Applying fuzzy-trace theory to attribute-framing bias: Gist and verbatim representations of quantitative information.

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 497-506 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eyal Gamliel ◽  
Hamutal Kreiner
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Information ◽  
Trace Theory ◽  
Fuzzy Trace Theory

Abstraction: An alternative neurocognitive account of recognition, prediction, and decision making

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerie F. Reyna ◽  
David A. Broniatowski
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Software Engineering ◽  
Systems Engineering ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Extensive Literature ◽  
Trace Theory ◽  
Fuzzy Trace Theory ◽  
Abstract Representations ◽  
Technical Systems

Abstract Gilead et al. offer a thoughtful and much-needed treatment of abstraction. However, it fails to build on an extensive literature on abstraction, representational diversity, neurocognition, and psychopathology that provides important constraints and alternative evidence-based conceptions. We draw on conceptions in software engineering, socio-technical systems engineering, and a neurocognitive theory with abstract representations of gist at its core, fuzzy-trace theory.

Processing Loci of the BRCA Gist Intelligent Tutor: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Approach

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Wolfe ◽  
Valerie Reyna ◽  
Priscila G. Brust-Renck ◽  
Colin L. Widmer ◽  
Elizabeth M. Cedillos ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Theory Approach ◽  
Trace Theory ◽  
Fuzzy Trace Theory ◽  
Intelligent Tutor

scholarly journals Framing Effects and Fuzzy Traces: ‘Some’ Observations

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah A. Fisher
Keyword(s):  
Framing Effects ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Core Element ◽  
Alternative Interventions ◽  
Trace Theory ◽  
Fuzzy Trace Theory ◽  
The Core ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Lower Bounding ◽  
Central Claim

AbstractFraming effects occur when people respond differently to the same information, just because it is conveyed in different words. For example, in the classic ‘Disease Problem’ introduced by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, people’s choices between alternative interventions depend on whether these are described positively, in terms of the number of people who will be saved, or negatively in terms of the corresponding number who will die. In this paper, I discuss an account of framing effects based on ‘fuzzy-trace theory’. The central claim of this account is that people represent the numbers in framing problems in a ‘gist-like’ way, as ‘some’; and that this creates a categorical contrast between ‘some’ people being saved (or dying) and ‘no’ people being saved (or dying). I argue that fuzzy-trace theory’s gist-like representation, ‘some’, must have the semantics of ‘some and possibly all’, not ‘some but not all’. I show how this commits fuzzy-trace theory to a modest version of a rival ‘lower bounding hypothesis’, according to which lower-bounded interpretations of quantities contribute to framing effects by rendering the alternative descriptions extensionally inequivalent. As a result, fuzzy-trace theory is incoherent as it stands. Making sense of it requires dropping, or refining, the claim that decision-makers perceive alternatively framed options as extensionally equivalent; and the related claim that framing effects are irrational. I end by suggesting that, whereas the modest lower bounding hypothesis is well supported, there is currently less evidence for the core element of the fuzzy trace account.

Word Frequency Effect in False Memories

2005 ◽  
Vol 96 (3_suppl) ◽  
pp. 1095-1112E ◽  
Author(s):  
İlyas Göz
Keyword(s):  
Word Frequency ◽  
Recognition Test ◽  
Recall Test ◽  
False Memories ◽  
The Other ◽  
Frequency Effect ◽  
Word Frequency Effect ◽  
Testing Effects ◽  
Trace Theory ◽  
Fuzzy Trace Theory

Fuzzy Trace Theory argues that false memories arise from a weak verbatim memory along with strong encoding of the meaning (gist). The present study simultaneously investigated the effects of the strength of both the gist and the verbatim information on false memories. Exp. 1 was carried out to compare false memories for common and rare words in recall and recognition. In Exp. 2 a control for possible testing effects was added, and participants were given a recognition test with no preceding recall test. Qualitative judgements (Remember vs Know) regarding words judged as old on the recognition test were also collected in Exp. 2. Both experiments showed that false memories were more likely when weak verbatim items occurred along with strong gist (as with common words) than only with weak gist encoding (as with rare words). Moreover, participants were more likely to choose falsely physically similar distractors for rare words than for common words. Semantically similar distractors, on the other hand, were more likely to be selected for common than for rare words. These results provide further support for the fuzzy trace theory explanation of false memories. However, some weaknesses of this model regarding false memories are also discussed.

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