High key exchange rate quantum key distribution in optical fibres

Author(s):  
G. Buller
2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 181-186
Author(s):  
Th. Beth ◽  
J. Muller-Quade ◽  
R. Steinwandt

Recently, a quantum key exchange protocol has been described\cite{PFLM04}, which served as basis for securing an actual bank transaction by means of quantum cryptography \cite{ZVS04}. The authentication scheme used to this aim has been proposed by Peev et al. \cite{PML04}. Here we show, that this authentication is insecure in the sense that an attacker can provoke a situation where initiator and responder of a key exchange end up with different keys. Moreover, it may happen that an attacker can decrypt a part of the plaintext protected with the derived encryption key.


2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (4&5) ◽  
pp. 326-335
Author(s):  
M. Legré ◽  
H. Zbinden ◽  
N. Gisin

We demonstrate an implementation of quantum key distribution with continuous variables based on a go-&-return configuration over distances up to 14km. This configuration leads to self-compensation of polarisation and phase fluctuations. We observe a high degree of stability of our set-up over many hours.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 045015 ◽  
Author(s):  
G B Xavier ◽  
N Walenta ◽  
G Vilela de Faria ◽  
G P Temporão ◽  
N Gisin ◽  
...  

2006 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liu Wei-Tao ◽  
Wu Wei ◽  
Liang Lin-Mei ◽  
Li Cheng-Zu ◽  
Yuan Jian-Min

2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (11) ◽  
pp. 1750119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junaid ur Rehman ◽  
Saad Qaisar ◽  
Youngmin Jeong ◽  
Hyundong Shin

Quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes rely on the randomness to exchange secret keys between two parties. A control key to generate the same (pseudo)-randomness for the key exchanging parties increases the key exchange rate. However, the use of pseudo-randomness where true randomness is required makes a classical system vulnerable to the known plain-text attack. Contrary to the belief of unavailability of this attack in QKD, we show that this attack is actually possible whenever a control key is employed. In this paper, we show that it is possible to make use of the uncertainty principle to not only avoid this attack, but also remove the hazards of photon-number splitting attack in quantum setting. We define the secrecy of control key based on the guessing probability, and propose a scheme to achieve this defined secrecy. We show the general applicability of our framework on the most common QKD schemes.


2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Mingesz ◽  
Laszlo Bela Kish ◽  
Zoltan Gingl ◽  
Claes-Göran Granqvist ◽  
He Wen ◽  
...  

Abstract There is an ongoing debate about the fundamental security of existing quantum key exchange schemes. This debate indicates not only that there is a problem with security but also that the meanings of perfect, imperfect, conditional and unconditional (information theoretic) security in physically secure key exchange schemes are often misunderstood. It has been shown recently that the use of two pairs of resistors with enhanced Johnsonnoise and a Kirchhoff-loop ‒ i.e., a Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) protocol ‒ for secure key distribution leads to information theoretic security levels superior to those of today’s quantum key distribution. This issue is becoming particularly timely because of the recent full cracks of practical quantum communicators, as shown in numerous peer-reviewed publications. The KLJN system is briefly surveyed here with discussions about the essential questions such as (i) perfect and imperfect security characteristics of the key distribution, and (ii) how these two types of securities can be unconditional (or information theoretical).


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