Philosophical Aspects of 500-Year Planning

1988 ◽  
Vol 20 (11) ◽  
pp. 1507-1522 ◽  
Author(s):  
B E Tonn

A class of environmental problems, termed 500-year problems, poses significant threats to the world's societies. In 500-year planning there is a need for a sound philosophical foundation to guide the development of appropriate methods which analyze problems that cover very long time periods and that involve large uncertainties. In this paper philosophical aspects of 500-year planning, related to determining whether present generations are meeting their obligations to future generations, are addressed. Topics discussed include the treatment of future populations (as identifiable individuals or as enumerable groups) and the appropriate base for 500-year planning (utilitarianism or social contract theory). Adopting Rawls's concepts of the original position and of the veil of ignorance, a social contract is developed that guarantees the possibility of existence for all potential individuals, and sets limits on the risks that current and future populations might endure as a result of their ancestors' abuse of the environment. The specifics of the contract represent rational criteria upon which to base 500-year planning activities.

Author(s):  
Albert Weale

For much of his professional career, Barry was not a contract theorist, and he relies on a number of elements from Scanlon’s construction. His general approach is built on a distinction he sees in theories of justice between those that rely on the idea that justice is agreement to mutual advantage and those that rely on the idea that justice is a matter of impartiality. His own theory is impartialist, but dispenses with the device of the veil of ignorance. Instead the contracting parties are assumed to reason with one another about the constitutional terms of their association, and all are allowed to veto proposals if those proposals and unreasonable. Unreasonable proposals are those that fail the test of avoiding absolute deprivation, relative deprivation, or failing to make provision for public goods. His anticipated theory of economic justice never materialized, and his derivation of a Rawlsian difference principle is only partially successful. However, it is possible to use the practical syllogism in a Barry set-up to derive a case for social insurance. More importantly, his principle contribution to social contract theory is his sketch of the empirical method, a method on which the future of social contract theory can be built.


1999 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. Child ◽  
Alexei M. Marcoux

Abstract:We argue that the Rawlsian social contract argument advanced for stakeholder theory by R. Edward Freeman, writing alone and with William M. Evan, fails in three main ways. First, it is true to Rawls in neither form, nor purpose, nor the level of knowledge (or ignorance) required to motivate the veil of ignorance. Second, it fails to tailor the veil of ignorance to the fairness conditions that are required to solve the moral problem that Freeman and Evan set out to solve (whereas Rawls’s own use of the device surely tailors the veil of ignorance to the problem of designing a just social order). Third, the argument, considered apart from its claimed Rawlsian pedigree, fails to bolster the stakeholder theory because it fails to demonstrate the rationality of adopting the institutional rules that Freeman and Evan favor.


2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-265
Author(s):  
Muhammad Zahid Siddique

John Rawls used an apparently neutral apparatus to derive the principles of justice that all “rational” people ought to agree with because they provide the basis of coexistence in a pluralistic society. He believes that religious faith is consistent with the commitment to liberalism. The paper shows that the Rawlsian liberal “self” modelled in the original position is not consistent with the original position recognized by religion in general and Islam in particular. According to Islam, the human self is mukallaf (subject of God) while Rawls treats it non-mukallaf. This is so because Rawlsian original position presumes an atheist self behind the veil of ignorance. This conceptualization of self is not only inconsistent with but also hostile to religion. The claims about liberalism’s tolerance towards religion are superficial. The liberal self can express itself in various religious forms provided these are aligned with the system of rights acknowledged by the liberal atheist self.


Author(s):  
Albert Weale

Social contract theory can be understood as a form of constructivism. Constructivism is the view that the content of morality can be defined by a procedure, the results of which define principles of actions. Constructivism can be understood as directed both to the normative question of what principles are justifiable and to the meta-ethical question as to the logical status of such principles. In respect of the latter, constructivism holds to a procedure-dependent conception of practical reason rather than a truth-directed view. In the case of social contract theory, the procedure is made up of three elements: an original position; the reasoning of the contracting parties; and the contents of the agreement that those contracting parties conclude with one another. Some contract theorists can be thought of as aspiring to a form of ethical reductionism, involving the defining of moral notions in non-moral terms by means of the constructed procedure, but this is not true of all. In this connection, there is a dispute as to whether rationality is to be defined in terms of self-interest. Constructivism is offered as an alternative to intuitionism, in which it is assumed that principles are in some sense self-evident.


Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 462
Author(s):  
Joseph Rivera

John Rawls’ well-known device of representation (his terminology) that he names the “original position” is put into play by the veil of ignorance. This imaginative device, found in both his early and late works, is often dismissed because it is misunderstood as an exercise in moral geometry. This essay discusses in more detail the subjective mechanics of the original position; while sympathetic of Rawls’ application of the veil of ignorance, I distinguish between a thick and thin veil, whereby I promote the latter. The final section makes a connection between the simulation of the original position and the religious practice of asceticism.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 179
Author(s):  
Edor J. Edor

John Rawls's theory of Justice is one of the most influential conceptions of justice. Scholars have continued to study it to understand the principles in the formation and to further frame it in the context of contemporary situations. This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion by presenting Rawls’ concept of “justice as fairness” as it evolved from the traditional conception of justice to the modern-shift in the concept. The paper also examines Rawls’s concept of justice as fairness, and it focuses on analyzing or studying the concept of justice as fairness in terms of the principles used in its formulations. Several criticisms developed by political philosophers to critique the idea were examined. In conclusion, it was argued that Rawls's invention of the veil-of-ignorance for the original position has affected the theory negatively.


2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (6) ◽  
pp. 10
Author(s):  
Olga Popova

The article analyzes a number of philosophical problems caused by the emergence of the new genetic engineering tool CRISPR/Cas9 and the possible legitimization of genetic engineering technologies, in general. The non-therapeutic context of the use of the CRISPR/Cas9 tool is considered, and in this context the problem of future generations' rights and human species identity is analyzed. Using J. Rawls' idea of the “veil of ignorance”, the problem of the distribution of genetic advantages is analyzed and possible trajectories for its solution are demonstrated. The link between genetic enhancement and new forms of biosociality and inequality is presented. It is concluded that the rights of future generations in the competition of opposing ethical-philosophical attitudes will be problematized both within the framework of defending the attitude to the naturalness and in the context of defending human genetic modification.


Author(s):  
Albert Weale

In the second half of the twentieth century, social contract theory flourished as a branch of moral and political theory. Its central claim was that principles of social and political organization could be derived from a hypothetical social contract that would be agreed among rational persons. It aspired to provide a theory of content, so defining justifiable principles, as well as a theory of obligation, so explicating the reasons that agents would have for following those principles. In scope it offered an account of interpersonal morality, political authority, and economic justice, although all could be regarded as departments of the theory of justice. Social contract theory also offered a method of ethics of a constructivist type. In this respect it followed the model of utilitarianism. The key authors were: Barry, Buchanan and Tullock, Harsanyi, Gauthier, Grice, Rawls, and Scanlon. Their different theories can be classified by reference to two dimensions. Are the hypothetical contracting parties behind a veil of ignorance or not? And, to what type of rationality—utility-based or deliberative—is their reasoning supposed to conform? The purpose of this work is to offer an exposition and evaluation of this body of work.


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