Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty seismic monitoring: 2012 USNAS report and recent explosions, earthquakes, and other seismic sources

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul G. Richards
Keyword(s):  
Seismic Monitoring ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Seismic Sources ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Nuclear Test Ban ◽  
Test Ban Treaty

Assessment of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization’s IMS/IDC seismic monitoring in Brazil vs ground truth

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasile I. MARZA ◽  
Cristiano N. CHIMPLIGANOND ◽  
Lucas V. BARROS ◽  
Daniel F. CAIXETA ◽  
Takato NAKAYOSHI ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Ground Truth ◽  
Seismic Monitoring ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Nuclear Test Ban ◽  
Test Ban Treaty

Nuclear Powers' Disarmament Obligation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Interactions between Soft Law and Hard Law

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALESSANDRA PIETROBON
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Soft Law ◽  
Legal Obligation ◽  
Hard Law ◽  
The Us ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Nuclear Test Ban ◽  
Test Ban Treaty

AbstractThe Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will not be effective until all the 44 states listed in its Annex 2 ratify it. A special link has been established between the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the CTBT. The disarmament obligation set by Article VI of the NPT, which has not yet been complied with, remains highly controversial. The relevant subsequent practice of the states parties to the NPT shows that the ratification of the CTBT is to be considered the first of the practical steps towards compliance with Article VI. However, as the practical steps do not set any legally binding norms, there is no legal obligation to ratify the CTBT, not even for the 44 states listed in Annex 2 whose ratification is essential. The paper deals with the position of nuclear powers party to the NPT that have not yet ratified the CTBT (most prominently the US and China) and demonstrates that these states should at least provide detailed motivation for their conduct. Otherwise, other states parties to the NPT could consider them as not complying in good faith with Article VI of the NPT and invoke the inadimplenti non est ademplendum rule to justify breaches of their own obligations under the same treaty.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document