Reconsidering rigor in psychological science: Lessons from a brief clinical ethnography.

William E. Hartmann; Joseph P. Gone; Denise M. Saint Arnault

doi:10.1037/qup0000170

Reconsidering rigor in psychological science: Lessons from a brief clinical ethnography.

Qualitative Psychology ◽

10.1037/qup0000170 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 7 (2) ◽

pp. 169-184

Author(s):

William E. Hartmann ◽

Joseph P. Gone ◽

Denise M. Saint Arnault

Keyword(s):

Psychological Science ◽

Clinical Ethnography

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A pragmatist philosophy of psychological science and its implications for replication

Behavioral and Brain Sciences ◽

10.1017/s0140525x18000626 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 41 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Ana Gantman ◽

Robin Gomila ◽

Joel E. Martinez ◽

J. Nathan Matias ◽

Elizabeth Levy Paluck ◽

...

Keyword(s):

William James ◽

Mental Processes ◽

Psychological Science ◽

Behavioral Measurement ◽

The World ◽

Pragmatist Philosophy

AbstractA pragmatist philosophy of psychological science offers to the direct replication debate concrete recommendations and novel benefits that are not discussed in Zwaan et al. This philosophy guides our work as field experimentalists interested in behavioral measurement. Furthermore, all psychologists can relate to its ultimate aim set out by William James: to study mental processes that provide explanations for why people behave as they do in the world.

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Replications can cause distorted belief in scientific progress

Behavioral and Brain Sciences ◽

10.1017/s0140525x18000584 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 41 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Michał Białek

Keyword(s):

Real World ◽

Scientific Progress ◽

The Public ◽

Psychological Science

AbstractIf we want psychological science to have a meaningful real-world impact, it has to be trusted by the public. Scientific progress is noisy; accordingly, replications sometimes fail even for true findings. We need to communicate the acceptability of uncertainty to the public and our peers, to prevent psychology from being perceived as having nothing to say about reality.

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Values in Psychological Science

10.1017/9781316471302 ◽

2018 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Lisa Osbeck

Keyword(s):

Psychological Science

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Translocation Relative to Range

Methodology ◽

10.1027/1614-2241.4.3.132 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 4 (3) ◽

pp. 132-138 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Michael Höfler

Keyword(s):

Risk Difference ◽

Binary Outcomes ◽

Number Needed To Treat ◽

Likert Scales ◽

Psychological Science ◽

The Absolute ◽

The Difference ◽

Variance Parameters ◽

Standardized Index ◽

Maximum Possible Magnitude

A standardized index for effect intensity, the translocation relative to range (TRR), is discussed. TRR is defined as the difference between the expectations of an outcome under two conditions (the absolute increment) divided by the maximum possible amount for that difference. TRR measures the shift caused by a factor relative to the maximum possible magnitude of that shift. For binary outcomes, TRR simply equals the risk difference, also known as the inverse number needed to treat. TRR ranges from –1 to 1 but is – unlike a correlation coefficient – a measure for effect intensity, because it does not rely on variance parameters in a certain population as do effect size measures (e.g., correlations, Cohens d). However, the use of TRR is restricted on outcomes with fixed and meaningful endpoints given, for instance, for meaningful psychological questionnaires or Likert scales. The use of TRR vs. Cohens d is illustrated with three examples from Psychological Science 2006 (issues 5 through 8). It is argued that, whenever TRR applies, it should complement Cohens d to avoid the problems related to the latter. In any case, the absolute increment should complement d.

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