Role of clustering in free recall.

1970 ◽  
Vol 86 (3) ◽  
pp. 384-386 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Richard Puff
Keyword(s):  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aisha P. Siddiqui ◽  
Nash Unsworth
Keyword(s):  

1966 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 627-634 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mari J. K. Brown

Free recall of lists at different orders of approximation to English was compared to the recall of the same lists when the order of the words had been scrambled to destroy their sequential organization. Recall of the organized lists showed the typical improvement with increasing order of approximation. Recall of the scrambled lists was unrelated to the original order of approximation. The results indicate that increased recall with increasing order of approximation to English is not produced by systematic differences in the characteristics of the individual words comprising the approximations. When recall of the organized lists was scored in terms of the number of longer sequences present in recall, the number of recalled sequences of any given length increased as order of approximation to English increased, with the first order list showing proportionally less organization in recall than the second and higher order lists.


2008 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 983-992 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian B. Gaigg ◽  
John M. Gardiner ◽  
Dermot M. Bowler

1988 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cesare Cornoldi ◽  
Adele Cavedon ◽  
Rossana De Beni ◽  
Alvaro Pra Baldi

In the literature, a memory advantage for bizarre items over common ones has been found only in a few studies, especially with materials prepared ad hoc by the experimenter and with free recall rather than cued recall tests. These results contrast with the widespread conviction that bizarreness helps recall. The present paper explores the role of some variables involved in the “bizarreness” effect: (1) It examines the typical self-generation procedure in which the subject is asked to create an interaction between a pair of nouns, as well as the case in which only one noun is given. Higher freedom in generating sentences appears to correspond to higher free recall of bizarre items. (2) It is shown that bizarre items must be distinguished from “unusual” ones, which have different effects on memory. (3) By contrasting groups instructed to use either imagery or verbal elaboration, it is shown that the bizarreness effect is linked to the use of imagery. Instructions to use imagery without the possibility of creating bizarre representations do not improve the recall of common items. (4) The classification of parts of sentences generated reveals that, under common instructions, one subject's choice of verb and noun is more likely to be shared by other subjects. This fact may explain the different effects found by previous research in cued and free recall. (5) The overestimation of the recallability of bizarre items appears less evident than in previous research, probably because subjects had direct experience of the difficulties met in generating bizarre images.


2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 306-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanna Brycz ◽  
Magdalena Wyszomirska-Góra ◽  
Yoram Bar-Tal ◽  
Piotr Wiśniewski

Abstract The main goal of our study was to investigate the role of insight into one’s own biases (metacognitive self) in the process of hypothesis validation in accordance to the two fundamental social perception domains (community and competence) on the example of confirmation bias. The study was conducted on a group of 593 participants with the use of a confirmation bias procedure, a free recall procedure and the Metacognitive Self scale. We manipulated with the domain and the value of information given to the respondents. We suspected that individuals with a high metacognitive self, in opposition to low metacognitive self ones, would not process the given information according to the two fundamental social perception domains. The results verified the existence of an interaction effect of the metacognitive self (MCS) and the domain of the information given about a perceived person on the susceptibility to follow the confirmation bias. Contrary to the low metacognitive self individuals, who show a higher tendency for the confirmation bias within the competence than the community domain, persons with a high insight into their own biases express the same level of confirmation bias in no respect to the domain of the information. The value of the information has no significant influence.


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