Interest group mobilization and lobbying patterns in Britain: A newspaper analysis

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Bernhagen ◽  
Brett Trani
1996 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony J. Nownes ◽  
Grant Neeley

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 243-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk De Bièvre ◽  
Arlo Poletti

Over the last decade, European Union (EU) trade agreement negotiations in the form of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada have been strongly contested. By contrast, many other EU trade negotiations have sailed on with far less politicization, or barely any at all. In this contribution, we assess a series of plausible explanation for these very varying degrees of politicization across EU trade agreement negotiations—conceived of as the combination of polarization of opinions, salience given to them in public debate, and the expansion of the number of societal actors involved therein. Through a review of existing explanations, we show how each of these explanations faces a set of challenges. In the third section, we argue it is useful to conceive of these existing explanations as structural background conditions enabling agency on the part of interest group and civil society organizations. We therefore close by sketching how literature on the relationship between interest group mobilization and public opinion could inform further comparative research on trade policy negotiations, and on politicization of EU policy making in general.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 136-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arndt Wonka ◽  
Iskander De Bruycker ◽  
Dirk De Bièvre ◽  
Caelesta Braun ◽  
Jan Beyers

Contemporary studies on interest group politics have mainly used single interest organizations as their central objects of study. This has led to a rich body of knowledge on the motivations of interest group mobilization, strategy development and even policy access and influence. The focus on single interest groups, however, has resulted in limited knowledge on aggregate patterns of interest groups’ activity. This article seeks to address this lacuna, by examining patterns of mobilization and conflict of interest groups’ activity in EU legislative policymaking. To do so, it adopts a unique policy-centred research design and an empirical assessment of policy mobilization for a sample of 125 EU legislative proposals based on extensive media coding as well as structured elite interviews. We find that levels of policy mobilization vary substantively across different legislative proposals and that political conflict between interest groups is remarkably low. This suggests that interest group conflict and mobilization contribute little to EU politicization and that in cases where interest groups voice opposing positions, conflicts do not occur between business and non-business groups. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of interest groups in EU legislative policymaking.


2001 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 463-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosemary Nossiff

In 1965 abortion was illegal in every state in America except when the woman's life was endangered. Eight years later, in its decision in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that a woman's decision to have an early elective abortion was constitutionally protected.


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