It's the Thought that Counts: The Ironic Effects of Intentions on Compensatory Reasoning

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Newman ◽  
Ravi Dhar
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
pp. 101579
Author(s):  
Charlotte J. Hagerman ◽  
Michelle L. Stock ◽  
Ellen W. Yeung ◽  
Susan Persky ◽  
Janine B. Beekman

2002 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 306-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy R. Dugdale ◽  
Robert C. Eklund

Two studies grounded in ironic-cognitive-processing theory were conducted to determine (a) whether ironic errors may be associated with efforts to exert mental control that typically occur in sport settings and (b) whether these potential ironic effects could be negated through the use of a task-relevant cue word to refocus one’s thoughts during suppression. Participants were asked to watch a videotape of a series of clips of Australian Rules Football players, coaches, and umpires. Study 1 revealed that participants were more aware of umpires when instructed not to pay attention to them. Contrary to expectations, however, ironic effects were not significantly magnified by the combination of high cognitive load and the instruction not to pay attention to the umpires. Results from Study 2 indicated that potential ironic effects could be negated when individuals were given a task-relevant cue word to focus on when suppressing unwanted or negative thoughts. Overall, support for ironic processing theory was found in Studies 1 and 2 in this investigation.


2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (12) ◽  
pp. 1472-1477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Legault ◽  
Jennifer N. Gutsell ◽  
Michael Inzlicht

Although prejudice-reduction policies and interventions abound, is it possible that some of them result in the precise opposite of their intended effect—an increase in prejudice? We examined this question by exploring the impact of motivation-based prejudice-reduction interventions and assessing whether certain popular practices might in fact increase prejudice. In two experiments, participants received detailed information on, or were primed with, the goal of prejudice reduction; the information and primes either encouraged autonomous motivation to regulate prejudice or emphasized the societal requirement to control prejudice. Ironically, motivating people to reduce prejudice by emphasizing external control produced more explicit and implicit prejudice than did not intervening at all. Conversely, participants in whom autonomous motivation to regulate prejudice was induced displayed less explicit and implicit prejudice compared with no-treatment control participants. We outline strategies for effectively reducing prejudice and discuss the detrimental consequences of enforcing antiprejudice standards.


2010 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marieke A. Adriaanse ◽  
Johanna M. F. van Oosten ◽  
Denise T. D. de Ridder ◽  
John B. F. de Wit ◽  
Catharine Evers

2012 ◽  
Vol 35 (6) ◽  
pp. 411-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Dixon ◽  
Mark Levine ◽  
Steve Reicher ◽  
Kevin Durrheim

AbstractFor most of the history of prejudice research, negativity has been treated as its emotional and cognitive signature, a conception that continues to dominate work on the topic. By this definition, prejudice occurs when we dislike or derogate members of other groups. Recent research, however, has highlighted the need for a more nuanced and “inclusive” (Eagly 2004) perspective on the role of intergroup emotions and beliefs in sustaining discrimination. On the one hand, several independent lines of research have shown that unequal intergroup relations are often marked by attitudinal complexity, with positive responses such as affection and admiration mingling with negative responses such as contempt and resentment. Simple antipathy is the exception rather than the rule. On the other hand, there is mounting evidence that nurturing bonds of affection between the advantaged and the disadvantaged sometimes entrenches rather than disrupts wider patterns of discrimination. Notably, prejudice reduction interventions may have ironic effects on the political attitudes of the historically disadvantaged, decreasing their perceptions of injustice and willingness to engage in collective action to transform social inequalities.These developments raise a number of important questions. Has the time come to challenge the assumption that negative evaluations are inevitably the cognitive and affective hallmarks of discrimination? Is the orthodox concept of prejudice in danger of side-tracking, if not obstructing, progress towards social justice in a fuller sense? What are the prospects for reconciling a prejudice reduction model of change, designed to get people to like one another more, with a collective action model of change, designed to ignite struggles to achieve intergroup equality?


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