Weaving yarns into good psychological science education

Can Science Explain the Human Mind? Intuitive Judgments About the Limits of Science

Psychological Science ◽

10.1177/0956797617722609 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 29 (1) ◽

pp. 121-130 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Sara Gottlieb ◽

Tania Lombrozo

Keyword(s):

Science Education ◽

Religious Belief ◽

Human Mind ◽

The Public ◽

Science Education Policy ◽

Scientific Explanations ◽

Psychological Phenomena ◽

Psychological Science ◽

Intuitive Judgments ◽

Conscious Will

Can science explain romantic love, morality, and religious belief? We documented intuitive beliefs about the limits of science in explaining the human mind. We considered both epistemic evaluations (concerning whether science could possibly fully explain a given psychological phenomenon) and nonepistemic judgments (concerning whether scientific explanations for a given phenomenon would generate discomfort), and we identified factors that characterize phenomena judged to fall beyond the scope of science. Across six studies, we found that participants were more likely to judge scientific explanations for psychological phenomena to be impossible and uncomfortable when, among other factors, they support first-person, introspective access (e.g., feeling empathetic as opposed to reaching for objects), contribute to making humans exceptional (e.g., appreciating music as opposed to forgetfulness), and involve conscious will (e.g., acting immorally as opposed to having headaches). These judgments about the scope of science have implications for science education, policy, and the public reception of psychological science.

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実証的研究の事前登録の現状と実践 —OSF事前登録チュートリアル—

10.31234/osf.io/kvgyc ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Ryuju Hasegawa ◽

Kanae Tada ◽

Fumiya Yonemitsu ◽

Ayumi Ikeda ◽

Yuki Yamada ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Science Education ◽

Practical Experience ◽

Psychological Research ◽

Open Science ◽

Psychological Science ◽

Supplementary Material ◽

Crisis In Psychology ◽

Science Framework

In the midst of the current reproducibility crisis in psychology, pre-registration is considered a remedy to increase the reliability of psychological research. However, as pre-registration is an unconventional practice for most psychological researchers, they find it difficult to introduce pre-registration into their studies. In order to promote pre-registration, this article provides a detailed and practical step-by-step tutorial for beginners on pre-registration with the Open Science Framework. Furthermore, a typical example of the practical experience of beginners and its revisions are provided as supplementary material. Finally, we discuss various issues related to pre-registration, such as transparent research, registered reports, preprints, and open science education. We hope that this article will contribute to the improvement of reproducible psychological science in Japan.

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An Interesting Career in Psychological Science: Education Researcher at Non-profit Organizations

PsycEXTRA Dataset ◽

10.1037/e554752011-006 ◽

2010 ◽

Author(s):

Ellen Mandinach

Keyword(s):

Science Education ◽

Non Profit ◽

Psychological Science ◽

Education Researcher ◽

Non Profit Organizations

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A pragmatist philosophy of psychological science and its implications for replication

Behavioral and Brain Sciences ◽

10.1017/s0140525x18000626 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 41 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Ana Gantman ◽

Robin Gomila ◽

Joel E. Martinez ◽

J. Nathan Matias ◽

Elizabeth Levy Paluck ◽

...

Keyword(s):

William James ◽

Mental Processes ◽

Psychological Science ◽

Behavioral Measurement ◽

The World ◽

Pragmatist Philosophy

AbstractA pragmatist philosophy of psychological science offers to the direct replication debate concrete recommendations and novel benefits that are not discussed in Zwaan et al. This philosophy guides our work as field experimentalists interested in behavioral measurement. Furthermore, all psychologists can relate to its ultimate aim set out by William James: to study mental processes that provide explanations for why people behave as they do in the world.

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Replications can cause distorted belief in scientific progress

Behavioral and Brain Sciences ◽

10.1017/s0140525x18000584 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 41 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Michał Białek

Keyword(s):

Real World ◽

Scientific Progress ◽

The Public ◽

Psychological Science

AbstractIf we want psychological science to have a meaningful real-world impact, it has to be trusted by the public. Scientific progress is noisy; accordingly, replications sometimes fail even for true findings. We need to communicate the acceptability of uncertainty to the public and our peers, to prevent psychology from being perceived as having nothing to say about reality.

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Values in Psychological Science

10.1017/9781316471302 ◽

2018 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Lisa Osbeck

Keyword(s):

Psychological Science

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Translocation Relative to Range

Methodology ◽

10.1027/1614-2241.4.3.132 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 4 (3) ◽

pp. 132-138 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Michael Höfler

Keyword(s):

Risk Difference ◽

Binary Outcomes ◽

Number Needed To Treat ◽

Likert Scales ◽

Psychological Science ◽

The Absolute ◽

The Difference ◽

Variance Parameters ◽

Standardized Index ◽

Maximum Possible Magnitude

A standardized index for effect intensity, the translocation relative to range (TRR), is discussed. TRR is defined as the difference between the expectations of an outcome under two conditions (the absolute increment) divided by the maximum possible amount for that difference. TRR measures the shift caused by a factor relative to the maximum possible magnitude of that shift. For binary outcomes, TRR simply equals the risk difference, also known as the inverse number needed to treat. TRR ranges from –1 to 1 but is – unlike a correlation coefficient – a measure for effect intensity, because it does not rely on variance parameters in a certain population as do effect size measures (e.g., correlations, Cohens d). However, the use of TRR is restricted on outcomes with fixed and meaningful endpoints given, for instance, for meaningful psychological questionnaires or Likert scales. The use of TRR vs. Cohens d is illustrated with three examples from Psychological Science 2006 (issues 5 through 8). It is argued that, whenever TRR applies, it should complement Cohens d to avoid the problems related to the latter. In any case, the absolute increment should complement d.

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