Stimulus intensity and reaction time: Evaluation of a decision-theory model.

1970 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 383-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harry G. Murray
Keyword(s):  
Reaction Time ◽  
Decision Theory ◽  
Stimulus Intensity ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Time Evaluation

scholarly journals Autoimmunity: a decision theory model.

1987 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 210-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
J A Morris
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Theory Model

A Decision Theory Model for Health Monitoring of Aeroengines

1979 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 222-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
V.V.S. Sarma ◽  
K.V. Kunhikrishnan ◽  
K. Ramchand
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Health Monitoring ◽  
Theory Model

scholarly journals Differential Effects of Startle on Reaction Time for Finger and Arm Movements

2009 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 306-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony N. Carlsen ◽  
Romeo Chua ◽  
J. Timothy Inglis ◽  
David J. Sanderson ◽  
Ian M. Franks
Keyword(s):  
Reaction Time ◽  
Stimulus Intensity ◽  
Index Finger ◽  
Acoustic Stimulus ◽  
Arm Movements ◽  
Startle Reaction ◽  
Differential Effects ◽  
Startling Acoustic Stimulus ◽  
Startling Stimulus

Recent studies using a reaction time (RT) task have reported that a preprogrammed response could be triggered directly by a startling acoustic stimulus (115–124 dB) presented along with the usual “go” signal. It has been suggested that details of the upcoming response could be stored subcortically and are accessible by the startle volley, directly eliciting the correct movement. However, certain muscles (e.g., intrinsic hand) are heavily dependent on cortico-motoneuronal connections and thus would not be directly subject to the subcortical startle volley in a similar way to muscles whose innervations include extensive reticular connections. In this study, 14 participants performed 75 trials in each of two tasks within a RT paradigm: an arm extension task and an index finger abduction task. In 12 trials within each task, the regular go stimulus (82 dB) was replaced with a 115-dB startling stimulus. Results showed that, in the arm task, the presence of a startle reaction led to significantly shorter latency arm movements compared with the effect of the increased stimulus intensity alone. In contrast, for the finger task, no additional decrease in RT caused by startle was observed. Taken together, these results suggest that only movements that involve muscles more strongly innervated by subcortical pathways are susceptible to response advancement by startle.

Reaction Speed as a Function of Stimulus Intensity in Normals and Retardates

1965 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 649-652 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred A. Baumeister ◽  
William F. Hawkins ◽  
George Kellas
Keyword(s):  
Reaction Time ◽  
Stimulus Intensity ◽  
Reaction Times ◽  
Reaction Time Task ◽  
Time Task ◽  
Motor Set ◽  
Reaction Speed

The reaction times of retardates and normals were compared as a function of intensity of the reaction signal. Three intensity levels of a 1000-cycle tone were used: 5, 15, and 25 db above threshold. Each S was presented all tones in a completely counterbalanced order. The results revealed that both intelligence groups reacted faster with each increase in intensity of the signal. Since no significant interactions emerged, it cannot be concluded that the groups benefited differentially from increases in intensity of reaction signal. It is suggested that retardates may have a sensory set whereas normals have a motor set in the reaction time task.

scholarly journals Belief, Faith, and Hope: On the Rationality of Long-Term Commitment

Mind ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Rational Action ◽  
The Face ◽  
Over Time ◽  
As If

Abstract I examine three attitudes: belief, faith, and hope. I argue that all three attitudes play the same role in rationalizing action. First, I explain two models of rational action—the decision-theory model and the belief-desire model. Both models entail there are two components of rational action: an epistemic component and a conative component. Then, using this framework, I show how belief, faith, and hope that p can all make it rational to accept, or act as if, p. I conclude by showing how my picture can explain how action-oriented commitments can be rational over time, both in the face of counterevidence and in the face of waning affections.

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