Are You Rich Enough to Eat Organic? Moral Judgments Depend on the Income of the Target

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jenny Olson ◽  
Brent McFerran ◽  
Andrea Morales ◽  
Darren Dahl
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgments

Cautiously optimistic rationalism may not be cautious enough

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin F. Landy
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Judgments

Abstract May expresses optimism about the source, content, and consequences of moral judgments. However, even if we are optimistic about their source (i.e., reasoning), some pessimism is warranted about their content, and therefore their consequences. Good reasoners can attain moral knowledge, but evidence suggests that most people are not good reasoners, which implies that most people do not attain moral knowledge.

Neuroscience and Ethics

2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Matthew Liao
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Joshua Greene

Abstract. A number of people believe that results from neuroscience have the potential to settle seemingly intractable debates concerning the nature, practice, and reliability of moral judgments. In particular, Joshua Greene has argued that evidence from neuroscience can be used to advance the long-standing debate between consequentialism and deontology. This paper first argues that charitably interpreted, Greene’s neuroscientific evidence can contribute to substantive ethical discussions by being part of an epistemic debunking argument. It then argues that taken as an epistemic debunking argument, Greene’s argument falls short in undermining deontological judgments. Lastly, it proposes that accepting Greene’s methodology at face value, neuroimaging results may in fact call into question the reliability of consequentialist judgments. The upshot is that Greene’s empirical results do not undermine deontology and that Greene’s project points toward a way by which empirical evidence such as neuroscientific evidence can play a role in normative debates.

Why People With High Alexithymia Make More Utilitarian Judgments

2020 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-30
Author(s):  
Xiangyi Zhang ◽  
Zhihui Wu ◽  
Shenglan Li ◽  
Ji Lai ◽  
Meng Han ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Empathic Concern ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Affective Processing ◽  
Process Dissociation ◽  
The Difference

Abstract. Although recent studies have investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments, such an effect remains elusive. Furthermore, moral judgments have been conflated with the moral inclinations underlying those judgments in previous studies. Using a process dissociation approach to independently quantify the strength of utilitarian and deontological inclinations, the present study investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments. We found that deontological inclinations were significantly lower in the high alexithymia group than in the low alexithymia group, whereas the difference in the utilitarian inclinations between the two groups was nonsignificant. Furthermore, empathic concern and deontological inclinations mediated the association between alexithymia and conventional relative judgments (i.e., more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments), showing that people with high alexithymia have low empathic concern, which, in turn, decreases deontological inclinations and contributes to conventional relative judgments. These findings underscore the importance of empathy and deontological inclinations in moral judgments and indicate that individuals with high alexithymia make more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments possibly due to a deficit in affective processing.

Do emotions underlie children's moral judgments?

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deena Skolnick Weisberg ◽  
Alan M. Leslie
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgments

Impurity of the soul, disgust, and moral judgments of suicide

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Rottman ◽  
Deborah Kelemen ◽  
Liane Young
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgments

Modifying response bias in moral judgments

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Derbyshire ◽  
Jessica Schofield ◽  
Nina Powell
Keyword(s):  
Response Bias ◽  
Moral Judgments

Framing Morality: How Antecedent-Focused Strategies Can Shape Moral Judgments

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Kappes ◽  
Jay Joseph Van Bavel
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Emotional Reactions ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Process Dissociation ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
First Response ◽  
High Conflict

From moral philosophy to programming driverless cars, scholars have long been interested in how to shape moral decision-making. We examine how framing can impact moral judgments either by shaping which emotional reactions are evoked in a situation (antecedent-focused) or by changing how people respond to their emotional reactions (response-focused). In three experiments, we manipulated the framing of a moral decision-making task before participants judged a series of moral dilemmas. Participants encouraged to go “with their first” response beforehand favored emotion-driven judgments on high-conflict moral dilemmas. In contrast, participants who were instructed to give a “thoughtful” response beforehand or who did not receive instructions on how to approach the dilemmas favored reason-driven judgments. There was no difference in response-focused control during moral judgements. Process-dissociation confirmed that people instructed to go with their first response had stronger emotion-driven intuitions than other conditions. Our results suggest that task framing can alter moral intuitions.

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