scholarly journals Optimal control and stabilization for linear continuous‐time mean‐field systems with delay

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao Ma ◽  
Qingyuan Qi ◽  
Xun Li ◽  
Huanshui Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Control ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Mean Field ◽  
Field Systems

scholarly journals Stabilization Control for Linear Continuous-Time Mean-Field Systems

2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (8) ◽  
pp. 3461-3468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qingyuan Qi ◽  
Huanshui Zhang ◽  
Zhen Wu
Keyword(s):  
Continuous Time ◽  
Mean Field ◽  
Stabilization Control ◽  
Field Systems

On closed-loop equilibrium strategies for mean-field stochastic linear quadratic problems

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 41
Author(s):  
Tianxiao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Control ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Optimal Control Problems ◽  
Mean Field ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Control Problems ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Linear Quadratic Optimal Control ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies

This article is concerned with linear quadratic optimal control problems of mean-field stochastic differential equations (MF-SDE) with deterministic coefficients. To treat the time inconsistency of the optimal control problems, linear closed-loop equilibrium strategies are introduced and characterized by variational approach. Our developed methodology drops the delicate convergence procedures in Yong [Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 369 (2017) 5467–5523]. When the MF-SDE reduces to SDE, our Riccati system coincides with the analogue in Yong [Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 369 (2017) 5467–5523]. However, these two systems are in general different from each other due to the conditional mean-field terms in the MF-SDE. Eventually, the comparisons with pre-committed optimal strategies, open-loop equilibrium strategies are given in details.

scholarly journals Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Guerrazzi
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Control ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Speed Of Convergence ◽  
Wage Setting ◽  
Dynamic Version ◽  
Efficient Bargaining ◽  
Over Time

AbstractIn this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal control in which a firm and a union bargain over the wage in a continuous-time environment under the supervision of an infinitely lived mediator. Overturning the findings achieved by means of a companion right-to-manage framework, I demonstrate that when employment is assumed to adjust itself with some attrition in the direction of the contract curve implied by the preferences of the two bargainers, increases in the bargaining power of the firm (union) accelerate (delay) the speed of convergence towards the stationary solution. In addition, confirming the reversal of the results obtained when employment moves over time towards the firm’s labour demand, I show that the dynamic negotiation of wages tends to penalize unionized workers and favour the firm with respect to the bargaining outcomes retrieved with a similar static wage-setting model.

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