scholarly journals The Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate for Health Insurance

2010 ◽  
Vol 362 (6) ◽  
pp. 482-483 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack M. Balkin
2019 ◽  
pp. 0095327X1987887 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dongjin Oh ◽  
Frances Stokes Berry

In December 2017, Congress repealed the individual insurance mandate penalty. Given the poor health status of veterans, their higher demands for health insurance, and the substantial number of uninsured veterans, the repeal of the individual mandate should have a significant impact on the veterans. This article investigates how the repeal of the individual mandate effective in January 2019 is likely to affect the number of uninsured veterans and their enrollments in Veterans Affairs (VA) insurance. By analyzing 52,692 nonelderly veterans in Florida and California from 2008 to 2017, the findings suggest that the repeal will lead to a considerable increase in the number of uninsured veterans. Veterans who are unemployed, poor, and suffering disabilities are more likely to sign up for the VA insurance than better-off veterans. Thus, one of the important functions of veteran health care is to serve as a social safety net for vulnerable veterans. Thus, the Veterans Health Administration should establish a policy to minimize the expected negative repercussions of the repeal.


2011 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wendy E. Parmet

No provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) has proven to be more contentious than the so-called “individual mandate.” Starting in 2014, the mandate will impose a penalty on non-exempt individuals who lack health insurance. According to Congress, the mandate is essential to ensuring near universal coverage. Without it, PPACA’s insurance reforms will lead healthy individuals to delay purchasing health insurance until they require medical care, resulting in risk pools with a disproportionate share of high-risk people. The price of insurance will then climb, causing more and more not-so-sick people to forego health insurance. The resulting “death spiral” will make insurance unaffordable to many more Americans.


2013 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-572
Author(s):  
Abigail R. Moncrieff

There was an argument that the Obama Administration's lawyers could have made—but didn't—in defending Obamacare's individual mandate against constitutional attack. That argument would have highlighted the role of comprehensive health insurance in steering individuals' healthcare savings and consumption decisions. Because consumer-directed healthcare, which reaches its apex when individuals self-insure, suffers from several known market failures and because comprehensive health insurance policies play an unusually aggressive regulatory role in attempting to correct those failures, the individual mandate could be seen as an attempt to eliminate inefficiencies in the healthcare market that arise from individual decisions to self-insure. This argument would done a better job than the Obama Administration's of aligning the individual mandate with existing Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause precedent, and it would have done a better job of addressing the conservative Justices' primary concerns with upholding the mandate. This Article lays out this forgone defense of the individual mandate.


2011 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 624-651 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel T. Grover

Arguably the most controversial change to the U.S. healthcare system written into the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA” or the “Act”) is what has been colorfully termed the Act’s “individual mandate,” the provision that establishes tax penalties for those who do not maintain health insurance in 2014 and beyond. Though the health insurance mandate does not go into effect until 2014, it has already faced numerous constitutional challenges in district and circuit courts, with entirely inconsistent results. Conflicting decisions regarding the Act’s constitutionality at the circuit court level cry out for Supreme Court review. But while the individual mandate’s validity under either the Commerce Clause or Congress’s taxing power has been the focal point of litigation thus far, another aspect of the individual mandate may undermine the goal of establishing universal, affordable healthcare coverage for all Americans. As currently written, the religious conscience exemption from the PPACA’s individual mandate threatens the efficacy of the Act and potentially exposes it to legal challenges under the Constitution’s Religion Clauses.


2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (3) ◽  
pp. 1030-1066 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin B. Hackmann ◽  
Jonathan T. Kolstad ◽  
Amanda E. Kowalski

We develop a model of selection that incorporates a key element of recent health reforms: an individual mandate. Using data from Massachusetts, we estimate the parameters of the model. In the individual market for health insurance, we find that premiums and average costs decreased significantly in response to the individual mandate. We find an annual welfare gain of 4.1 percent per person or $51.1 million annually in Massachusetts as a result of the reduction in adverse selection. We also find smaller post-reform markups. (JEL D82, G22, H75, I13)


2011 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 394-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
James G. Hodge ◽  
Erin C. Fuse Brown ◽  
Daniel G. Orenstein ◽  
Sarah O'Keefe

Despite historic efforts to enact the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) in 2010, national health reform is threatened by multiple legal challenges grounded in constitutional law. Premier among these claims is the premise that PPACA’s “individual mandate” (requiring all individuals to obtain health insurance by 2014 or face civil penalties) is constitutionally infirm. Attorneys General in Virginia and Florida (joined by 25 other states) allege that Congress’ interstate commerce powers do not authorize federal imposition of the individual mandate because Congress lacks the power to regulate commercial “inactivity.” Stated simply, Congress cannot regulate individuals who choose not to obtain health insurance because they are not engaged in a commercial venture. Several courts initially considering this argument have rejected it, but two federal district courts in Virginia and Florida have concurred, leading to numerous appeals and the near promise of United States Supreme Court review.


2015 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Klock

The Affordable Care Act seeks to remedy the problem of information asymmetry in the health insurance market by mandating that everyone obtain health insurance or pay a penalty, and by requiring the States to expand Medicaid or lose existing federal funds. In NFIB v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts held that Congress’ power to regulate under the Commerce Clause could not justify the Individual Mandate to purchase insurance, but that the penalty could be construed as a tax and upheld under the taxing power. Chief Justice Roberts also held the Medicaid Expansion to be an unconstitutional use of spending power, but determined that the Medicaid Expansion could remain with the States having the option to keep existing funding and not expand or expand and take the incremental funding. Eight Justices disagreed with the Chief Justice on the Individual Mandate, and six Justices disagreed with the Chief Justice on the Medicaid Expansion. This creates a paradox in that a supermajority of the Court believes the case was wrongly decided on both main questions. More distressing is the scant analysis given in all of the opinions to the constitutional constraints on taxes.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 236-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey J. Lee ◽  
Deena Kelly ◽  
Matthew D. McHugh

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 is landmark legislation designed to expand access to health care for virtually all legal U.S. residents. A vital but controversial provision of the ACA requires individuals to maintain health insurance coverage or face a tax penalty—the individual mandate. We examine the constitutionality of the individual mandate by analyzing relevant court decisions. A critical issue has been defining the “activities” Congress is authorized to regulate. Some judges determined that the mandate was constitutional because the decision to go without health insurance, that is, to self-insure, is an activity with substantial economic effects within the overall scheme of the ACA. Opponents suggest that Congress overstepped its authority by regulating “inactivity,” that is, compelling people to purchase insurance when they otherwise would not. The U.S. Supreme Court is set to review the issues and the final ruling will shape the effectiveness of health reform.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 378-407
Author(s):  
Ithai Z. Lurie ◽  
Daniel W. Sacks ◽  
Bradley Heim

We estimate the effect of the ACA’s individual mandate on insurance coverage using regression discontinuity and regression kink designs with tax return data. We have four key results. First, the actual penalty paid per uninsured month is less than half the statutory amount. Second, nonetheless, we find visually clear and statistically signifi-cant responses to both extensive margin exposure to the mandate and to marginal increases in the mandate penalty. Third, we find substantial heterogeneity in who responds; men are especially responsive. Fourth, our estimates imply fairly small quantitative responses to the individual mandate, especially in the Health Insurance Exchanges. (JEL G22, H24, H51, I13, I18)


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