scholarly journals Closing the Loop in Deep Brain Stimulation for Psychiatric Disorders: Lessons from Motor Neural Prosthetics

2015 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 379-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alik S Widge ◽  
Amar Sahay
Keyword(s):  
Deep Brain Stimulation ◽  
Psychiatric Disorders ◽  
Brain Stimulation ◽  
Neural Prosthetics ◽  
Closing The Loop ◽  
Deep Brain

scholarly journals Special Issue: Trends in Clinical Deep Brain Stimulation

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 178
Author(s):  
Marcus L. F. Janssen ◽  
Yasin Temel
Keyword(s):  
Deep Brain Stimulation ◽  
Psychiatric Disorders ◽  
Brain Stimulation ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Deep Brain

Deep brain stimulation (DBS) has been successfully applied in several neurological and psychiatric disorders [...]

Neuroimaging Deep Brain Stimulation in Psychiatric Disorders

2012 ◽  
pp. 225-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martijn Figee ◽  
Pepijn van den Munckhof ◽  
Rick Schuurman ◽  
Damiaan Denys
Keyword(s):  
Deep Brain Stimulation ◽  
Psychiatric Disorders ◽  
Brain Stimulation ◽  
Deep Brain

Neuroethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 405-420
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Deep Brain Stimulation ◽  
Psychiatric Disorders ◽  
Brain Stimulation ◽  
Empirical Data ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Ethical Issues ◽  
Spatio Temporal ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Deep Brain

Neuroethics, located at the interface of conceptual and empirical dimensions, carries major implications for psychiatry, such as the neuroscientific basis of ethical concepts as moral agency. Drawing on data in neuroscience, this chapter highlights issues central to psychiatric ethics. First, it addresses a reductionistic model of the brain, often conceived as purely neuronal, and then it discusses empirical data suggesting that the brain’s activity is strongly aligned to its respective social (e.g., relation to others) and ecological (e.g., relation to the environment and nature) contexts; this implies a relational rather than reductionist model. Second, it suggests that self (e.g., the experience or sense of a self) and personhood (e.g., the person as existent independent of experience) must also be understood in such a social and ecological and, therefore, relational and spatio-temporal sense. Ethical concepts like agency, therefore, cannot be limited solely to the person and brain, but must rather be understood in a relational and neuro-ecological/social way. Third, it discusses deep brain stimulation as a treatment that promotes enhancement. In sum, this chapter presents findings in neuroscience that carry major implications for our view of brain, mental features, psychiatric disorders, and ethical issues like agency, responsibility, and enhancement.

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