scholarly journals Channel choice and coordination of fresh agricultural products supply chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Yan ◽  
Jing Fan ◽  
Jiwen Wu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Single Channel ◽  
Operating Cost ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Optimal Pricing Strategy ◽  
Internet Channel ◽  
Varying Demand

By constructing a dual-channel fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier, this paper considers the effect of fresh-keeping level on the freshness of perishable products and constructs a time-varying demand function based on freshness. The operating cost of the internet channel to the supplier has also been considered in the model. Optimal pricing strategy and profits of supply chain members under dual channels are investigated respectively in this paper. Comparing the optimal profit under traditional single-channel and dual-channel supply chain, we obtain the condition that the internet operating cost should satisfy. Given the situation where the supplier obtains profit while the retailer loses after the supplier introduced the internet channel, this paper proposes a revenue-sharing contract to make up for the loss of the retailer and achieves a win-win situation. Research shows that in the numerical analysis the supplier’s and the retailer’s profit can only be improved when the operating cost of the internet channel  c  0  and revenue-sharing ratio ψ are within a certain range. When ψ ≥ 0.4 and 0 ≤ c 0  ≤ [[EQUATION]] , Pareto improvement will be attained on both sides in the supply chain.  

scholarly journals Three-level supply chain coordination of fresh agricultural products in the Internet of Things

2017 ◽  
Vol 117 (9) ◽  
pp. 1842-1865 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Yan ◽  
Xiao-hua Wu ◽  
Bing Ye ◽  
Yong-wang Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
The Internet Of Things

Purpose The Internet of Things (IoT) is used in the fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain, which can be coordinated through a revenue-sharing contract. The purpose of this paper is to make the three-level supply chain coordinate in IoT by considering the influence of FAP on market demand and costs of controlling freshness on the road. Design/methodology/approach A three-level FAP supply chain that comprises a manufacturer, distributor, and retailer in IoT is regarded as the research object. This study improves the revenue-sharing contract, determines the optimal solution when the supply chain achieves maximum profit in three types of decision-making situations, and develops the profit distribution model based on the improved revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain. Findings The improved revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the FAP supply chain that comprises a manufacturer, distributor, and retailer in IoT, as well as benefit all enterprises in the supply chain. Practical implications Resource utilization rate can be improved after coordinating the entire supply chain. Moreover, loss in the circulation process is reduced, and the circulation efficiency of FAPs is improved because of the application of IoT. The validity of the model is verified through a case analysis. Originality/value This study is different from other research in terms of the combination of supply chain coordination, FAPs, and radio frequency identification application in IoT.

scholarly journals Pricing and Coordination Strategies of Dual Channels Considering Consumers’ Channel Preferences

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11191
Author(s):  
Rufeng Wang ◽  
Siqi Wang ◽  
Shuli Yan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Customer Loyalty ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Physical Channel ◽  
Dual Channels ◽  
Channel Preferences ◽  
Internet Channel

With the rapid development of electronic commerce, consumers can freely buy the same product from a manufacturers’ Internet channel or a resellers’ physical channel. Based on the consumers’ channel preferences, this article classifies consumers into three types and investigates the price decision in a dual-channel supply chain using a Stackelberg game, which assumes that the manufacturer, as the game leader, first sets the wholesale price, then the reseller decides the retail price, according to the wholesale price. Furthermore, some numerical experiments are developed to investigate the impact of consumer acceptance, the degree of customer loyalty, and the proportion of identical shoppers on prices and profits. The results show that whether both the retail price and the wholesale price rise or fall depends on a combination of the cost of the physical channel and the Internet shopper’s acceptance of the Internet channel. The reseller’s profit is always lower than the manufacturer’s profit. The reseller’s profit is lower and the manufacturer’s profit is higher, compared with that of a traditional single channel supply chain. The numerical experiments showed that when an Internet shopper’s acceptance of an Internet channel is lower, the wholesale price and retail price in the dual channels will increase with an increase of the degree of customer loyalty (the proportion of identical shoppers). The reseller’s profit (the manufacturer’s profit) will reduce (rise) with the augmentation of the Internet shopper’s acceptance of an Internet channel. Finally, we design a revenue-sharing contract that can coordinate the supply chain and implement a win–win strategy for all partners. This work makes some contributions to the research area of coordination in dual-channel supply chains.

Pricing and service decision of dual-channel operations in an O2O closed-loop supply chain

2017 ◽  
Vol 117 (8) ◽  
pp. 1567-1588 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lingcheng Kong ◽  
Zhiyang Liu ◽  
Yafei Pan ◽  
Jiaping Xie ◽  
Guang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Return Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Channel Conflict ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Dual Channel

Purpose The online direct selling mode has been widely accepted by enterprises in the O2O era. However, the dual-channel (online/offline, forward/backward) operations of the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) changed the relationship between manufacturers and retailers, thus resulting in channel conflict. The purpose of this paper is to take a dual-channel operations of CLSC as the research target, where a manufacturer sells a single product through a direct e-channel as well as a conventional retail channel; the retailer are responsible for collecting used products in the reverse supply chain and the manufacturer are responsible for remanufacturing. Design/methodology/approach The authors build a benchmark model of dual-channel price and service competition and take the return rate, which is considered to be related to the service level of the retailer, as the function of the service level to extend the model in the reverse SC. The authors then analyze the optimal pricing and service decision under centralization and decentralization, respectively. Finally, with the revenue-sharing factor, wholesale price and recycling price transfer payment coefficient as contract parameters, the paper also designs a revenue-sharing contract led by the manufacturer and explores in what situation the contract could realize the Pareto optimization of all players. Findings In the baseline model, the results show that optimal price and service level correlate positively in centralization; however, the relation relies on consumers’ price sensitivity in decentralization. In the extension model, the relationship between price and service level also relies on the relative value of increased service cost and remanufacturing saved cost. When the return rate correlates with the service level, a recycling transfer payment can elevate the service level and thus raise the return rate. Through analyzing the parameters in revenue-sharing contract, a point can be reached where lowering the wholesale price and raising the transfer payment coefficient will promote retailers to share revenue. Practical implications Many enterprises establish the dual-channel distribution system both online and offline, which need to understand how to resolve their channel conflict. The conflict is especially strong in CLSC with remanufacturing. The result helps the node enterprises realize the coordination of the dual-channel CLSC. Originality/value It takes into account the fact that there are two complementary relationships, such as online selling and offline delivery; used product recycling and remanufacturing. The authors optimize the strategy of product pricing and service level in order to solve channel conflict and double marginalization in the closed-loop dual-channel distribution network.

LMI-Based H ∞ Control for Dual-Channel E-Commerce CLSC Networks and its Bullwhip Effect

2015 ◽  
Vol 734 ◽  
pp. 216-219
Author(s):  
Hai Feng Guo
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Reverse Logistics ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Bullwhip Effect ◽  
Linear Matrix ◽  
Supply Chain Networks ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Linear Matrix Inequality Approach ◽  
Internet Channel ◽  
Effective Integration

Through the effective integration of the traditional channel and Internet channel, Dual-channel E-commerce is so important in the supply chain. In this paper, a state space dynamic model of a Dual-channel E-commerce closed-loop supply chain networks is established, which includes the manufacturer, the distributor, the consumer and the reverse logistics including the remanufacturing and the gratuitous return. An l2 norm of the model’s transfer function is described as a method to quantify the bullwhip effect. In order to minimize of the up bound of the bullwhip effect, the linear matrix inequality approach is applied to design H∞ control strategy under the uncertain conditions. A simulation number example indicates the proposed algorithm is effective and feasible.

Competition and Coordination in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain With Asymmetric Retailers

2020 ◽  
pp. 1311-1328
Author(s):  
YuHang Zhang ◽  
Ying Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Single Channel ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Market ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Different Characteristics ◽  
Linear Quantity

This article studies competition and coordination in a dual-channel supply chain where one supplier supplies homogeneous products to multiple asymmetric retailers, meanwhile, selling products to the end consumers acting as retailers, through a two-level Stackelberg game. This article first studies the asymmetry among the retailers in terms of the different characteristics of the cost, price, quantity. This article finds that a supplier's profits increase when the number of retailers are high enough in the retail market, even though the retail price of the retailers is lower than that of the supplier, or the wholesale price is cut down when there are many retailers competing in the retail market. On the other hand, under certain conditions, the efficiency of supply chain goes to 1. In this article, the authors show that some traditional contracts that can perfectly coordinate the single-channel supply chain, while failing to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain. Therefore, this article puts forth a linear quantity discount contract and first proves it can be applicable to the dual-channel supply chain with asymmetric retailers under a certain special condition where the lead retailer exits the retail market. The authors examine contracts which can reduce the loss of the efficiency, though they cannot completely coordinate a dual-channel supply chain.

How Internet Channel Promotions Work Together Based on a Weakest Online Manufacturer? From the Dual Markets Capacity Optimization Perspective

2013 ◽  
Vol 275-277 ◽  
pp. 2689-2692
Author(s):  
Pei Qin Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Model Analysis ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Capacity Optimization ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Internet Market ◽  
Internet Channel

Channel promotion competitions have been common in the Internet market. The paper researches three supply chain partners’ dynamic games in dual markets to find out how Internet channel promotions affect them. Being a leader the first manufacturer’s role is complicated who is the weaker traditional retailer’s supplier, and it competes with the second weakest manufacturer in the internet contemporarily. Then it finds out their optimal decisions by model analysis. Especially it focuses on analyzing how the two Internet channel promotion forms affect three enterprises’ optimal revenues, etc. Besides, some managerial inspiration about capacity optimization could be find out.

Research on Strategies of Pricing and Coordinating in Reverse Supply Chain for Remanufacturing

2012 ◽  
Vol 203 ◽  
pp. 459-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhan Feng Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Reverse Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Optimal Pricing Strategy ◽  
Applied Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game Model

Based on the remanufacturing reverse supply chain consisted of single retailer and single manufacturer, this paper applied game theory to establish a non-cooperative game and cooperative game model and got optimal pricing strategy by solving this two kinds of game model. By comparing the total profits of reverse supply chain in every game model, a conclusion was draw that non-cooperative game model led to profit loss and double marginal effect. In order to solve the problems, revenue sharing contract was used to coordinate the reverse supply chain and coordinating strategy was got. The results show that revenue sharing contract can increase the total profits of the reverse supply chain, while at the same time meet the respective interests of retailer and manufacturer and coordinate the reverse supply chain.

scholarly journals Mobile Communication Procurement Platform Optimization Decision Based on Overseas Retailer Investment under Supply and Demand Disruption Risk

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Deli Wang ◽  
Wuwei Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Mobile Communication ◽  
Single Channel ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
National Policy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Disruption Risk

With the rapid development of mobile communication procurement platform, it is faced with many risks, such as national policy differences, regional market differentiation, trade control, and technical barriers. Among them, the risk of supply and demand interruption will lead to the disconnection between upstream and downstream enterprises and consumers in the crossborder supply chain, making it difficult for them to achieve the profit target of the supply chain and meet the market demand. In order to reduce the risk of supply and demand disruption in mobile communication procurement platform and improve the ability to prevent and deal with disruption emergencies, a two-level supply chain composed of crossborder suppliers, overseas suppliers, and overseas retailers is established, and the procurement decision optimization of crossborder supply chain under the condition of single channel procurement and dual channel procurement before and after investment is studied. The research show that when overseas retailers invest in crossborder suppliers and choose a dual-source ordering strategy, it is more conducive to overseas retailers to reduce the risk of crossborder supply chain interruption and obtain higher expected profits.

scholarly journals Tripartite game models in a dual-channel supply chain: competition and cooperation

2021 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 653-671
Author(s):  
Zhenkai Lou ◽  
Fujun Hou ◽  
Xuming Lou ◽  
Yubing Zhai
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Competition And Cooperation ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Bertrand Game ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper considers tripartite games in a dual-channel supply chain which involves a manufacturer, an offline retailer and an online retailer. Both competition and cooperation issues are analyzed. In the competition model, a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and two retailers and a Bertrand game between two retailers occur simultaneously. It is shown that the channel which attracts more consumers’ purchase preference is charged a higher wholesale price and it meanwhile declares a higher sales price. In the presence of revenue sharing, cooperation issues between the three participants are studied and the change of the revenue of each participant is analyzed when partial cooperation exists. Further, the definition of the optimum two-player coalition is proposed. We demonstrate that the channel which attracts more preference of consumers is definitely in the optimum coalition. The structure of the two-player coalition is analyzed. Finally, under revenue sharing and cost apportionments, the change of each participant’s profit is examined.

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