scholarly journals Moral Bargain Hunters Purchase Moral Righteousness When it is Cheap: Within-Individual Effect of Stake Size in Economic Games

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Toshio Yamagishi ◽  
Yang Li ◽  
Yoshie Matsumoto ◽  
Toko Kiyonari
Keyword(s):  
Individual Effect ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Stake Size

Measuring perceptions of post-conflict actors’ economic behavior: the case of Colombia

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santiago Alonso Diaz ◽  
Nicolás Enrique Arévalo Jaimes ◽  
Sebastian Balcucho ◽  
Daniel Duque ◽  
Tatiana García ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
University Students ◽  
Exposure To Violence ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Economic Behavior ◽  
Behavioral Changes ◽  
Current Evidence ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Intertemporal Discounting

Exposure to violence has lasting effects on economic behavior years after it has ended. Previous literature has proved that there is an increase in altruism, impatience, and risk-seeking. However, it is unknown if regular citizens, not directly involved in the conflict, perceive such economic behavior in post-conflict actors. We asked participants to report, relative to them, how Colombia's post-conflict actors (ex-guerrillas, ex-paramilitaries, and victims) behave in different economic games (dictator game, lotteries, and intertemporal discounting). Our sample of university students believes that victims are less altruistic than current evidence with real victims, not particularly risky, and impatient. Also, that former combatants are risk-seeking, impatient, and altruistic towards victims. These beliefs about post-conflict actors' economic behavior do not consistently coincide with behavioral changes found in actual actors involved in violence and could guide reintegration policies.

On economic games which are not necessarily superadditive

1979 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 301-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Guesnerie ◽  
C. Oddou
Keyword(s):  
Economic Games

scholarly journals When Fair Is Not Equal

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (8) ◽  
pp. 847-857 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kun Zhao ◽  
Eamonn Ferguson ◽  
Luke D. Smillie
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Personality Traits ◽  
Big Five ◽  
Real World ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Prosocial Behaviors ◽  
Contextual Cues ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
The Real

Growing evidence has highlighted the importance of social norms in promoting prosocial behaviors in economic games. Specifically, individual differences in norm adherence—captured by the politeness aspect of Big Five agreeableness—have been found to predict fair allocations of wealth to one’s partner in the dictator game. Yet, most studies have used neutrally framed paradigms, where players may default to norms of equality in the absence of contextual cues. In this study ( N = 707), we examined prosocial personality traits and dictator allocations under salient real-world norms of equity and need. Extending on the previous research, we found that—in addition to politeness—the compassion aspect of agreeableness predicted greater allocations of wealth when they were embedded in real-world norms. These results represent an important step in understanding the real-world implications of laboratory-based research, demonstrating the importance of both normative context and prosocial traits.

scholarly journals The role of character traits in economic games

2017 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 186-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Willibald Ruch ◽  
Richard Bruntsch ◽  
Lisa Wagner
Keyword(s):  
Character Traits ◽  
Economic Games

scholarly journals The pyeTribe: Simultaneous eyetracking for economic games

2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 1769-1779 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomás Lejarraga ◽  
Michael Schulte-Mecklenbeck ◽  
Daniel Smedema
Keyword(s):  
Economic Games

scholarly journals Does Cooperation in the Laboratory Reflect the Operation of A Broad Trait?

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H.B. McAuliffe ◽  
Daniel E. Forster ◽  
Eric J. Pedersen ◽  
Michael E. McCullough
Keyword(s):  
European Association ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Bifactor Model ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
General Factor ◽  
Valid Measure ◽  
Personality Psychology ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Social Settings ◽  
Self Assessments

The Dictator Game, a face valid measure of altruism, and the Trust Game, a face valid measure of trust and trustworthiness, are among the most widely used behavioural measures in human cooperation research. Researchers have observed considerable covariation among these and other economic games, leading them to assert that there exists a general human propensity to cooperate that varies in strength across individuals and manifests itself across a variety of social settings. To formalize this hypothesis, we created an S–1 bifactor model using 276 participants’ Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions. The general factor had significant, moderate associations with self–reported and peer–reported altruism, trust, and trustworthiness. Thus, the positive covariation among economic games is not reducible to the games’ shared situational features. Two hundred participants returned for a second session. The general factor based on Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions from this session did not significantly predict self–reported and peer–reported cooperation, suggesting that experience with economic games causes them to measure different traits from those that are reflected in self–assessments and peer–assessments of cooperativeness. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology

The biasing effects of appearances go beyond physical attractiveness and mating motives

2017 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Y. Olivola ◽  
Alexander Todorov
Keyword(s):  
Labor Markets ◽  
Physical Attractiveness ◽  
Facial Features ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Experimental Economic ◽  
Growing Body ◽  
Social Attributions ◽  
Biasing Effects

AbstractThe influence of appearances goes well beyond physical attractiveness and includes the surprisingly powerful impact of “face-ism” – the tendency to stereotype individuals based on their facial features. A growing body of research has revealed that these face-based social attributions bias the outcomes of labor markets and experimental economic games in ways that are hard to explain via evolutionary mating motives.

Modeling Economic Games

1997 ◽  
pp. 154-168
Author(s):  
Matthias Ruth ◽  
Bruce Hannon
Keyword(s):  
Economic Games
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