Cyber security of operational technology: understanding differences and achieving balance between nuclear safety and nuclear security

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Litherland ◽  
R. Orr ◽  
R. Piggin
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Security ◽  
Nuclear Safety ◽  
Nuclear Security

scholarly journals JRC in Euratom Research and Training Programme − 2014–2020

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 45
Author(s):  
Said Abousahl ◽  
Andrea Bucalossi ◽  
Victor Esteban Gran ◽  
Manuel Martin Ramos
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Management ◽  
Waste Management ◽  
Emergency Preparedness ◽  
Training Programme ◽  
Nuclear Safety ◽  
Research Infrastructure ◽  
Framework Programme ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
And Training ◽  
The Eu

The Euratom Research and Training Programme 2014–2018 and its extension 2019–2020 (the Euratom Programme) is implemented through direct actions in fission − i.e. research performed by the Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC), and through indirect actions in fission– i.e. via competitive calls for proposals, and in fusion − i.e. through a comprehensive named-beneficiary co-fund action managed by the Commission's Directorate-General for Research & Innovation (RTD). The general objective of the Programme is “to pursue nuclear research and training activities with an emphasis on the continuous improvement of nuclear safety, security and radiation protection, in particular to potentially contribute to the long-term decarbonisation of the energy system in a safe, efficient and secure way.” The Programme is an integral part of Horizon 2020, the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation. The direct actions implemented by the JRC constitute an important part of the Euratom Programme and pursue specific objectives covering: nuclear safety, radioactive waste management, decommissioning, emergency preparedness; nuclear security, safeguards and non-proliferation; standardisation; knowledge management; education and training; and support to the policy of the Union on these fields. The JRC multi-annual work programme for nuclear activities fully reflects the aforementioned objectives. It is structured in about 20 projects, and allocates 48% of its resources to nuclear safety, waste management, decommissioning and emergency preparedness, 33% to nuclear security, safeguards and non-proliferation, 12% to reference standards, nuclear science and non-energy applications and 7% to education, training and knowledge management. To ensure that direct actions are in line with and complement the research and training needs of Member States, JRC is continuously interacting with the main research and scientific institutions in the EU, and actively participating in several technological platforms and associations. JRC also participates as part of the consortia in indirect actions, which allows JRC scientist to engage in top level scientific research, and yields maintaining and further developing JRC's scientific excellence. At the same time, the members of the consortia can have access to unique research infrastructure. The participation of JRC in indirect actions can be improved by exploiting synergies inside the Euratom Programme, and also with the future Horizon Europe Framework Programme. In preparation of the next Euratom Programme 2021–2025, two pilot projects on knowledge management and on open access to JRC research infrastructure will explore and test this improved involvement of JRC in indirect actions. The paper highlights some of the achievements of recent JRC direct actions with a focus on the interaction with EU MS research organisations, as well as some of the most important elements of the Commission Proposal for the next (2021–2025) Euratom Programme, with a focus on the new positioning of the JRC as regards its participation in indirect actions.

From Cyber Norms to Cyber Rules: Re-engaging States as Law-makers

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 877-899 ◽  
Author(s):  
KUBO MAČÁK
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Technological Development ◽  
Nuclear Safety ◽  
Window Of Opportunity ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
Critical Window ◽  
Legal Questions ◽  
Near Future ◽  
Law Making

AbstractSeveral indicators point to a crisis at the heart of the emerging area of international cyber security law. First, proposals for binding international treaties by leading stakeholders, including China and Russia, have been met with little enthusiasm by other states, and are generally seen as having limited prospects of success. Second, states are extremely reluctant to commit themselves to specific interpretations of controversial legal questions and thus to express their cyberopinio juris. Third, instead of interpreting or developing rules, state representatives seek refuge in the more ambiguous term ‘norms’. This article argues that the reluctance of states to engage in international law-making has left a power vacuum, lending credence to claims that international law fails in addressing modern challenges posed by rapid technological development. In response, several non-state-driven norm-making initiatives have sought to fill the void, including Microsoft's cyber norms proposals and theTallinn Manualproject. The article then contends that this emerging body of non-binding norms presents states with a critical window of opportunity to reclaim a central law-making position, similar to historical precedents including the development of legal regimes for Antarctica and nuclear safety. Whether the supposed crisis will lead to the demise of inter-state cyberspace governance or a recalibration of legal approaches will thus be decided in the near future. States should assume a central role if they want to ensure that the existing power vacuum is not exploited in a way that would upset their ability to achieve strategic and political goals.

Problem of China's Nuclear Security Supervision System

2014 ◽  
Vol 962-965 ◽  
pp. 1806-1808
Author(s):  
Jing Yi Kong
Keyword(s):  
Public Administration ◽  
Regulatory System ◽  
Nuclear Safety ◽  
Atomic Energy ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Supervision System ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
Legal Construction

In the perspective of public administration study, intends to explore and analyze the problems rooted in China's current nuclear safety regulatory system, which are associated with such respects as inter-ministerial coordination mechanism, legal construction and personnel allotment. The absence of authoritative department overseeing nuclear safety, the omission of The Atomic Energy Act, and the inefficiency of nuclear safety regulatory personnel are important factors restraining China’s progress on the reform of nuclear safety regulatory system.

scholarly journals A Institucionalização da Política Internacional Nuclear: entre a Não Proliferação de Armas e a Prevenção contra Acidentes

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 543-572
Author(s):  
Leonardo Carvalho Leite Azeredo Bandarra ◽  
Patrícia Nabuco Martuscelli
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Second World War ◽  
Nuclear Safety ◽  
World War ◽  
Atomic Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
Core Issue ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Second World

No campo da segurança nuclear (nuclear security), a não proliferação de armas atômicas é tema patente desde o final da Segunda Guerra Mundial, em especial durante o período da Guerra Fria. De fato, conformou-se, neste momento, um conjunto amplo de regras, normas e organizações direcionadas para conter o avanço das armas nucleares. Essas instituições tornaram-se mecanismos fundamentais no que concerne à condução das relações internacionais contemporâneas. Tendo esse cenário em perspectiva, o presente artigo busca analisar os rumos do regime internacional de não proliferação nuclear desde a década de 1960, destacando as diferenças entre três períodos (décadas de 1950-1960; décadas de 1970-1980; décadas de 1990-2000). Dentre as principais modificações, destaca-se uma mudança de ênfase nas relações internacionais, em direção a aspectos de seguridade nuclear (nuclear safety) principalmente após o acidente de Chernobyl (1986). Palavras-Chave: regimes internacionais; segurança internacional; não proliferação de armas nucleares, Guerra Fria, segurança nuclear.     Abstract: In the field of nuclear security, the non-proliferation of atomic weapons is a core issue since the end of the Second World War and especially during the Cold War. In fact, during this period, it has been designed a wide set of rules, norms, and organizations, which were directed to counter the advance of nuclear weapons. These institutions became fundamental mechanisms to the conduction of contemporary international relations. Considering this scenario, this article aims to analyze the directions of the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation since the 1960’s, highlighting the differences within three periods (1950’s-1960’s; 1970’s-1980’s; 1990’s-2000’s). Among the main modification, we highlight a change in emphasis towards issues related to nuclear safety, especially after the Chernobyl accident (1986). Key-Words: International Regimes; International Security; Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; Cold War; Nuclear Safety.     Recebido em: abril/2017 Aprovado em: dezembro/2017

scholarly journals Cyberwar as a Phenomenon of Asymmetric Threat and Cyber-Nuclear Security Threats

2019 ◽  
pp. 50-57
Author(s):  
Alika Guchua ◽  
Thornike Zedelashvili
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Security ◽  
International Security ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Modern World ◽  
Global Changes ◽  
Security Threats ◽  
Cyber Terrorism ◽  
Hybrid Warfare ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
Nuclear Security

The work deals with the topic of cyberwar as a phenomenon of asymmetric threat and cyber-nuclear security threats in modern world politics, potential threats to international politics and global security issues, counter-terrorism policies are discussed. The paper discusses the challenges facing cyber security worldwide and the phenomenon of cyber security against the backdrop of asymmetric threats. Cyberspace has already become a weapon of infinite capacity for the whole world. It has generated positive effect as well as has become the area of evil for terrorists, which are actively using modern technologies, computer systems. The facts are many and we are often in the center of events. With the development of technology in the 21st century, global changes are taking place in international security, the geopolitical transition and new threats and challenges, and international security issues are becoming increasingly important. The international security system is vulnerable to challenges such as the use of weapons of mass destruction and cyber terrorism. The article discusses the dangers and problems of hybrid warfare in international security, as well as the Russian-Georgian hybrid warfare. Keywords: Cyberwar, asymmetric threat, hackers, attack, hybrid war, Russia-Georgia, NATO, EU, nuclear terrorism, nuclear security

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