter interest and voter control increases the ability of lobbying organizations to influence county decisions, which is likely to strengthen the dominance of producer interests relative to that of citizens and consumers. Such developments may induce demand for further state legislation to protect consumer interests, which will challenge the overall legitimacy of intermediate democracy.

1987 ◽  
Vol 31 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 151-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
I. Schapera

In the closing paragraph of his inaugural lecture Law and Language, Professor Allott referred to what he termed “a daunting obstacle” to the intensive study of African legal systems.That obstacle is the rapid disappearance, before our very eyes, of the traditional systems that we have proposed to study. A generation ago there would not have been that difficulty; but today the traditional tribunals have vanished in many African countries where their place has been taken by statutory local courts. Even where the traditional courts appear to have survived, at least in name, they are usually affected by the impact of western law and institutions and of central government control.Those words were written in 1965. How true and necessary they were is shown by the fact that more than fifty years previously—even more than “a generation ago”—the impact of “western” influences upon the Tswana peoples of the Bechuanaland Protectorate (now the Republic of Botswana) had already led to many changes in the indigenous legal system, although, at that time, the “traditional courts” still survived virtually intact and not merely “in name”.The nature and extent of those changes can be readily ascertained by the fortunate chance that, there are still available the records of approximately 470 cases tried, over a period of six and a half years, in the highest traditional court of the Ngwaketse, a major Tswana chiefdom.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-42
Author(s):  
Muhadam Labolo ◽  
Etin Indrayani

Bureaucratic reformation is the fundamental structuring efforts are expected to havean impact on changing systems and structures. The system deals with the relationshipbetween the unsure or the element that influence each other and are associated to makea form totally. The change in one element can influence the other elements in the system.The structure relates with the order of who arrayed a regular basis and systematically.Structure changes is also included with the mechanism and procedure, human resources,facilities and infrastructure, organization and organization’s environment in terms of theachievement of the efficiency of government bureaucracy. These changes include allowingall of the aspects of the bureaucracy has sufficient capacity to carry out the duties and thebasic function. Bureaucratic failure in a term for service the public until now representpoor government both at central and local government level. The urgency of bureaucraticreform in Indonesia is driven by a number of important note. First, the increased apparatusexpenditure is caused by increased of apparatus recruitment without unmeasured control.Second, the ballooning cost of democracy (election) affected the floated of local governmentbudget have increased significantly. The magnitude of the election budget and the impact ongovernmental bureaucracy resulted not ready to close the budget deficit. More than thesebureaucracy has loyalty dilemma caused by dispersed of concentration in every election’sactivity. Third, increased of develop the bureaucratic organization without planning andanalysis of the measured trigger financing and recruitment of apparatus that not less. Asa result, the bureaucracy in most areas are overload, or even lack in outside of Java. Inother side, less of local incomes make dependence to central government, while the localgovernment expenditure is to far from efficiency, even tend to be less controlled due to thehigh cost of the organization. Fourth, extensive corrupt behavior in almost all public sectorbureaucracy encourages lose confidence as a public servant.Keywords: Bureaucratic Reformation, bureaucracy design, local government, GoodGovernance


2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 29-33
Author(s):  
Dang Phuc Vu ◽  
◽  
Thi Thanh Nga Nguyen ◽  

Control of local governments in countries around the world is very diverse,but mainly divided into two categories: 1) control of state agencies (central government control, court control, control of local power representations); 2) control of social institutions including political party control over local government, control of organizations and public associations, control of the media, and control of the people. The paper focuses on analysing the controlling local governments in some countries, thereby giving reference values for Vietnam.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 141
Author(s):  
Trust Madhovi

This paper examines the impact of social accountability mechanisms on the fiscal management challenges facing local government bodies in Zimbabwe. The paper hypothesises that there is a positive relationship between the use of social accountability mechanisms or tools by local authorities and the effectiveness of their fiscal management policies to mobilize more revenue for service delivery. In this study, both quantitative and qualitative methods are adopted in gathering and analysing data from central government officials, Goromonzi Rural District Council employees and members of the public. The results of the study reveal that the local government body faces a number of fiscal management challenges that include a shrinking tax base, non-payment of taxes, resistance to successive budgets; lack of implementation; lack of monitoring and evaluation. Council has implemented participatory budgeting to deal with some of these challenges. While results show a significant improvement in tax collection, some of the challenges have persisted. The paper proposes some recommendations useful to central government, policy makers, civil society organisations, local government officials and the general public. The paper manages to demonstrate that the implementation of social accountability tools can have positive impacts on the fiscal management challenges facing local governments. 


2016 ◽  
Vol 34 (6) ◽  
pp. 602-619 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Michael Greenhalgh ◽  
Kevin Muldoon-Smith ◽  
Sophie Angus

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the introduction of the business rates retention scheme (BRRS) in England which transferred financial liability for backdated appeals to LAs. Under the original scheme, business rates revenue, mandatory relief and liability for successful appeals is spilt 50/50 between central government and local government which both share the rewards of growth and bear the risk of losses. Design/methodology/approach The research adopts a microanalysis approach into researching local government finance, conducting a case study of Leeds, to investigate the impact of appeals liability and reveal disparities in impact, through detailed examination of multiple perspectives in one of the largest cities in the UK. Findings The case study reveals that Leeds, despite having a buoyant commercial economy driven by retail and service sector growth, has been detrimentally impacted by BRRS as backdated appeals have outweighed uplift in business rates income. Fundamentally BRRS is not a “one size fits all” model – it results in winners and losers – which will be exacerbated if local authorities get to keep 100 per cent of their business rates from 2020. Research limitations/implications LAs’ income is more volatile as a consequence of both the rates retention and appeals liability aspects of BRRS and will become more so with the move to 100 per cent retention and liability. Practical implications Such volatility impairs the ability of local authorities to invest in growth at the same time as providing front line services over the medium term – precisely the opposite of what BRRS was intended to do. It also incentivises the construction of new floorspace, which generates risks overbuilding and exacerbating over-supply. Originality/value The research reveals the significant impact of appeals liability on LAs’ business rates revenues which will be compounded with the move to a fiscally neutral business rates system and 100 per cent business rates retention by 2020.


1999 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 237-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Blom-Hansen

This paper seeks to explain patterns of central government control and local government discretion across nations as well as across policy areas. The argument is that central-local policy is the result of the interaction of three types of actors: ‘Expenditure advocates’, ‘expenditure guardians’, and ‘topocrats’. The argument is based on two assumptions. First, the actors are assumed to pursue self-interests – respectively, sectoral policy goals, macroeconomic control, and local autonomy. Second, the actors' abilities to pursue their self-interests are assumed to be constrained and facilitated by the structure of intergovernmental policy networks. The theoretical propositions are put to a first test in a comparative analysis of three policy areas (economic policy, health policy, and child care policy) in the three Scandinavian countries of Sweden, Norway and Denmark.


1985 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre-Henri Derycke ◽  
Guy Gilbert

ABSTRACTAfter a sharp increase, the public debt of French local communities has been stabilized in real terms: its amount reached 54 per cent of total public debt in 1980. In the French institutional framework, local government borrowing policy is under the tight control of central agencies. An econometric model of the borrowing behaviour of local governments since 1965 is presented; it emphasizes the role of internal determinants of local debt (needs for investment, self-financing ability of governments), external constraints (e.g. interest rates and the financial resources of lenders, such as households savings), and finally the impact of macroeconomic policy measures from the central government.


2007 ◽  
Vol 189 ◽  
pp. 43-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
John James Kennedy

Over the last decade, there have been numerous reports of rural discontent and unrest over excessive local taxes and fees known as villagers' burdens. In response, the central government enacted the tax-for-fee reform (TFR) in 2002 that abolished local fees levied on individuals and rural households in favour of a single agricultural tax. In addition the central government has announced plans to eliminate the agricultural tax as well after 2006. The aim of the TFR is to streamline local revenue collection and establish a more transparent and efficient provision of services. The immediate result, however, is a dramatic reduction in the autonomy of township governments as well as the provision of local services. Poorer townships have become more dependent on county government for revenues, and these townships function more like county administrative units than local self-governments. Moreover, many services have also been cut due to a lack of local revenues. In north-west China, there has been a sharp decline in the provision of educational and medical services. The solution is an increase in county remittances, but these are slow and uneven, and the combination of reduced autonomy and services has produced a number of “administrative shells” at the township level. If the inefficacy continues, then there may be even greater rural discontent and unrest over the loss of basic services than there was over increasing villagers' burdens.


10.1068/c9865 ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eran Razin

Results of the comparative study presented in this paper suggests that local government organization influences land-use planning, and local development strategies and disparities. Local government reforms can, therefore, serve to modify spatial patterns of development and disparities. Based on a review of studies made in the developed and the developing world, the author provides a comparative perspective on these influences. Five major dimensions of local government organization—territorial, functional, political autonomy, fiscal, and electoral—are used to define four extreme models of local government. The American self-government model leads to substantial inequalities and to considerable sprawl. The Western welfare-state model alleviates these problems somewhat, but at a cost to central government. Its positive impact is also dependent on norms of administration at the central level, whereas reduced competition over economic development has its negative sides. Developing-world-type centralism has no real advantages in terms of development or disparities. The developing-world decentralized model can be regarded as a transitional phase towards either the self-government or the welfare-state models. Its implementation has been partial; hence its impact has, so far, been rather small.


2015 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Considine ◽  
Theresa Reidy

Abstract There are two essential elements to this paper. In the first instance, we explore the specific details of revenue and expenditure trends for local authorities over the last decade. The analysis is framed against a longer-term political context of forty years which focuses especially on the weakness of local government in Ireland. Despite an official narrative of financial overdependence on central government, the comparative examination of budgetary records of local authorities reveals considerable diversity in both the revenue and expenditure patterns of authorities across the state. While some authorities are heavily reliant on central government funding, others have a much stronger base of local funding, and indeed the financial crisis since 2008 may have increased these differences. The second dimension to the research is an exploration of the impact of the great recession from 2008 on local government finance in Ireland. Using a framework of new institutionalism, we identify the crisis as another critical moment for local government. We consider the political, economic and administrative variables which have brought local government to a financial crossroads, and we explore the potential for long-lasting financial change in local government, as well as speculating on the nature and outcome of that change.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document