Studies examine the surge capacity of U.S. hospitals to respond to bioterrorism or other public health disasters

2007 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
2006 ◽  
Vol 121 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard K. Koh ◽  
Amie C. Shei ◽  
Janette Bataringaya ◽  
Jon Burstein ◽  
Paul D. Biddinger ◽  
...  

2007 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander L. Eastman ◽  
Kathy J. Rinnert ◽  
Ira R. Nemeth ◽  
Raymond L. Fowler ◽  
Joseph P. Minei

2010 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tarun S. Weeramanthri ◽  
Andrew G. Robertson ◽  
Gary K. Dowse ◽  
Paul V. Effler ◽  
Muriel G. Leclercq ◽  
...  

This article reviews the lessons that can be learned by the health sector, in particular, and the public sector, more generally, from the governmental response to pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza A (pH1N1) in Australia during 2009. It covers the period from the emergence of the epidemic to the release of the vaccine, and describes a range of impacts on the Western Australian health system, the government sector and the community. There are three main themes considered from a State government agency perspective: how decisions were influenced by prior planning; how the decision making and communication processes were intimately linked; and the interdependent roles of States and the Commonwealth Government in national programs. We conclude that: (a) communications were generally effective, but need to be improved and better coordinated between the Australian Government, States and general practice; (b) decision making was appropriately flexible, but there needs to be better alignment with expert advice, and consideration of the need for a national disease control agency in Australia; and (c) national funding arrangements need to fit with the model of state-based service delivery and to support critical workforce needs for surge capacity, as well as stockpile and infrastructure requirements. What is known about the topic? There have been a number of articles on pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza in Australia that have provided an overview of the response from a Commonwealth Government perspective, as well as specific aspects of the State response (e.g. virology, impact on intensive care units across Australia, infection control). Victoria, Queensland and NSW have published papers more focussed on epidemiology and an overview of public health actions. What does this paper add? This would be the first in-depth account of the response that both details a broader range of impacts and costs across health and other State government agencies, and also provides a critical reflection on governance, communication and decision making arrangements from the beginning of the pandemic to the start of the vaccination program. What are the implications for practitioners? Practitioners (clinical, public health, and laboratory) would recognise the importance of the workforce and surge capacity issues highlighted in the paper, and the extent to which they were stretched. Addressing these issues is vital to meeting practitioner needs in future pandemic seasons. Policy makers would see the relevance of the observations and analysis to governance arrangements within a Federal system, where the majority of funding is provided from the Commonwealth level, whereas service delivery responsibilities remain with the States and Territories. In particular, the argument to consider a national disease control agency along the lines of the US and UK will be of interest to public health and communicable disease practitioners in all States and Territories, as it would affect how and where policy and expert advice is created and used.


2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 150-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather E. Kaiser ◽  
Daniel J. Barnett ◽  
Awori J. Hayanga ◽  
Meghan E. Brown ◽  
Andrew T. Filak

ABSTRACTAs cases of 2009 novel H1N1 influenza became prevalent in Cincinnati, Ohio, Hamilton County Public Health called upon the University of Cincinnati College of Medicine to enhance its surge capacity in vaccination administration. Although the collaboration was well organized, it became evident that a system should exist for medical students' involvement in disaster response and recovery efforts in advance of a disaster. Therefore, 5 policy alternatives for effective utilization of medical students in disaster-response efforts have been examined: maintaining the status quo, enhancing the Medical Reserve Corps, creating medical school–based disaster-response units, using students within another selected disaster-response organization, or devising an entirely new plan for medical students' utilization. The intent of presenting these policy alternatives is to foster a policy dialogue around creating a more formalized approach for integrating medical students into disaster surge capacity–enhancement strategies. Using medical students to supplement the current and future workforce may help substantially in achieving goals related to workforce requirements. Discussions will be necessary to translate policy into practice.(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:150–153)


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 175-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amir Khorram-Manesh

Background: Failed attempts to improve the delivery of healthcare to communities show distinct flaws that have a higher impact during a major incident or disaster (MID). This study evaluates the concept of surge capacity, which intends to achieve a balance between the needs and resources in affected areas by providing staff, stuff, structure, and system. Methods: A systematic literature review was performed according to the PRISMA statement and by using PubMed, Scopus, and Google Scholar, and related keywords. Results: There were limited publications about flexible surge capacity (FSC). However, the sum of data obtained indicated the need for flexibility in expanding major incidents or disasters, demanding new resources, which may neither be available on time nor reachable due to infrastructural damage. Conclusion: FSC is a novel concept based on international guidelines. It refers to the extra and adjustable human and material resources that can be mobilized by activating nonprofessional but educated staff and different but accepted facilities in a fast, smooth, and productive way. Public health and public education play an essential role in obtaining such flexibility.


2008 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 320-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Miller ◽  
Stephen Randolph ◽  
Jan E. Patterson

Objective.To describe the results of a simulation study of the spread of pandemic influenza, the effects of public health measures on the simulated pandemic, and the resultant adequacy of the surge capacity of the hospital infrastructure and to investigate the adequacy of key elements of the national pandemic influenza plan to reduce the overall attack rate so that surge capacity would not be overwhelmed.Design.We used 2 discrete-event simulation models: the first model simulates the contact and disease transmission process, as affected by public health interventions, to produce a stream of arriving patients, and the second model simulates the diagnosis and treatment process and determines patient outcomes.Setting.Hypothetical scenarios were based on the response plans, infrastructure, and demographic data of the population of San Antonio, Texas.Results.Use of a mix of strategies, including social distancing, antiviral medications, and targeted vaccination, may limit the overall attack rate so that demand for care would not exceed the capacity of the infrastructure. Additional simulations to assess social distancing as a sole mitigation strategy suggest that a reduction of infectious community contacts to half of normal levels would have to occur within approximately 7 days.Conclusions.Under ideal conditions, the mix of strategies may limit demand, which can then be met by community surge capacity. Given inadequate supplies of vaccines and antiviral medications, aggressive social distancing alone might allow for the control of a local epidemic without reliance on outside support.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S1) ◽  
pp. s161-s161
Author(s):  
M. Reilly

IntroductionDeveloping alternative systems to deliver emergency health services during a pandemic or public health emergency is essential to preserving the operation of acute care hospitals and the overall health care infrastructure. Alternate care sites or community-based care centers which can serve as areas for primary screening and triage or short-term medical treatment can assist in diverting non-acute patients from hospital emergency departments and manage non-life threatening illnesses in a systematic and efficient manner. Additionally, if planned for correctly these facilities can also be used to decant less critical patients from inpatient wards thereby increasing the surge capacity of acute care hospitals.MethodsA model concept of operations plan for alternate care sites to be used during pandemics and large-scale public health emergencies was developed over a 3 year period, 2007–2010. Subject matter experts were convened and best-practice methods were used to design operational plans, clinical protocols, modified standards of care, and checklists for facilities appropriate to locate such a facility. This model plan was designed to allow the mild to moderately ill patient to be managed in a non-acute care hospital or community-based care setting and then ultimately return to their homes for convalescence, following a public health emergency where regional surge capacity had been exceeded.ResultsOver three years of interagency, comprehensive planning, training and review was conducted to create the model alternate care site/community-based care center concept of operations plan. Accomplishments and milestones included: Creating stakeholders, engaging community partners, site selection, staffing issues, detailed medical protocols and clinical pathways, functional role development, equipment and supplies, site security, media and communications plans, designing training programs and conducting drills and exercises.ConclusionThe key tenets of the concept, planning, operation and demobilization of an alternate care site or community-based care center will be discussed in this session. Participants will learn what has worked based on our planning experience. Lessons learned and best-practices developed in our program will be presented to assist attendees in beginning or continuing the process of creating surge capacity in the out-of-hospital setting, by planning to operate alternate care sites in their local areas.


2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashlea Bennett Milburn ◽  
Charleen McNeill

The number of persons seeking medical treatment during a public health emergency could quickly overwhelm the capacity of hospitals and emergency rooms. The amount of surge capacity home health care could provide during a public health emergency is unknown. The purpose of this research is to quantify the surge capacity of the home health sector in four emergency scenarios. According to the model developed, routine demand will exceed scenario capacity for almost all home health agencies in all pessimistic cases for the four scenarios discussed. However, home health agencies have the surge capacity to contribute to the provision of care for patients during times of demand under routine operating conditions as well as in conditions where demand may be moderately increased.


2001 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 184-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Loretti ◽  
Xavier Leus ◽  
Bart Van Holsteijn

AbstractFor millions of people world-wide, surviving the pressure of extreme events is the predominant objective in daily existence. The distinction between natural and human-induced disasters is becoming more and more blurred. Some countries have known only armed conflict for the last 25 years, and their number is increasing. Recently, humanitarian sources reported 24 ongoing emergencies, each of them involving at least 300,000 people “requiring international assistance to avoid malnutrition or death”. All together, including the countries still only at risk and those emerging from armed conflicts, 73 countries, i.e., almost 1.8 trillion people, were undergoing differing degrees of instability.Instability must be envisioned as a spectrum extending between “Utopia” and “Chaos”. As emergencies bring forward extreme challenges to human life, medical and public health ethics make it imperative for the World Health Organisation (WHO) to be involved. As such, WHO must enhance its presence and effectiveness in its capacity as a universally accepted advocate for public health. Furthermore, as crises become more enmeshed with the legitimacy of the State, and armed conflicts become more directed against countries' social capital, they impinge more on WHO's work, and WHO must reconcile its unique responsibility in the health sector, the humanitarian imperative and the mandate to assist its primary constituents.Health can be viewed as a bridge to peace. The Organization specifically has recognised that disasters can and do affect the achievement of health and health system objectives. Within WHO, the Department of Emergency and Humanitarian Action (EHA) is the instrument for intervention in such situations. The scope of EHA is defined in terms of humanitarian action, emergency preparedness, national capacity building, and advocacy for humanitarian ^principles. The WHO's role is changing from ensuring a two-way flow of information on new scientific developments in public health in the ideal all-stable, all-equitable, well-resourced state, to dealing with sheer survival when the state is shattered or is part of the problem. The WHO poses itself the explicit goals to reduce avoidable loss of life, burden of disease and disability in emergencies and post-crisis transitions, and to ensure that the Humanitarian Health Assistance is in-line with international standards and local priorities and does not compromise future health development. A planning tree is presented.The World Health Organization must improve its own performance. This requires three key pre-conditions: 1) presence, 2) surge capacity, and 3) institutional support, knowledge, and competencies. Thus, in order to be effective, WHO's presence and surge capacity in emergencies must integrate the institutional knowledge, the competencies, and the managerial set-up of the Organization.


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