scholarly journals Game theory and neural basis of social decision making

2008 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 404-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daeyeol Lee
2020 ◽  
pp. 155-185
Author(s):  
Daeyeol Lee

According to the social intelligence hypothesis, the unusual enlargement of primate brains, including the human brain, was driven by the complexity of social decision-making primates face in their societies. Social decision-making is fundamentally more complex due to the recursive nature of social reasoning. This chapter begins with the review of game theory and illustrates how game theory has transformed neuroscience research on social decision-making. Some of the topics covered include the supposed death of game theory, altruism and its dark side, cooperation, the theory of the mind, the prisoner’s dilemma, the recursive mind, and the social brain.


Science ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 318 (5850) ◽  
pp. 598-602 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan G. Sanfey

By combining the models and tasks of Game Theory with modern psychological and neuroscientific methods, the neuroeconomic approach to the study of social decision-making has the potential to extend our knowledge of brain mechanisms involved in social decisions and to advance theoretical models of how we make decisions in a rich, interactive environment. Research has already begun to illustrate how social exchange can act directly on the brain's reward system, how affective factors play an important role in bargaining and competitive games, and how the ability to assess another's intentions is related to strategic play. These findings provide a fruitful starting point for improved models of social decision-making, informed by the formal mathematical approach of economics and constrained by known neural mechanisms.


Author(s):  
Sebastian Möller ◽  
Anton M. Unakafov ◽  
Julia Fischer ◽  
Alexander Gail ◽  
Stefan Treue ◽  
...  

AbstractInteractions of group-living primates with conspecifics range from cooperation to competition. Game theory allows testing the strategies that underlie such interactions, but in classical theory, agents act simultaneously or sequentially. Many real-world decisions, however, are made while directly observing partner’s actions. To investigate social decision-making under conditions of face-to-face action visibility, we developed a setup where two agents observe each other and reach to targets on a shared transparent display, enabling naturalistic interactions we call “transparent games”. Here we compared human and macaque pairs in the transparent version of the coordination game “Bach or Stravinsky”, which rewards coordination but entails the conflict about which of the two individually-preferred coordinated options to choose. Most human pairs developed coordinated behavior, and 53% adopted dynamic coordination via turn-taking to equalize the payoffs. All macaque pairs also converged on coordination, but in a simpler, static way: persistently selecting one of the two coordinated options or one of the two display sides. Two animals that underwent training with a turn-taking human confederate learned to coordinate dynamically. When tested as a pair, they mostly converged on the faster monkey’s preferred option, and a dynamic coordination emerged as animals spontaneously took turns in leading to their respective preferred option and following to the other’s. The observed choices were captured by modeling a probability to see the other’s action before own movement. Importantly, such competitive turn-taking was unlike the benevolent turn-taking in humans, who equally often initiated switches to and from their preferred option. Our findings demonstrate that dynamic coordination is not restricted to humans – although it serves a selfish motivation in macaques – and emphasize the importance of action visibility in the emergence and maintenance of coordination.


Neurology ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 78 (Meeting Abstracts 1) ◽  
pp. S44.001-S44.001
Author(s):  
R. Goldmann Gross ◽  
C. McMillan ◽  
J. Kitain ◽  
K. Rascovsky ◽  
R. Clark ◽  
...  

Neurology ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 78 (Meeting Abstracts 1) ◽  
pp. IN4-1.010-IN4-1.010
Author(s):  
R. Goldmann Gross ◽  
C. McMillan ◽  
J. Kitain ◽  
K. Rascovsky ◽  
R. Clark ◽  
...  

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