Spatial Perception During Joint Action: The "Other" as Potential Perturbation

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Kenning ◽  
J. Scott Jordan ◽  
Cooper Cutting ◽  
Jim Clinton ◽  
Justin Durtschi
2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Pettit

Abstract Michael Tomasello explains the human sense of obligation by the role it plays in negotiating practices of acting jointly and the commitments they underwrite. He draws in his work on two models of joint action, one from Michael Bratman, the other from Margaret Gilbert. But Bratman's makes the explanation too difficult to succeed, and Gilbert's makes it too easy.


2005 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. MARK SMITH

From the late thirteenth to the early seventeenth century, the process of visual imaging was understood in the Latin West as an essentially subjective act initiated by the eye and completed by the brain. The crystalline lens took center stage in this act, its role determined by its peculiar physical and sensitive capacities. As a physical body, on the one hand, it was disposed to accept the physical impressions of light and color radiating to it from external objects. As a sensitive body, on the other hand, it was enabled by the visual spirit flowing to it from the brain to feel those impressions visually. Acting as a sentient selector of visual information, the lens transformed the brute physical impressions of light and color into visual impressions. These, in turn, gave rise to perceptual “depictions” that were passed back along the stream of visual spirits to the brain. Known in Scholastic parlance as “intentional species,” these depictions served as virtual representations of their generating objects. As such, they provided the wherewithal not only for perception, but also for conception and cognition.


2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 338-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni Pezzulo ◽  
Pierpaolo Iodice ◽  
Francesco Donnarumma ◽  
Haris Dindo ◽  
Günther Knoblich

Using a lifting and balancing task, we contrasted two alternative views of planning joint actions: one postulating that joint action involves distinct predictions for self and other, the other postulating that joint action involves coordinated plans between the coactors and reuse of bimanual models. We compared compensatory movements required to keep a tray balanced when 2 participants lifted glasses from each other’s trays at the same time (simultaneous joint action) and when they took turns lifting (sequential joint action). Compared with sequential joint action, simultaneous joint action made it easier to keep the tray balanced. Thus, in keeping with the view that bimanual models are reused for joint action, predicting the timing of their own lifting action helped participants compensate for another person’s lifting action. These results raise the possibility that simultaneous joint actions do not necessarily require distinguishing between one’s own and the coactor’s contributions to the action plan and may afford an agent-neutral stance.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryszard F. Sadowski

AbstractThis article presents religion’s potential where the promotion and implementation of the concept of sustainable development are concerned. First inspired by Lynn White in the 1960s, discussion on religion’s role in the ecological crisis now allows for an honest assessment of the ecological potential of various religious traditions and their contribution to the building of a sustainable world. This article on the one hand points to the religious inspirations behind the concept of sustainable development, and on the other highlights the joint action of representatives of religion and science in the name of sustainable development, as well as the involvement of religions in the concept’s implementation.


1997 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 750-751
Author(s):  
J. Scott Jordan

Ballard et al. model eye position as a deictic pointer for spatial perception. Evidence from research on gaze control indicates, however, that shifts in actual eye position are neither necessary nor sufficient to produce shifts in spatial perception. Deictic context is instead provided by the interaction between two deictic pointers; one representing actual eye position, and the other, intended eye position.


1992 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-229
Author(s):  
Frederic Schick
Keyword(s):  

In a conflict between two people, one person wants one thing and the other wants something else and they think they can't both have what they want. Suppose that what they want can only be the outcome of some joint action. Adam must do either y or z and Eve either y' or z' – here y-and-y' would be one joint action, y-and-z' would be another, and so on. Adam wants the outcome of his doing z while Eve is doing y'. Eve wants the outcome of her doing z' while Adam is doing y. Each thinks that these outcomes can't both be had.


2012 ◽  
Vol 109 (38) ◽  
pp. 15191-15196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malini Suchak ◽  
Frans B. M. de Waal

The debate about the origins of human prosociality has focused on the presence or absence of similar tendencies in other species, and, recently, attention has turned to the underlying mechanisms. We investigated whether direct reciprocity could promote prosocial behavior in brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Twelve capuchins tested in pairs could choose between two tokens, with one being “prosocial” in that it rewarded both individuals (i.e., 1/1), and the other being “selfish” in that it rewarded the chooser only (i.e., 1/0). Each monkey’s choices with a familiar partner from their own group was compared with choices when paired with a partner from a different group. Capuchins were spontaneously prosocial, selecting the prosocial option at the same rate regardless of whether they were paired with an in-group or out-group partner. This indicates that interaction outside of the experimental setting played no role. When the paradigm was changed, such that both partners alternated making choices, prosocial preference significantly increased, leading to mutualistic payoffs. As no contingency could be detected between an individual’s choice and their partner’s previous choice, and choices occurred in rapid succession, reciprocity seemed of a relatively vague nature akin to mutualism. Having the partner receive a better reward than the chooser (i.e., 1/2) during the alternating condition increased the payoffs of mutual prosociality, and prosocial choice increased accordingly. The outcome of several controls made it hard to explain these results on the basis of reward distribution or learned preferences, and rather suggested that joint action promotes prosociality, resulting in so-called attitudinal reciprocity.


2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfram Nitsch

Verkehrsmittel lassen sich als Medien betrachten, die auf die Wahrnehmung des Raums einwirken, aber auch als Milieus, die bestimmte Formen sozialer Interaktion erzeugen. Um beide Perspektiven aufeinander zu beziehen, umreißt der Beitrag eine Topologie der Fahrzeuge anhand von Stadttexten aus der französischen Literatur der Gegenwart. Aus deren eingehender Darstellung bestimmter Verkehrsmittel geht hervor, dass literarische Texte nicht allein fahrzeugspezifische Weisen der Raumerfahrung entziffern, sondern darüber hinaus auch in Auseinandersetzung mit einer überkommenen Transportkultur originelle Praktiken des Fahrzeuggebrauchs ersinnen. </br></br>On the one hand, means of transport can be considered as media which shape the perception of space; on the other, they can be considered as milieus which produce certain forms of social interaction. In order to relate both perspectives to each other, the present contribution outlines a topology of vehicles, drawing upon contemporary French literature set in cities. Their detailed representation of certain means of transport shows that literary texts not only decipher modes of spatial perception that are specific to certain vehicles, but also devise new ways of using vehicles through their involvement with an outdated culture of transport.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 182-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noomi Matthiesen ◽  
Jacob Klitmøller

It is a notion often taken for granted in contemporary Western everyday life that there is an intimate connection between empathy and moral action. Yet, in recent years, this connection has come under scrutiny. In this article, we first ask the question, “What is empathy?” A brief survey of the psychological and philosophical approaches to the notion of empathy shows that it remains a highly contested concept. The field has a propensity to discuss empathy within the frame of sameness. We instead argue that, in order to grasp empathy, it is necessary to foreground otherness. Drawing on Hannah Arendt, we further argue that, when encountering the stranger, moral action requires both visiting the other—as distinct from empathic knowledge—and thinking in order to judge what is right. Ultimately, moral dilemmas are solved, not by having or demanding empathy, but by addressing the issues at hand in joint action.


PMLA ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 131 (2) ◽  
pp. 469-479
Author(s):  
Claudia Brodsky

Try as we might, kant conclusively explains in his “exposition” of “space” in the critique of pure reason's “transcendental Analytic”—the opening section of that inaugural work, in which Kant demonstrates the fundamental, “practical” necessity of its guiding, “theoretical” premises—we cannot imagine, let alone perceive, any external “matter” or object without first representing it to ourselves as occupying space. Objects are individual, distinct, exactly because they are material—whether empirically experienced or merely imagined as such—and the always impure, partly intellectual, partly empirical basis of their apprehension indicates that objects cannot themselves be the basis of their spatial perception by us. A less “philosophically” descriptive, somewhat more contemporary, but certainly contemporarily more recognizable analysis of the same intellectual procedure may be recognized in Marx's upending account of the things we perceive and value as “commodities.” As on Marx's analogous terms, “commodities form the presupposition” of the “circulation” of “values” (that “produces exchange value”) and not the other way around, and thus have “constantly … to be thrown into [circulation] anew from the outside, like fuel into a fire,” so no number and variety of objects or quantity and quality of the general object we call “matter” could ever suffice to account for space, the indispensable basis of their own conception as phenomenal, material objects (Grundrisse 254-55). While Kant deduced that no knowledge, and no possible access to knowledge, would result from the solipsistic wish to make space itself an object of spatial perception—or, for that matter, of pure (immaterial) speculation, that is, the wish to spatialize or idealize a “real,” or nonperceptual, reality of space—Marx deduced, conversely, that, without “standing in any connection to [the] commodities” that “mediate” it, “circulation” itself—the basis of valuation—would “flicker out in indifference,” “d[ying] out with money” or, rather, taking money along with it, destroying the abstracted “economic existence” of this essential while “non-substantial form of wealth” precisely by reducing it to an object “with only its metallic existence left over” (255).


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document