Thought insertion and inner speech

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agustin Vicente
Keyword(s):  
Inner Speech ◽  
Thought Insertion

Voice of God, Sound of Self

2020 ◽  
pp. 49-76
Author(s):  
Robert N. McCauley ◽  
George Graham
Keyword(s):  
Speech Acts ◽  
Source Monitoring ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Inner Speech ◽  
Cognitive Systems ◽  
Linguistic Processing ◽  
Thought Insertion ◽  
Religious Rituals ◽  
External Agents ◽  
The Voice

Humans are biologically evolved to identify sources of their own conscious experience and to distinguish between private inner speech and speech acts of external agents. So how are we to explain exceptions to our success in this capacity? How, in particular, can we account for hallucination of the voice of God? The chapter explores the question in detail. It distinguishes between hallucinations that result from religiously undomesticated breakdowns of source monitoring, in, say, schizophrenia, and those that are parts of culturally standard religious rituals and practices. The chapter identifies a range of cognitive systems that are connected with source monitoring and active in hallucination. These include, among others, theory of mind and linguistic processing systems. The chapter compares and contrasts hallucination of God’s voice with self-attribution of God’s thought in a delusion of thought insertion.

Effect of Font Style on the Volume of Inner Speech

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan R. Wagge ◽  
Shawnalee Criss ◽  
Rebekah Sewing
Keyword(s):  
Inner Speech

Self-Reported Frequency, Content, and Functions of Inner Speech

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alain Morin ◽  
Bob Uttl ◽  
Breanne Hamper
Keyword(s):  
Inner Speech ◽  
Frequency Content

Some thoughts on lexemes, the dome, and inner speech

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
William Benzon
Keyword(s):  
Language Development ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Cognitive Structure ◽  
External World ◽  
Inner Speech ◽  
Neural Systems ◽  
The Common

Sydney Lamb’s model focuses our attention on the physicality of language, of the signs themselves as objects in the external world and the neural systems the support them. By means of the metaphor of a cognitive dome, he demonstrates that there is no firm line between linguistic and cognitive structure. In this context, I offer physically grounded accounts of Jakobson’s metalingual and emotive functions. Drawing on Vygotsky’s account of language development, I point out that inner speech, corresponding to the common sense notion of thought, originates in a circuit that goes through the external world and is then internalized.

Social-Emotional Problems in Deaf and Hard-of-Hearing Children from an Executive and Theory-of-Mind Perspective

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Constance Th. W. M. Vissers ◽  
Daan Hermans
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Executive Functioning ◽  
Children And Adolescents ◽  
Hard Of Hearing ◽  
Cognitive Model ◽  
Emotional Problems ◽  
Inner Speech ◽  
Social Emotional Development ◽  
Social Emotional ◽  
Hearing Children

The implications of a hearing loss can go far beyond the linguistic domain. Several studies have revealed that deaf and hard-of-hearing children are at risk in their social-emotional development. This chapter argues that executive functions and theory of mind are two central underlying cognitive factors in people’s social-emotional functioning. We briefly review what is currently known about executive functioning and theory-of-mind development in deaf and hard-of-hearing children and adolescents and then present a cognitive model with a central role for inner speech in relation to executive functioning and theory of mind. We hypothesize that inner speech both enables and urges the regulation of oneself (executive function) and also the mentalization of one’s own and others’ inner worlds (theory of mind). We discuss the implications for assessing and treating social-emotional problems in deaf and hard-of-hearing children and adolescents.

Activity, Agency, and Inner Speech Pathology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauren Swiney
Keyword(s):  
Motor Control ◽  
Sensory Input ◽  
The Other ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Inner Speech ◽  
Speech Pathology ◽  
Active Inference ◽  
Comparator Hypothesis

Over the last thirty years the comparator hypothesis has emerged as a prominent account of inner speech pathology. This chapter discusses a number of cognitive accounts broadly derived from this approach, highlighting the existence of two importantly distinct notions of inner speech in the literature; one as a prediction in the absence of sensory input, the other as an act with sensory consequences that are themselves predicted. Under earlier frameworks in which inner speech is described in the context of classic models of motor control, I argue that these two notions may be compatible, providing two routes to inner speech pathology. Under more recent accounts grounded in the architecture of Bayesian predictive processing, I argue that “active inference” approaches to action generation pose serious challenges to the plausibility of the latter notion of inner speech, while providing the former notion with rich explanatory possibilities for inner speech pathology.

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