The Doha Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations

Author(s):  
Dilip K Das
2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caf Dowlah

Purpose – The purpose of the paper is to examine convergence of economic interests – both empirically and theoretically – among labor-abundant (labor-sending) and labor scarce (labor receiving) countries, in the context of Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the WTO. The paper also explores regional trade associations as an interim alternative forum for promoting temporary cross-border labor mobility in the backdrop of failure of multilateral trade negotiations under the Doha Round. Design/methodology/approach – The research methodology of the paper involves literature review, an analysis of databases and theoretical findings, and a critical examination of pertinent empirical and secondary information on the subject matter. Findings – The findings reveal that although a convergence of economic interests seem to exist between the labor-sending and receiving countries for promoting cross-border labor mobility, this sector faces formidable trade and non-trade barriers across the world, especially in the developed countries. As multilateral trade negotiations under the Doha Round have failed to make any progress toward liberalization of this sector, regional trade associations, especially those pursued by the USA, Canada and Australia, seem to provide a credible alternative vehicle, as an interim measure, for further liberalization of this sector. These RTAs can serve as examples for other RTAs to promote regional mobility of labor. Research limitations/implications – Cross-border temporary labor mobility, as envisaged by GATs of the WTO, is a burgeoning field. Although some serious works are available, especially sponsored by the World Bank and some leading universities, there is a considerable dearth in this field, especially in respect to contribution from individual scholars and researchers. This paper fills the void to some extent by ascertaining factors and forces that help or hinder cross-border mobility, by pointing out limitations of multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO, and by exploring the regional trade associations as an interim measure for promoting cross-border labor mobility. Practical implications – This paper points out factors and forces that help or hinder cross-border mobility, ascertains crucial limitations of multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO, and explores the RTAs as an interim measure for promoting cross-border labor mobility – all these would have practical policy implications. Originality/value – The originality of the paper lies with its critical and careful review of existing literature and available databases, with the determination of factors and forces that help or hinder cross-border mobility in the contemporary world, in pointing out the limitations of multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO, and in exploring the RTAs as an interim measure for promoting cross-border labor mobility.


2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Ahnlid

Abstract The informal WTO ministerial meeting in July 2008 brought the long stalled Doha Round to the verge of a breakthrough. The reason for its final failure was substantive and not related to the negotiating procedures, which previously had contributed to meager results and failures in the round. The meeting was conducted using procedures that ensured a considerable amount of trustworthiness, transparency and legitimacy, which in turn contributed to effectiveness in the process. Thus, the meeting solved many, albeit not all, outstanding issues on the path towards agreement on so-called modalities for agriculture and industrial products, which in turn would have been necessary for a final successful conclusion of the Round. The 2008 July negotiations demonstrated that complex large-scale multilateral negotiations can be handled procedurally in an acceptable and successful way. The article advances a neglected interpretation of the July meeting, and provides lessons for both future WTO negotiations and multilateral negotiations in other policy areas.


1970 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-91
Author(s):  
Hiranya Nath ◽  
Halis Yildiz

Following the failure of multilateral trade negotiations at the Cancun meetingand the Doha Round, developing countries have pursued an alternative in so called"south-south" trade agreements. Since these agreements lead to trade diversionfrom efficient north (developed) countries to less efficient south (developing)partners, there have been widespread concerns regarding their welfare implications.Using a three country oligopoly model of trade, we first examine staticallythe implications of a south-south customs union (CU) on the pattern of tariffs andwelfare. We find that south countries always have incentives to form a CU that reducesthe welfare of the north country. Moreover, when south firms are sufficientlyinefficient relative to north firms, a south-south CU leads to a large trade diversioneffect and reduces world welfare. We further show that, in a repeated interactionmodel, free trade is less likely to be sustainable under the south-south CU relativeto no agreement.


2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt

Abstract While the number of preferential trade agreements (PTA) has increased rapidly in recent years, the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations has been deadlocked since 2006. Most PTAs were even concluded after the start of the Doha round. Does the shift to PTAs “marginalize” the multilateral system? And is there a clash between preferential and multilateral trade liberalization? To answer these questions, we build upon negotiation analysis literature, arguing that the proliferation of PTAs draws negotiating capacity away from the multilateral level and thus reduces the incentives to agree on multilateral trade agreements. The willingness of actors to move from their initial bargaining positions and make concessions at the multilateral level depends on their outside options, that is, their best or worst alternatives to a negotiated agreement. The more credible an actor’s argument that he has a good alternative to multilateralism, the greater his bargaining power will be. In order to support the argument we will analyze the negotiation process at the multilateral level and link it to PTAs under negotiation by the EU, US, Brazil, Australia, and India.


2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (S1) ◽  
pp. S33-S58 ◽  
Author(s):  
ARLO POLETTI ◽  
DIRK DE BIÈVRE ◽  
J. TYSON CHATAGNIER

AbstractIn the current multilateral trade regime, members often negotiate under the shadow of WTO law. This article develops a formal explanation of the way in which the credible threat to resort to and the actual use of WTO litigation can influence multilateral trade negotiations. We contend that the ability to impose costs on a defendant by way of litigation increases the complainant's bargaining power, opening a bargaining window and ultimately increasing the chances for cooperation in multilateral trade negotiations. On the other hand, the complainant's preference for loss-mitigation over gains from retaliation and its expectations about the likelihood that the defendant will not comply with an adverse ruling can augment the defendant's bargaining leverage. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, increased enforcement does not necessarily make actors shy away from further cooperation, although the credibility of the defendant's non-compliant threats crucially affects the location of any potential negotiated agreement. Empirically, we show that the argument can account for how Brazil, a potential complainant, and the EU and the US, two potential defendants, approached and bargained agricultural negotiations in the Doha Round.


2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 963 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Bouzas ◽  
Julieta Zelicovich

The paralysis of the Doha Round, the proliferation of preferential trade agreement and the launching of mega-regional trade negotiations have encouraged the debate about the governance of international trade. In contrast to a benign interpretation of the relationship between “XXI century regionalism” and the multilateral trade regime, we argue that there is a remarkable continuity between the incentives and characteristics of the “new regionalism” and those of “XXI century regionalism”. Even when the content of the regulatory agenda may have reduced the discriminatory nature of the new agreements, the basic conflict between the two modalities of governance of the international trade regime remains in place.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document