The Impact of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising on Health Insurance Markets

2014 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 749-767 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Encinosa ◽  
Chad Meyerhoefer ◽  
Samuel Zuvekas ◽  
Dongyi Du
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Insurance Markets ◽  
Direct To Consumer ◽  
Health Insurance Markets ◽  
Direct To Consumer Advertising ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (7) ◽  
pp. 2643-2682 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin R Handel
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Large Firm ◽  
Choice Model ◽  
Major Change ◽  
Insurance Markets ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Health Insurance Markets ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets, where adverse selection is a potential concern. We leverage a major change to insurance provision that occurred at a large firm to identify substantial inertia, and develop and estimate a choice model that also quantifies risk preferences and ex ante health risk. We use these estimates to study the impact of policies that nudge consumers toward better decisions by reducing inertia. When aggregated, these improved individual-level choices substantially exacerbate adverse selection in our setting, leading to an overall reduction in welfare that doubles the existing welfare loss from adverse selection. (JEL D82, G22, I13)

Community Rating And Sustainable Individual Health Insurance Markets In New Jersey

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 167-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan C. Monheit ◽  
Joel C. Cantor ◽  
Margaret Koller ◽  
Kimberley S. Fox
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
New Jersey ◽  
Insurance Markets ◽  
Community Rating ◽  
Individual Health ◽  
Health Insurance Markets

Contending with Risk Selection in Health Insurance Markets in Germany

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (Supplement) ◽  
pp. 75-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Glazer ◽  
Thomas G. McGuire
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Risk Adjustment ◽  
Simple Approach ◽  
Insurance Markets ◽  
Risk Selection ◽  
Health Plans ◽  
Health Insurance Markets ◽  
The U.S

Abstract In many countries, competition among health plans or sickness funds raises issues of risk selection. Funds may discourage or encourage potential enrollees from joining, and these actions may have efficiency or fairness implications. This article reviews the experience in the U.S., and comments on the evidence for risk selection in Germany. There is little evidence that risk selection causes efficiency problems in Germany, but risk selection does lead to an inequality in contribution rates. A simple approach to equalizing contribution rates that does not involve risk adjustment is presented and discussed.

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