Do infants and nonhuman animals attribute mental states?

2018 ◽  
Vol 125 (3) ◽  
pp. 409-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tyler Burge
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Nonhuman Animals

Animals as Reflexive Thinkers

2015 ◽  
pp. 318-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Rowlands ◽  
Susana Monsó
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Intellectual Achievement ◽  
Nonhuman Animals

The ability to engage in reflexive thought—in thought about thought or about other mental states more generally—is regarded as a complex intellectual achievement that is beyond the capacities of most nonhuman animals. To the extent that reflexive thought capacities are believed necessary for the possession of many other psychological states or capacities, including consciousness, belief, emotion, and empathy, the inability of animals to engage in reflexive thought calls into question their other psychological abilities. This chapter attacks the idea that reflexive thought is required in this pervasive way and holds that supposing that it is derives from a tendency among philosophers and scientists toward overcomplication. Against this tendency, it recommends an aponoian framework, from apó, “away from” and noûs, “intelligence” or “thought,” arguing that seemingly complex psychological abilities are often not as complex as they seem, and do not require the ability to engage in reflexive thought.

Consciousness in animals

2019 ◽  
pp. 140-164
Author(s):  
Peter Carruthers
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
First Person ◽  
Nonhuman Animals ◽  
Global Workspace ◽  
Asking Questions ◽  
Global Workspace Theory

This chapter argues that if a global workspace theory of phenomenal consciousness is correct, and is fully reductive in nature, then we should stop asking questions about consciousness in nonhuman animals. But this is not because those questions are too hard to answer, but because there are no substantive facts to discover. The argument in support of this conclusion turns on the idea that while global broadcasting is all-or-nothing in the human mind, it is framed in terms that imply gradations across species. Yet our concept of phenomenal consciousness doesn’t permit mental states to be to some degree conscious. Moreover, the first-person concepts that give rise to the problem of consciousness cannot intelligibly be projected into minds significantly different from our own.

Effect of Tranquil and Active Video Representations of an Unfamiliar Dog on Subjective Mental States

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Natalie Ein ◽  
Maureen J. Reed ◽  
Kristin Vickers
Keyword(s):  
Pilot Study ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Subjective Measures ◽  
Nonhuman Animals ◽  
Active Video ◽  
Subjective Alertness ◽  
Practical Implications

Abstract The aim of this pilot study was to examine the effects of different videos of an unfamiliar dog (tranquil and active) on subjective mental state measures. All participants watched two videos of an unfamiliar dog (tranquil and active). Subjective measures of stress, anxiety, alertness, attention, likeability, and cuteness were assessed. The results showed that the tranquil dog video significantly decreased anxiety only. Additionally, the active dog video significantly decreased stress and anxiety. Across the videos, the results showed the active dog video significantly improved subjective alertness and attention when compared with the tranquil dog video. Lastly, the active dog video was rated more likeable and cuter relative to the tranquil dog video. The practical implications of these findings could include how to improve various subjective mental states for humans in public settings (e.g., hospital) where nonhuman animals are not always allowed.

How to Read Fishes: Science, Empathy, and Salar the Salmon

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Candice Allmark-Kent
Keyword(s):  
Salmo Salar ◽  
Salmo Trutta ◽  
Animal Studies ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Public Perceptions ◽  
Subjective Experiences ◽  
Science And Literature ◽  
Classic Work ◽  
Nonhuman Animals ◽  
Human Animal

Abstract Despite the interdisciplinarity of human-animal studies, there has been little research about the interactions between science and literature in relation to nonhuman animals. This paper explores the representation of Atlantic salmons (Salmo salar) and brown trouts (Salmo trutta) in Henry Williamson’s classic work of animal fiction, Salar the Salmon (1935). In particular, the analysis focuses on depictions of mental states and subjective experiences in fishes. This work offers the first animal-centric analysis of the text, while also addressing the marginalization of fishes in literary animal studies. The wider purpose is to identify the ways in which fiction can influence public perceptions and encourage empathy in readers. The ultimate aim is to improve our methods of communicating about fishes in both literature and science.

Animal Ethics and the Scientific Study of Animals

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 404-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Fraser ◽  
Rod Preece ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Animal Welfare ◽  
Animal Ethics ◽  
Ancient Greece ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Cognitive Ethology ◽  
Ethical Implications ◽  
Nonhuman Animals ◽  
Animal Welfare Science ◽  
Taxonomic Groups ◽  
Empirical Material

From ancient Greece to the present, philosophers have variously emphasized either the similarities or the differences between humans and nonhuman animals as a basis for ethical conclusions. Thus animal ethics has traditionally involved both factual claims, usually about animals’ mental states and capacities, and ethical claims about their moral standing. However, even in modern animal ethics the factual claims are often scientifically uninformed, involve broad generalizations about diverse taxonomic groups, and show little agreement about how to resolve the contradictions. Research in cognitive ethology and animal welfare science provides empirical material and a set of emerging methods for testing the plausibility of claims about animal mentation and thus for clarifying the interests and needs of animals. We suggest that progress in animal ethics requires both philosophically informed science to provide an empirically grounded understanding of animals, and scientifically informed philosophy to explore the ethical implications that follow.

Using the research on intergroup conflict in nonhuman animals to help inform patterns of human intergroup conflict

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda R. Ridley ◽  
Melanie O. Mirville
Keyword(s):  
Large Body ◽  
Nonhuman Animal ◽  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Animal Groups ◽  
Interesting Article ◽  
Nonhuman Animals

Abstract There is a large body of research on conflict in nonhuman animal groups that measures the costs and benefits of intergroup conflict, and we suggest that much of this evidence is missing from De Dreu and Gross's interesting article. It is a shame this work has been missed, because it provides evidence for interesting ideas put forward in the article.

Animals as Social Objects

2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 206-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Verónica Sevillano ◽  
Susan T. Fiske
Keyword(s):  
Social Perception ◽  
Animal Species ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Social Responses ◽  
Content Model ◽  
Stereotype Content ◽  
Nonhuman Animals ◽  
Behavioral Tendencies ◽  
Similarities And Differences ◽  
Sphere Of Influence

Abstract. Nonhuman animals are typically excluded from the scope of social psychology. This article presents animals as social objects – targets of human social responses – overviewing the similarities and differences with human targets. The focus here is on perceiving animal species as social groups. Reflecting the two fundamental dimensions of humans’ social cognition – perceived warmth (benign or ill intent) and competence (high or low ability), proposed within the Stereotype Content Model ( Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002 ) – animal stereotypes are identified, together with associated prejudices and behavioral tendencies. In line with human intergroup threats, both realistic and symbolic threats associated with animals are reviewed. As a whole, animals appear to be social perception targets within the human sphere of influence and a valid topic for research.

When Mother Earth Rises Up

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 271-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simona Sacchi ◽  
Paolo Riva ◽  
Marco Brambilla
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Natural Disasters ◽  
Natural Disaster ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Disaster Victims ◽  
Willingness To Help ◽  
Mother Earth

Anthropomorphization is the tendency to ascribe humanlike features and mental states, such as free will and consciousness, to nonhuman beings or inanimate agents. Two studies investigated the consequences of the anthropomorphization of nature on people’s willingness to help victims of natural disasters. Study 1 (N = 96) showed that the humanization of nature correlated negatively with willingness to help natural disaster victims. Study 2 (N = 52) tested for causality, showing that the anthropomorphization of nature reduced participants’ intentions to help the victims. Overall, our findings suggest that humanizing nature undermines the tendency to support victims of natural disasters.

Temporal Control of Mental States in Pigeons

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert G. Cook ◽  
Hara A. Rosen
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Temporal Control
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