Acting and reacting: Is intentional binding due to sense of agency or to temporal expectancy?

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Miriam Ruess ◽  
Roland Thomaschke ◽  
Andrea Kiesel
Keyword(s):  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Intentional Binding ◽  
Temporal Expectancy

scholarly journals Altered sense of agency in Gilles de la Tourette syndrome: behavioural, clinical and functional magnetic resonance imaging findings

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Zapparoli ◽  
Silvia Seghezzi ◽  
Francantonio Devoto ◽  
Marika Mariano ◽  
Giuseppe Banfi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Magnetic Resonance Imaging ◽  
Magnetic Resonance ◽  
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging ◽  
Tourette Syndrome ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Healthy Controls ◽  
Functional Magnetic Resonance ◽  
Resonance Imaging ◽  
Intentional Binding ◽  
Action Monitoring

Abstract Current neurocognitive models of motor control postulate that accurate action monitoring is crucial for a normal experience of agency—the ability to attribute the authorship of our actions and their consequences to ourselves. Recent studies demonstrated that action monitoring is impaired in Gilles de la Tourette syndrome, a movement disorder characterized by motor and vocal tics. It follows that Tourette syndrome patients may suffer from a perturbed sense of agency, the hypothesis tested in this study. To this end, we recruited 25 Tourette syndrome patients and 25 matched healthy controls in a case-control behavioural and functional magnetic resonance imaging study. As an implicit index of the sense of agency, we measured the intentional binding phenomenon, i.e., the perceived temporal compression between voluntary movements and their external consequences. We found evidence of an impaired sense of agency in Tourette syndrome patients who, as a group, did not show a significant intentional binding. The more reduced was the individual intentional binding, the more severe were the motor symptoms. Specific differences between the two groups were also observed in terms of brain activation patterns. In the healthy controls group, the magnitude of the intentional binding was associated with the activity of a premotor–parietal–cerebellar network. This relationship was not present in the Tourette syndrome group, suggesting an altered activation of the agency brain network for self-generated acts. We conclude that the less accurate action monitoring described in Tourette syndrome also involves the assessment of the consequences of actions in the outside world. We discuss that this may lead to difficulties in distinguishing external consequences produced by their own actions from the ones caused by others in Tourette syndrome patients.

Studying sense of agency online: Can intentional binding be observed in uncontrolled online settings?

2021 ◽  
Vol 95 ◽  
pp. 103217
Author(s):  
Carl Michael Galang ◽  
Rubina Malik ◽  
Isaac Kinley ◽  
Sukhvinder S. Obhi
Keyword(s):  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Intentional Binding

scholarly journals Intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency

2019 ◽  
Vol 67 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shu Imaizumi ◽  
Yoshihiko Tanno
Keyword(s):  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Intentional Binding

scholarly journals Intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shu Imaizumi ◽  
Yoshihiko Tanno
Keyword(s):  
Visual Outcome ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Intentional Binding ◽  
Temporal Interval ◽  
Regression Slope ◽  
Variable Delays ◽  
Trial Basis ◽  
Visual Domain ◽  
Trial Participants

Sense of agency, a feeling of generating actions and events by oneself, stems from action–outcome congruence. An implicit marker of sense of agency is intentional binding, which is compression of subjective temporal interval between action and outcome. We investigated relationships between intentional binding and explicit sense of agency. Participants pressed a key triggering auditory (Experiment 1) or visual outcome (Experiment 2) that occurred after variable delays. In each trial, participants rated their agency over the outcome and estimated the keypress–outcome temporal interval. Results showed that delays decreased agency ratings and intentional binding. There was inter-individual correlation between sensitivities to outcome delay (i.e., regression slope) of agency rating and intentional binding in the auditory but not visual domain. Importantly, we found intra-individual correlations between agency rating and intentional binding on a trial-by-trial basis in both outcome modalities. These results suggest that intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency.

scholarly journals A reduction in the implicit sense of agency during adolescence compared to childhood and adulthood

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali AYTEMUR ◽  
Liat Levita
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Critical Period ◽  
Developmental Trajectory ◽  
Age Effects ◽  
Developmental Changes ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Temporal Association ◽  
Intentional Binding ◽  
Developmental Effects ◽  
Increased Risk

Sense of agency (SoA), the fundamental feeling of control over our actions and their consequences, may show key developmental changes during adolescence. We examined SoA in childhood (9-10), mid-adolescence (13-14), late-adolescence (18-20) and adulthood (25-28) using two tasks (Libet Clock and Stream of Letters). SoA was implicitly indexed by intentional binding that reflects the agency effect on action-outcome temporal association. We found age effects on the sub-processes in both tasks. In the Libet Clock task, where performance was more reliable, we observed a U-shaped developmental trajectory of intentional binding suggesting an adolescent-specific reduction in the experience of control. This study provides evidence for the developmental effects on the implicit agency experience and suggests adolescence as a critical period. Our findings may have implications for understanding increased risk-taking behaviour and greater vulnerability for agency related disorders such as schizophrenia during adolescence.

scholarly journals ‘Intentional binding’ without intentional action

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keisuke Suzuki ◽  
Peter Lush ◽  
Anil Seth ◽  
Warrick Roseboom
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Information ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Fundamental Aspect ◽  
Implicit Measure ◽  
Intentional Binding ◽  
Related Information ◽  
Temporal And Spatial

The experience of authorship over one’s actions and their consequences - sense of agency - is a fundamental aspect of conscious experience. In recent years, it has become common to use intentional binding as an implicit measure of the sense of agency. However, it remains contentious whether binding effects indicate the role of intention-related information in perception or merely represent a strong case of multisensory causal binding. Here, we use a novel virtual reality setup to demonstrate identical magnitude binding effects both in the presence and complete absence of intentional action, when perceptual stimuli are matched for temporal and spatial information. Our results demonstrate that intentional binding-like effects are most simply accounted for by multisensory causal binding, without necessarily being related to intention or agency. Future studies which relate binding effects to agency must provide evidence for effects beyond that expected for multisensory causal binding by itself.

scholarly journals Intentional Binding Without Intentional Action

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 842-853 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keisuke Suzuki ◽  
Peter Lush ◽  
Anil K. Seth ◽  
Warrick Roseboom
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Information ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Fundamental Aspect ◽  
Implicit Measure ◽  
Intentional Binding ◽  
Related Information ◽  
Temporal And Spatial

The experience of authorship over one’s actions and their consequences—sense of agency—is a fundamental aspect of conscious experience. In recent years, it has become common to use intentional binding as an implicit measure of the sense of agency. However, it remains contentious whether reported intentional-binding effects indicate the role of intention-related information in perception or merely represent a strong case of multisensory causal binding. Here, we used a novel virtual-reality setup to demonstrate identical magnitude-binding effects in both the presence and complete absence of intentional action, when perceptual stimuli were matched for temporal and spatial information. Our results demonstrate that intentional-binding-like effects are most simply accounted for by multisensory causal binding without necessarily being related to intention or agency. Future studies that relate binding effects to agency must provide evidence for effects beyond that expected for multisensory causal binding by itself.

scholarly journals The Power of Suggestion: Posthypnotically Induced Changes in the Temporal Binding of Intentional Action Outcomes

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 661-669 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Lush ◽  
Emilie A. Caspar ◽  
Axel Cleeremans ◽  
Patrick Haggard ◽  
Pedro Alexandre Magalhães De Saldanha da Gama ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Action ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Intentional Binding ◽  
Strategic Action ◽  
Temporal Binding ◽  
Induced Changes

The sense of agency is the experience of initiating and controlling one’s voluntary actions and their outcomes. Intentional binding (i.e., when voluntary actions and their outcomes are perceived to occur closer together in time than involuntary actions and their outcomes) is increased in intentional action but requires no explicit reflection on agency. The reported experience of involuntariness is central to hypnotic responding, during which strategic action is experienced as involuntary. We report reduced intentional binding in a hypnotically induced experience of involuntariness, providing an objective correlate of reports of involuntariness. We argue that this reduced binding results from the diminished influence of motor intentions in the generation of the sense of agency when beliefs about whether an action is intended are altered. Thus, intentional binding depends on awareness of intentions. This finding shows that changes in metacognition of intentions affect perception.

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