scholarly journals Experimental quantum key distribution with active phase randomization

2007 ◽  
Vol 90 (4) ◽  
pp. 044106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Zhao ◽  
Bing Qi ◽  
Hoi-Kwong Lo
2010 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 281
Author(s):  
Wang Jin-Dong ◽  
Qin Xiao-Juan ◽  
Wei Zheng-Jun ◽  
Liu Xiao-Bao ◽  
Liao Chang-Jun ◽  
...  

2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (8) ◽  
pp. 2215-2218
Author(s):  
方俊彬 Fang Junbin ◽  
魏正军 Wei Zhengjun ◽  
王金东 Wang Jindong ◽  
廖常俊 Liao Changjun ◽  
刘颂豪 Liu Songhao

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hang Liu ◽  
Zhen-Qiang Yin ◽  
Rong Wang ◽  
Ze-Hao Wang ◽  
Shuang Wang ◽  
...  

AbstractUnlike traditional communication, quantum key distribution (QKD) can reach unconditional security and thus attracts intensive studies. Among all existing QKD protocols, round-robin-differential-phase-shift (RRDPS) protocol can be running without monitoring signal disturbance, which significantly simplifies its flow and improves its tolerance of error rate. Although several security proofs of RRDPS have been given, a tight finite-key analysis with a practical phase-randomized source is still missing. In this paper, we propose an improved security proof of RRDPS against the most general coherent attack based on the entropic uncertainty relation. What’s more, with the help of Azuma’s inequality, our proof can tackle finite-key effects primely. The proposed finite-key analysis keeps the advantages of phase randomization source and indicates experimentally acceptable numbers of pulses are sufficient to approach the asymptotical bound closely. The results shed light on practical QKD without monitoring signal disturbance.


2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shi-Hai Sun ◽  
Mu-Sheng Jiang ◽  
Xiang-Chun Ma ◽  
Chun-Yan Li ◽  
Lin-Mei Liang

Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides means for unconditional secure key transmission between two distant parties. However, in practical implementations, it suffers from quantum hacking due to device imperfections. Here we propose a hybrid measurement attack, with only linear optics, homodyne detection and single photon detection, to the widely used vacuum + weak decoy state QKD system when the phase of source is partially randomized. Our analysis shows that, in some parameter regimes, the proposed attack would result in an entanglement breaking channel but still be able to trick the legitimate users to believe they have transmitted secure keys. That is, the eavesdropper is able to steal all the key information without discovered by the users. Thus, our proposal reveals that partial phase randomization is not sufficient to guarantee the security of phase-encoding QKD systems with weak coherent states.


2008 ◽  
Vol 53 (9) ◽  
pp. 1310-1314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Chen ◽  
ZhengFu Han ◽  
XiaoFan Mo ◽  
FangXing Xu ◽  
Guo Wei ◽  
...  

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