scholarly journals On the role of external constraints in a spatially extended evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
György Szabó
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
External Constraints ◽  
Spatially Extended ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

scholarly journals Moral labels increase cooperation and costly punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with punishment option

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Axel Buchner ◽  
Raoul Bell
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Framing Effects ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

AbstractTo determine the role of moral norms in cooperation and punishment, we examined the effects of a moral-framing manipulation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a costly punishment option. In each round of the game, participants decided whether to cooperate or to defect. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game was identical for all participants with the exception that the behavioral options were paired with moral labels (“I cooperate” and “I cheat”) in the moral-framing condition and with neutral labels (“A” and “B”) in the neutral-framing condition. After each round of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, participants had the opportunity to invest some of their money to punish their partners. In two experiments, moral framing increased moral and hypocritical punishment: participants were more likely to punish partners for defection when moral labels were used than when neutral labels were used. When the participants’ cooperation was enforced by their partners’ moral punishment, moral framing did not only increase moral and hypocritical punishment but also cooperation. The results suggest that moral framing activates a cooperative norm that specifically increases moral and hypocritical punishment. Furthermore, the experience of moral punishment by the partners may increase the importance of social norms for cooperation, which may explain why moral framing effects on cooperation were found only when participants were subject to moral punishment.

The effect of memory in prisoner’s dilemma game under multi-strategy update mechanism

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (06) ◽  
pp. 2050077
Author(s):  
Hai Zhu ◽  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Qingyang Zhao ◽  
Xing Jin ◽  
Lanping Yu
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Joint Effect ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Open Issue ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Due to the heterogeneity of strategy updating rules progressively destroying the cluster of cooperators, cooperation would be heavily suppressed when players adopt mixed strategy updating rules. Thus, how to improve the emergence of cooperation with the scenario of heterogeneous strategy updating rules becomes an important open issue. In this paper, we introduce the memory factor into the game model, and then study the joint effect of memory and heterogeneous strategy updating rules on the emergence of cooperation. Detailly, in our game model, memory-based imitation and innovation are chosen as two different strategy updating rules. Afterwards, the annealing and quenching rules are specifically used as the methods to mix the proposed two memory-based strategy updating rules. At last, Monte Carlo simulations are conducted to demonstrate the significance of our model. The simulation results show that for memory-based imitators, memory is not always effective in promoting cooperation. It’s more like a catalyst. When the proportion of the memory-based imitation is large, it promotes the emergence of cooperation. When the proportion of innovation is large, it accelerates the extinction of cooperation; for overall proportion of cooperation, memory effectively promotes the emergence of cooperation and improves the ability of cooperators to resist high temptation, but memory is a partial optimization, it cannot offset the deterioration of cooperation caused by heterogeneous strategies updating rules, memory only reduces the degree of deterioration. Finally, compared with the annealing rule, the change of quenching rule is more smooth, because it is easier for cooperators to form clusters under the quenching rule. Our investigation sheds some light to the role of memory in prisoner’s dilemma game under heterogeneous strategies updating rules.

Self-control in a Prisoner's Dilemma game: the role of trial spacing and an interfering task

2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 273-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edmund Fantino ◽  
Santino C. Gaitan ◽  
Stephen Meyer ◽  
Stephanie Stolarz-Fantino
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Trial Spacing ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Facial Likability and Smiling Enhance Cooperation, but Have No Direct Effect on Moralistic Punishment

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 263-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Raoul Bell ◽  
Axel Buchner
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Moralistic Punishment

Abstract. The present study serves to test how positive and negative appearance-based expectations affect cooperation and punishment. Participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with partners who either cooperated or defected. Then they were given a costly punishment option: They could spend money to decrease the payoffs of their partners. Aggregated over trials, participants spent more money for punishing the defection of likable-looking and smiling partners compared to punishing the defection of unlikable-looking and nonsmiling partners, but only because participants were more likely to cooperate with likable-looking and smiling partners, which provided the participants with more opportunities for moralistic punishment. When expressed as a conditional probability, moralistic punishment did not differ as a function of the partners’ facial likability. Smiling had no effect on the probability of moralistic punishment, but punishment was milder for smiling in comparison to nonsmiling partners.

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