Comment: Signature scheme based on discrete logarithm without using one-way hash-function

1998 ◽  
Vol 34 (24) ◽  
pp. 2329 ◽  
Author(s):  
C.Y. Yeun ◽  
C.J. Mitchell ◽  
S.L. Ng
2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 57
Author(s):  
Herdita Fajar Isnaini ◽  
Karyati Karyati

Tanda tangan digital dapat dijadikan sebagai salah satu cara untuk menjamin keaslian pesan atau informasi yang diterima. Salah satu skema yang dapat digunakan dalam membentuk tanda tangan adalah skema tanda tangan Schnorr. Skema tanda tangan ini berdasarkan pada masalah logaritma diskret. Skema ini memerlukan penggunaan fungsi hash yang akan menghasilkan nilai hash pesan untuk pembuatan tanda tangan, yang menjadi salah satu alasan keamanan dari skema ini. Skema tanda tangan Schnorr terdiri dari tiga proses, yaitu: pembentukan kunci, pembuatan tanda tangan serta verifikasi. Kajian ini akan membahas mengenai skema tanda tangan Schnorr dalam membentuk tanda tangan digital sebagai pengaman keaslian informasi, yang dibahas per prosesnya, meliputi: pembentukan kunci, pembuatan tanda tangan yang disertai perhitungan nilai hash serta verifikasi. Hasil dari kajian ini adalah didapatkan algoritma – algoritma dari skema tanda tangan Schnorr, yaitu algoritma pembentukan kunci publik dan kunci privat, algoritma pembuatan tanda tangan, serta algoritma verifikasi tanda tangan.Kata Kunci: tanda tangan digital, skema tanda tangan Schnorr, nilai hash, kunci publik, kunci privat. Implementation of Schnorr Signature Scheme in The Form of  Digital Signature AbstractDigital signature can be used as a way to ensure the authenticity of a received message or information. There is a scheme that can be used to form a signature called Schnorr signature scheme. This signature scheme is based on discrete logarithm problem. This scheme requires the use of hash function that will result to a message digest to form the signature, which is the reason of this scheme’s security. Schnorr signature scheme consists of three processes, namely: the key generation, signature formation, and verification. This study will discuss the Schnorr signature scheme in the form of digital signatures as a safeguard of an information’s authenticity, which is discussed process by process, including: the key generation, signature formation as well as the calculation of message digest and verification. The results of this study obtained algorithms - algorithms of Schnorr signature scheme, which is an algorithm of a public key and a private key generation, an algorithm of the signature formation, and an algorithm of signature verification.Keywords: digital signature, Schnorr signature scheme, message digest, public key, privat key


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 155014772110017
Author(s):  
Han-Yu Lin

Fog computing is viewed as an extended technique of cloud computing. In Internet of things–based collaborative fog computing systems, a fog node aggregating lots of data from Internet of things devices has to transmit the information to distributed cloud servers that will collaboratively verify it based on some predefined auditing policy. However, compromised fog nodes controlled by an adversary might inject bogus data to cheat or confuse remote servers. It also causes the waste of communication and computation resources. To further control the lifetime of signing capability for fog nodes, an appropriate mechanism is crucial. In this article, the author proposes a time-constrained strong multi-designated verifier signature scheme to meet the above requirement. In particular, a conventional non-delegatable strong multi-designated verifier signature scheme with low computation is first given. Based on its constructions, we show how to transform it into a time-constrained variant. The unforgeability of the proposed schemes is formally proved based on the famous elliptic curve discrete logarithm assumption. The security requirement of strong signer ambiguity for our substantial constructions is also analyzed by utilizing the intractable assumption of decisional Diffie–Hellman. Moreover, some comparisons in terms of the signature size and computational costs for involved entities among related mechanisms are made.


Author(s):  
Nikolay A. Moldovyan ◽  
◽  
Alexandr A. Moldovyan ◽  

The article considers the structure of the 2x2 matrix algebra set over a ground finite field GF(p). It is shown that this algebra contains three types of commutative subalgebras of order p2, which differ in the value of the order of their multiplicative group. Formulas describing the number of subalgebras of every type are derived. A new post-quantum digital signature scheme is introduced based on a novel form of the hidden discrete logarithm problem. The scheme is characterized in using scalar multiplication as an additional operation masking the hidden cyclic group in which the basic exponentiation operation is performed when generating the public key. The advantage of the developed signature scheme is the comparatively high performance of the signature generation and verification algorithms as well as the possibility to implement a blind signature protocol on its base.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Nguyễn Đào Trường ◽  
Lê Văn Tuấn

Tóm tắt— Chữ ký số ngày càng được sử dụng rộng rãi và là yêu cầu bắt buộc đối với rất nhiều nền tảng an toàn. Bài báo đề xuất một giải pháp nâng cao độ an toàn cho lược đồ chữ ký số dựa trên bài toán logarit rời rạc trên vành hữu hạn Zn.Abstract— The digital signature is increasingly widely used, and it is the mandatory requirement for many security platforms. The paper proposes a solution to improve the security of digital signature scheme based on the problem of discrete logarithm on finite ring Zn.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Kashi Neupane

Abstract. Key establishment protocols based on hardness assumptions, such as the discrete logarithm problem and the integer factorization problem, are vulnerable to quantum computer attacks, whereas the protocols based on other hardness assumptions, such as the conjugacy search problem and the decomposition search problem, can resist such attacks. The existing protocols based on the hardness assumptions which can resist quantum computer attacks are only passively secure. Compilers are used to convert a passively secure protocol to an actively secure protocol. Compilers involve some tools such as a signature scheme and a collision-resistant hash function. If there are only passively secure protocols but not a signature scheme based on the same assumption, then the application of existing compilers requires the use of such tools based on different assumptions. But the introduction of new tools, based on different assumptions, makes the new actively secure protocol rely on more than one hardness assumption. We offer an approach to derive an actively secure two-party protocol from a passively secure two-party protocol without introducing further hardness assumptions. This serves as a useful formal tool to transform any basic algebraic method of public key cryptography to the real world applicable cryptographic scheme.


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