Energy principle with global invariants: Applications

1983 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 526 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Bhattacharjee
Keyword(s):  
Energy Principle ◽  
Global Invariants

Energy Principle with Global Invariants for Toroidal Plasmas

1980 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 347-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Bhattacharjee ◽  
R. L. Dewar ◽  
D. A. Monticello
Keyword(s):  
Energy Principle ◽  
Toroidal Plasmas ◽  
Global Invariants

scholarly journals Energy principle with global invariants

1981 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Bhattacharjee ◽  
R. L. Dewar
Keyword(s):  
Energy Principle ◽  
Global Invariants

scholarly journals Energy principle with global invariants

1980 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Bhattacharjee ◽  
R.L. Dewar ◽  
D.A. Monticello
Keyword(s):  
Energy Principle ◽  
Global Invariants

scholarly journals Energy principle with global invariants

1982 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 887 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Bhattacharjee
Keyword(s):  
Energy Principle ◽  
Global Invariants

Encultured minds, not error reduction minds

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Mirski ◽  
Mark H. Bickhard ◽  
David Eck ◽  
Arkadiusz Gut
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Error Reduction ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Current Article

Abstract There are serious theoretical problems with the free-energy principle model, which are shown in the current article. We discuss the proposed model's inability to account for culturally emergent normativities, and point out the foundational issues that we claim this inability stems from.

scholarly journals Modelling ourselves: what the free energy principle reveals about our implicit notions of representation

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matt Sims ◽  
Giovanni Pezzulo
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Self Organized ◽  
Functional Aspects ◽  
Structural Content ◽  
Unified View

AbstractPredictive processing theories are increasingly popular in philosophy of mind; such process theories often gain support from the Free Energy Principle (FEP)—a normative principle for adaptive self-organized systems. Yet there is a current and much discussed debate about conflicting philosophical interpretations of FEP, e.g., representational versus non-representational. Here we argue that these different interpretations depend on implicit assumptions about what qualifies (or fails to qualify) as representational. We deploy the Free Energy Principle (FEP) instrumentally to distinguish four main notions of representation, which focus on organizational, structural, content-related and functional aspects, respectively. The various ways that these different aspects matter in arriving at representational or non-representational interpretations of the Free Energy Principle are discussed. We also discuss how the Free Energy Principle may be seen as a unified view where terms that traditionally belong to different ontologies—e.g., notions of model and expectation versus notions of autopoiesis and synchronization—can be harmonized. However, rather than attempting to settle the representationalist versus non-representationalist debate and reveal something about what representations are simpliciter, this paper demonstrates how the Free Energy Principle may be used to reveal something about those partaking in the debate; namely, what our hidden assumptions about what representations are—assumptions that act as sometimes antithetical starting points in this persistent philosophical debate.

scholarly journals Oriented arrangement of simple monomers enabled by confinement: towards living supramolecular polymerization

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yingtong Zong ◽  
Si-Min Xu ◽  
Wenying Shi ◽  
Chao Lu
Keyword(s):  
Activation Barrier ◽  
Degree Of Polymerization ◽  
Supramolecular Polymer ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Spontaneous Nucleation ◽  
Pyrene Derivatives ◽  
Multifunctional Molecules ◽  
Double Hydroxide ◽  
Supramolecular Polymerization ◽  
Kinetics Of

AbstractThe living supramolecular polymerization technique provides an exciting research avenue. However, in comparison with the thermodynamic spontaneous nucleation, using simple monomers to realize living supramolecular polymerization is hardly possible from an energy principle. This is because the activation barrier of kinetically trapped simple monomer (nucleation step) is insufficiently high to control the kinetics of subsequent elongation. Here, with the benefit of the confinement from the layered double hydroxide (LDH) nanomaterial, various simple monomers, (such as benzene, naphthalene and pyrene derivatives) successfully form living supramolecular polymer (LSP) with length control and narrow dispersity. The degree of polymerization can reach ~6000. Kinetics studies reveal LDH overcomes a huge energy barrier to inhibit undesired spontaneous nucleation of monomers and disassembly of metastable states. The universality of this strategy will usher exploration into other multifunctional molecules and promote the development of functional LSP.

scholarly journals Is free-energy minimisation the mark of the cognitive?

2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Kiverstein ◽  
Matt Sims
Keyword(s):  
Nervous System ◽  
Free Energy ◽  
Problem Solving ◽  
Living Systems ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Energy Minimisation ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Evolution Of Life ◽  
Mark Of The Cognitive

AbstractA mark of the cognitive should allow us to specify theoretical principles for demarcating cognitive from non-cognitive causes of behaviour in organisms. Specific criteria are required to settle the question of when in the evolution of life cognition first emerged. An answer to this question should however avoid two pitfalls. It should avoid overintellectualising the minds of other organisms, ascribing to them cognitive capacities for which they have no need given the lives they lead within the niches they inhabit. But equally it should do justice to the remarkable flexibility and adaptiveness that can be observed in the behaviour of microorganisms that do not have a nervous system. We should resist seeking non-cognitive explanations of behaviour simply because an organism fails to exhibit human-like feats of thinking, reasoning and problem-solving. We will show how Karl Friston’s Free-Energy Principle (FEP) can serve as the basis for a mark of the cognitive that avoids the twin pitfalls of overintellectualising or underestimating the cognitive achievements of evolutionarily primitive organisms. The FEP purports to describe principles of organisation that any organism must instantiate if it is to remain well-adapted to its environment. Living systems from plants and microorganisms all the way up to humans act in ways that tend in the long run to minimise free energy. If the FEP provides a mark of the cognitive, as we will argue it does, it mandates that cognition should indeed be ascribed to plants, microorganisms and other organisms that lack a nervous system.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document