TRUDA: a truthful auction mechanism with non-uniform payment for heterogeneous spectrum access in wireless networks

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (14) ◽  
pp. 2214-2220
Author(s):  
Yonglong Zhang ◽  
Bin Li ◽  
Haiyan Qin
2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zijuan Shi ◽  
Gaofeng Luo

Abstract Auction is often applied in cognitive wireless networks due to its fairness properties and efficiency. To solve the allocation issues of cognitive wireless network inamulti-band spectrum, multi-item auction mechanism and models were discussed in depth. Multi-item highest price sealed auction was designed for cognitive wireless networks’multi-band spectrum allocation algorithm. This algorithm divided the spectrum allocation process into several stages which was along with low complexity. Experiments show that the algorithm improves the utilization of spectrum frequency, because it takes into account the spectrum owner’s economic efficiency and the users’equity.


Author(s):  
Danda B. Rawat ◽  
Chandra Bajracharya ◽  
Gongjun Yan

Wireless technologies and devices are becoming increasingly ubiquitous in modern society. Wireless resources are natural and fixed, whereas wireless technologies and devices are increasing day-by-day, resulting in spectrum scarcity. As a consequence, efficient use of limited wireless resources has become an issue of vital importance in wireless systems. As demand increases, management of limited wireless resources for optimal allocation becomes crucial. Optimal allocation of limited wireless resources results in quick and reliable dissemination of information to larger service areas. Recently, game theory has emerged as an efficient tool to help optimally allocate wireless resources. Game theory is an optimization technique based on strategic situations and decision-making, and has found its application in numerous fields. The first part of this chapter presents a review of game theory and its application in resource allocation at different layers of the protocol stack of the network model. As shown by a recent study, static assignment of frequency spectrum by governmental bodies, such as FCC (Federal Communications Commission) in the United States, is inefficient since the licensed systems do not always fully utilize their frequency bands. In such a scenario, unlicensed secondary (cognitive radio) users can identify the idle spectrum bands and use them opportunistically. In order to access the licensed spectrum dynamically and opportunistically, the dynamic spectrum access functionality needs to be incorporated in the next generation (XG) wireless networks. Different game theory approaches for dynamic spectrum access are discussed in the second part of the chapter.


2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 314-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Faisal Uddin ◽  
Hamed M. K. AlAzemi ◽  
Chadi Assi

2006 ◽  
Vol 50 (13) ◽  
pp. 2127-2159 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian F. Akyildiz ◽  
Won-Yeol Lee ◽  
Mehmet C. Vuran ◽  
Shantidev Mohanty

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