Application of the Shapley Value on transmission cost allocation in the competitive power market environment

2002 ◽  
Vol 149 (1) ◽  
pp. 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
X. Tan ◽  
T.T. Lie
Author(s):  
Alexander Kolker

The goal of this chapter is to illustrate two mathematical game theory concepts for allocating costs (savings) between cooperating participants, specifically in healthcare settings. These concepts are the nucleolus and the Shapley value. The focus of this chapter is on the practical application of the Shapley value for the cost sharing within the bundled payments model for the episodes of care mandated recently by the Center for Medicare Services (CMS). The general Shapley value methodology is illustrated, as well as an important particular case in which each participant uses only a portion of the largest participant's asset (the so-called airport game). The intended readers are primarily leaders of organizations and hospitals involved in the implementation of the CMS mandated bundled payment model for the episodes of care.


Author(s):  
Shijie Ji ◽  
Shengnan Zhang ◽  
Yupeng Dong ◽  
Dunnan Liu ◽  
Jiahao Liang ◽  
...  

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Shanshan Liu ◽  
Zhaohui Liu

We consider the parallel identical machine sequencing situation without initial schedule. For the situation with identical job processing time, we design a cost allocation rule which gives the Shapley value of the related sequencing game in polynomial time. For the game with identical job weight, we also present a polynomial time procedure to compute the Shapley value.


1979 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alvin E. Roth ◽  
Robert E. Verrecchia

2019 ◽  
pp. 200-217
Author(s):  
Miren Josune Albizuri ◽  
Juan Carlos Santos ◽  
José Manuel Zarzuelo

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