Congestion cost allocation method in a pool model

2003 ◽  
Vol 150 (5) ◽  
pp. 604 ◽  
Author(s):  
H.S. Jung ◽  
D. Hur ◽  
J.K. Park
Author(s):  
Hongming Yang ◽  
Yu Wang ◽  
Mingyong Lai

In bilateral transaction market, the congestion relief cost should be allocated in an equitable manner among all the market participants contributing to the congestion. Unfortunately in the allocation of the congestion relief cost to the congested lines, which is the first step of cost allocation, the previously proposed shadow price method and the aggregated allocation method both have some shortcomings. To overcome these shortcomings, a cost allocation method based on the Aumann-Shapley value is proposed. By means of the Aumann-Shapley value, a solution concept in the cooperative game with infinitely many players, the proposed method takes all orders of relieving congestion on the lines into consideration and satisfies the consistency of the allocation, thus guarantees equitable allocation of the congestion relief cost to the congested lines. In addition, the calculating procedure is both simple and accurate due to the use of the Gauss Integration method. Test results show that this method can lead to better allocation than do the shadow price method and the aggregated allocation method.


Energy ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 134 ◽  
pp. 240-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zefeng Wang ◽  
Wei Han ◽  
Na Zhang ◽  
Meng Liu ◽  
Hongguang Jin

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Ning Liu ◽  
Yaorong Cheng

Interest has been raised by the recent identification of cooperation cost through collaborative planning in horizontal logistics operations. Even though cooperation cost can be realized, one key question exists: how should cooperation cost be divided among a group of collaborating companies. In this article, the question is studied in a centralized framework context. We divide the participants into two groups, leading companies (LC) and nonleading companies (NLC), and propose five fair distribution rules from the perspective of leading companies. According to these distribution principles, we developed an allocation method called Leading-idealism Cost Allocation Model (LiCAM) and compared it with three existing classic allocation mechanisms which violate some of these criteria are discussed. Computational results show that our method has acceptable calculation time, stability, consistency, and monotony. Our model can fully reflect the value as a leading company which is consistent with the actual practice requirements. We also illustrate the value and operability of our model by discussing the number of leading companies and the size of the alliance.


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