A case of prediction over a century: Heine on the national-socialist revolution.

1941 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 583-588 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Wyatt
2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 729-738
Author(s):  
Rastko Jovanov

The article analyzes Heidegger?s relation to National Socialism based on his private writing in the ?Black Notebooks,? published in their entirety (nine volumes) this year. Although it is indisputable that Heidegger was an enthusiastic adherent of the National Socialist program between 1930 and 1934, his private writings show his avowed philosophical delusion that the National Socialist ?revolution? in Germany was going to bring about a new beginning of philosophy beyond the metaphysical tradition. The article shows how Heidegger criticized National Socialism after 1934, and the circumstances of his resignation from the post of Rector of Freiburg University in that year.


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolai Krejberg Knudsen

Abstract This article provides a detailed analysis of the function of the notion of Volk in Martin Heidegger’s philosophy. At first glance, this term is an appeal to the revolutionary masses of the National Socialist revolution in a way that demarcates a distinction between the rootedness of the German People (capital “P”) and the rootlessness of the modern rabble (or people). But this distinction is not a sufficient explanation of Heidegger’s position, because Heidegger simultaneously seems to hold that even the Germans are characterized by a lack of identity. What is required is a further appropriation of the proper. My suggestion is that this logic of the Volk is not only useful for understanding Heidegger’s thought during the war, but also an indication of what happened after he lost faith in the National Socialist movement and thus had to make the lack of the People the basis of his thought.


Nordlit ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas V. H. Hagen

Kinodriften i Norge 1940–1945 var preget av nye politiske omstendigheter. I artikkelen utforskes spørsmålet om hvordan kinobransjens autonomi ble påvirket av den tyske okkupasjonen og NS’ forsøk på å gjennomføre nasjonalsosialistisk revolusjon. Arbeidshverdagen i kinobransjen ble sterkt påvirket av politiske utskiftninger og innføringen av nye institusjoner som hadde til hensikt å gjennomføre en omfattende reorganisering av hele film- og kinofeltet.Ideologisk påtrykk og politisk press fra tyske og norske aktører rundt programoppsetningen var et særtrekk. Krigssituasjonen skapte også generelt en del praktiske utfordringer. Det var likevel ikke slik at presset og hindringene for normal kinodrift var konstant eller like stort overalt. Artikkelen viser hvordan kinoene i Norge ble påvirket og rammet forskjellig, blant annet ut fra hva slags type kino det var snakk om.Ettersom kinoene ble forsøkt brukt som propagandakanal for den tyske okkupanten og NS, ble kinoene også et sted for «demonstrasjoner». Både tyske og norske myndigheter var klar over sprengkraften som lå i denne formen for hverdagsmotstand, og forsøkte å forebygge gjennom ulike tiltak.Dette førte til at de kinoansatte befant seg i et krysspress. Ved noen kinoer valgte ledelsen frivillig samarbeid med de nye kinomyndighetene. Ved andre kinoer valgte ledelsen en motstandsholdning. Men ved de aller fleste kinoene ble det staket ut en tilpasningskurs.Statens filmdirektorat hadde høye ambisjoner om total omlegging av det norske kinosystemet. Dette handlet ikke bare om ideologisk betingede målsetninger, men også om bransjespesifikk reformpolitikk. Artikkelen foreslår å se okkupasjonsperioden ikke som en parentes eller som en unntaksperiode i norsk film- og kinohistorie, men understreker kontinuitetstrekk mellom perioden før, under og etter andre verdenskrig. NS’ utskjelte film- og kinopolitikk la på mange områder grunnlaget for politikken på dette feltet etter 1945. Cinema in Norway from 1940 to 1945 was characterized by new political circumstances. This article explores the question of how the autonomy of the cinema industry was influenced by the German occupation and the attempt of Nasjonal Samling (NS) to implement a national socialist revolution. Cinemas were heavily influenced by political replacement of key personnel and the introduction of new institutions intended to undertake a comprehensive reorganization of the entire film and cinema field.Ideological pressure and political pressure from German officers and Norwegian officials and propagandists, was a distinctive feature. However, the political pressure and the practical obstacles were neither constant nor similar across the country. The article shows how different types of cinemas in Norway were affected in different ways.As cinema was used as a propaganda vehicle for the German occupier and NS, the cinemas also became a place of everyday resistance and organized civil resistance. “Demonstrations" in the cinemas were widespread.The cinema staff were in the line of fire, between intersecting demands, interests and expectations. At some cinemas, the management chose eager cooperation with the new cinema authorities. At other cinemas, the management chose resistance. However, most cinemas adapted professionally to the new laws of cinema politics.The Norwegian Film Directorate had high ambitions for a total restructuring of the Norwegian cinema system. This was not just about ideologically determined goals, but also about reform policies. The article suggests that the occupation period was neither a parenthesis nor an exceptional case in Norwegian media history, and accentuates several features of continuity before, during and after the occupation years. The scorned film and cinema politics advocated by the new regime during the occupation laid the foundation for government policy in the same areas after 1945.


2016 ◽  
pp. 91-118
Author(s):  
Peter Black

The Sonderdienst (Special Service) was an enforcement agency developed by German SS and Police authorities, specifically in the Lublin District of the so called Government General (central and southeastern German-occupied Poland) to assist in enforcing German occupation ordinances in the cities and particularly in the countryside, where lack of police personnel, ignorance of local conditions, and perceived fear of partisan attack discouraged a direct German police presence. After February 1941, the SS and Police relinquished control over the Sonderdienst to the German civilian occupation authorities. Under civilian authority, the Sonderdienst was deployed at the Kreis level, under command of the so-called German Stadt- and Kreishauptmänner in detachments of approximately 30 men to carry out administrative enforcement activities when the civilian authorities were unable to count or SS and police support. This article examines how the Sonderdienst highlights the dependence of German administration in the Government General on locally recruited auxiliaries, particularly in the countryside. The Sonderdienst was conceived, developed, expanded, and deployed within the context of a bitter battle between German civilian authorities and the SS/police apparatus over control of local executive police power. This is hardly new; yet the Government General is unusual in that the German civilian authorities were able to fight the SS to a draw on this issue. Since its formation followed the recruitment of the “ethnic” and ideological “cream” of the ethnic German population of occupied Poland into agencies such as the Selbstschutz, and the Waffen SS, the Sonderdienst represents an early effort of the National Socialist authorities to fashion an ethnically conscious and ideologically committed corps from young men of questionable, even dubious, German ancestry and heritage. Finally, this study reveals not only the complicity of the civilian authorities in Nazi crimes, but the link in German-occupied Poland between “routine” administrative duties, such as collecting fines for ordinance violations, and the brutal persecution and annihilation of groups targeted as enemies of the German Reich, such as the Polish Jews. Civilian administrators and SS and police authorities shared the “National Socialist consensus” in occupied Poland. They wanted to annihilate the Jews and the Polish intelligentsia, to exploit the labor potential of the Polish masses, and to turn the Government General into a region of German settlement. As a part of this vision, the Sonderdienst was to serve not only as a police executive, but as a political and cultural steppingstone to full acceptance into the German “racial community.” There is no question that, even in “routine” duties, the Sonderdienst participated, more or less willingly, in the implementation of the most evil racist policies of the National Socialist regime.


Author(s):  
Claudia Leeb

Through a critical appropriation of Hannah Arendt, and a more sympathetic engagement with Theodor W. Adorno and psychoanalysis, this book develops a new theoretical approach to understanding Austrians’ repression of their collaboration with National Socialist Germany. Drawing on original, extensive archival research, from court documents on Nazi perpetrators to public controversies on theater plays and museums, the book exposes the defensive mechanisms Austrians have used to repress individual and collective political guilt, which led to their failure to work through their past. It exposes the damaging psychological and political consequences such failure has had and continues to have for Austrian democracy today—such as the continuing electoral growth of the right-wing populist Freedom Party in Austria, which highlights the timeliness of the book. However, the theoretical concepts and practical suggestions the book introduces to counteract the repression of individual and collective political guilt are relevant beyond the Austrian context. It shows us that only when individuals and nations live up to guilt are they in a position to take responsibility for past crimes, show solidarity with the victims of crimes, and prevent the emergence of new crimes. Combining theoretical insights with historical analysis, The Politics of Repressed Guilt is an important addition to critical scholarship that explores the pathological implications of guilt repression for democratic political life.


Author(s):  
Steven Michael Press

In recognizing more than just hyperbole in their critical studies of National Socialist language, post-war philologists Viktor Klemperer (1946) and Eugen Seidel (1961) credit persuasive words and syntax with the expansion of Hitler's ideology among the German people. This popular explanation is being revisited by contemporary philologists, however, as new historical argument holds the functioning of the Third Reich to be anything but monolithic. An emerging scholarly consensus on the presence of more chaos than coherence in Nazi discourse suggests a new imperative for research. After reviewing the foundational works of Mein Kampf (1925) and Myth of the Twentieth Century (1930), the author confirms Klemperer and Seidel’s claim for linguistic manipulation in the rise of the National Socialist Party. Most importantly, this article provides a detailed explanation of how party leaders employed rhetorical language to promote fascist ideology without an underlying basis of logical argumentation.


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